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1Introduction
2 CHAPTER 1
1.1 Price dispersion
According to the classical paper by Bertrand (1883) in a world with perfect information and
without transaction costs, the price for a homogeneous good sold by firms with identical costs
and no capacity constraints will converge to the Walrasian price, even if there is a finite number
of firms. As explained by Bertrand (1883), if firms set prices, each firm can simply conquer
the whole market by setting a slightly lower price than the prices of the rivals. As a result
each rationally behaving firm will try to undercut the price of its competitors. This process
will continue until the price is equal to marginal cost as a further lowering of the price would
yield negative profits. The unique Nash Equilibrium is such that each firm sets a price equal to
marginal cost.
The ease with which one can find two stores that charge different prices for similar products
shows that this ‘law of one price’ does not hold in general. Instead, price dispersion seems
to be the rule in real-world markets. Over the years economists have come up with several
explanations for these observed differences in prices. A first explanation is that instead of what
is assumed by Bertrand (1883) in reality it is often the case that there is spatial differentiation
or that goods differ in terms of their characteristics. If consumers have different tastes for these
characteristics, goods are no longer perfect substitutes and this will give firms market power.
As a result there are less incentives for firms to undercut each other and goods might be offered
at different prices.
What is intriguing is that also in markets where the goods and the firms are seemingly
identical, price dispersion is observed. If we purely focus on the firm side, in such a situation
there are clear incentives for firms to undercut their competitors. However, if instead of what is
assumed by Bertrand (1883) consumers have imperfect information, the incentives to undercut
each other weaken. In recent empirical work this line of thought is being followed to explain
price differences for seemingly homogeneous goods. The idea is that, due to search frictions
some consumers do not compare prices, which allows firms to set a higher price than in a
frictionless economy. Firms might then set different prices to either maximize surplus from
consumers who do not compare prices, by setting a high price, or to maximize surplus from
price comparing consumers, by setting a low price. As a result, price dispersion emerges.
Notice that if goods are identical, but the firms are different in their marginal costs, price
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dispersion might also emerge, but only in combination with search frictions. The idea is that
without search frictions firms with higher marginal cost than their competitors cannot survive,
because they can never set prices as low as their competitors without making a loss. If the goods
are identical, consumers will simply buy from the lowest priced firm, which is the firm with the
lowest marginal cost. However, if marginal cost differences coexist with search frictions also
the firms with higher marginal cost might survive, by catering the consumers with high search
costs.
Although product differentiation, uncertainty in demand and capacity constraints might also
act as sources of price dispersion, this thesis will focus on search frictions as an important
determinant of price variation. Nevertheless, the framework will be extended to include vertical
product differentiation as well in the last essay of this book. Of course, this does not mean that
uncertainty in demand and capacity constraints are not important sources of price dispersion.
In some markets capacity constraints will be an important contributor or maybe even the most
important source of price dispersion. This means that the models described in this thesis will
be less applicable to those markets.
Existing consumer search models have showed that the way search frictions influence mar-
kets may depend on how search costs are distributed among consumers. For example, in the
sequential search model of Stahl (1989), if search costs are high mean prices remain constant
if a merger occurs, while otherwise mean prices will fall.1 In addition, in the nonsequential
search model of Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) whether a merger leads to higher or to
lower mean prices depends on the height of search costs. More in general, this implies that
for a sound assessment of the price and welfare effects of competition policy measures such as
the increase of a sales tax, the softening of barriers to entry or the imposition of a price cap,
one needs to have knowledge about supply and demand parameters, including the search cost
distribution. For this, one could simply assume some search cost distribution, but given the de-
pendence of the results on the exact shape of the search cost distribution, without having some
good estimates this exercise might lead to misleading conclusions.
The purpose of this thesis is to come up with methods to estimate consumer search models,
using a limited amount of data. This thesis is part of a relatively new strain of the consumer
search literature that uses the structure of search models to identify and estimate search cost
1See also Chapter 4 of this thesis.
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distributions. It builds on existing theoretical and empirical work; the next section discusses
this literature, focussing on the most relevant theoretical and empirical contributions.2
1.2 Consumer search literature
Starting from the seminal article of Stigler (1961), economists have put much effort in trying to
understand the nature of price dispersion. In the theoretical literature the initial goal was to find
a rationale for price dispersion as an equilibrium outcome. Although Stigler (1961) succeeded
in giving this rationale using a search-theoretic approach, his model was criticized because it
focussed only on the consumer side. The distribution of prices was taken as exogenous and
not based on optimal firm price setting behavior. Diamond (1971) showed that when firms are
also optimizing, positive search costs lead to a unique equilibrium where all firms charge the
monopoly price. This result became known as the Diamond Paradox because even though there
is a continuum of identical firms in his model, search frictions lead to monopoly pricing and not
to the competitive outcome. From that moment on the theoretical literature was concerned with
finding ways to overcome this striking result.
One of the first papers that shows that price dispersion can arise as an equilibrium outcome
with both firms and consumers optimizing is Reinganum (1979). In this paper there is a con-
tinuum of firms with heterogenous costs, selling a good to consumers who search sequentially
for prices. Reinganum (1979) proves that an equilibrium with price dispersion arises as long
as consumers hold elastic demands. Although consumers have to search for prices, because
in equilibrium each firm will set a constant markup over its marginal cost, the source of price
dispersion is marginal cost heterogeneity.
In a model with homogenous firms, Stahl (1989) shows price dispersion can also be a result
of search cost heterogeneity only. As in Reinganum (1979) consumers search sequentially, but
in Stahl (1989) some consumers search costlessly, while others have positive search costs. The
equilibrium is in mixed strategies: firms try to attract both types of consumers by randomizing
their prices. Moreover, consumers with positive search costs do not search.
Burdett and Judd (1983) show that in order to have price dispersion as an equilibrium out-
come, it is not necessary to have any ex-ante heterogeneity whatsoever. Burdett and Judd (1983)
2For a more extended overview of the existing literature on consumer search, see Baye et al. (2006).
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assume that consumers search nonsequentially, that is, consumers determine before they start
searching how many times to search. As in Stahl (1989), depending on the height of the search
cost of consumers, it might be optimal for firms to randomize their prices. For consumers it
might then be optimal to randomize between searching once and twice.
More recent theory papers focus on the relation between market characteristics, prices and
price dispersion. For example, Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) study an oligopolistic
version of Burdett and Judd (1983) with a two-type distribution of consumers. Comparative
statics with respect to the number of firms show that equilibrium prices, price dispersion and
welfare depend on the height of the search cost of consumers.
The empirical work focussed initially on documenting to what extent price dispersion is
observed in real world markets. Stigler (1961) already gave some examples on price dispersion;
he found that the coefficient of variation for Chevrolets in the Chicago area was 1.72, while
that for anthracite coal delivered in Washington was around 6.8. The more systematic approach
of Pratt et al. (1979) showed that there was also substantial price dispersion for 39 randomly
chosen products from the Yellow Pages in the Boston Area.
While the earlier empirical work focused mainly on documenting price dispersion, later
empirical work tried to test some of the comparative statics results of search models directly.
Although Stigler (1961) and Pratt et al. (1979) already identified a relation between price dis-
persion and the benefits of search by comparing price dispersion for cheap versus expensive
items, Sorensen (2000) focused more directly on this relationship by studying price dispersion
in the market for prescription drugs. He finds substantial price differences and that price dis-
persion is inversely related to purchase frequency. The reason for this is that the consumers’
benefit per search is higher for frequently purchased drugs, leading to more search and lower
price dispersion.
With the onset of e-commerce in the nineties, the focus of empirical work shifted to the
relation between the cost of searching and price dispersion. The common hypothesis studied in
the large number of papers that appeared since then is that search cost of consumers shopping
online is lower than the cost of searching for consumers shopping in traditional markets. This
would imply that prices and price dispersion should be lower in online markets than in tradi-
tional ones; however, in general, the empirical results are quite mixed. Some papers find higher
price dispersion and prices online than in traditional stores, while others find that they are the
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same, or find an opposite relation. For instance, concerning price levels, Clay et al. (2001)
report that prices in online and traditional stores are similar. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) find
that there is no evidence that the Internet reduced prices before price comparison sites emerged
and proliferated. Finally, Bailey (1998) finds that online prices are higher than off-line ones for
books and CDs. On price dispersion, the effect of moving markets online seems to be ambigu-
ous empirically as well.
Theory search models can be divided in models that generate price dispersion as a result
of pure strategy equilibria (e.g., Reinganum, 1979) or as a result of mixed strategy equilibria
(e.g., Burdett and Judd, 1983; Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez, 2004; Stahl, 1989). Lach (2002)
explicitly studies whether price dispersion is in line with mixed strategy equilibria by studying
the persistence and the nature of price dispersion over time. If firms play a mixed strategy
equilibrium in prices, over time prices should fluctuate in a random fashion. Indeed, after
correcting for observed and unobserved firm heterogeneities, Lach (2002) finds prices in his
data set to be in line with random pricing strategies.
So far, surprisingly little attention has been given to quantifying search costs in real world
markets. This is an important omission, since it is known from the existing theory that the
predictions often depend on the shape of the search cost distribution. As a matter of fact,
the mixed results found in empirical papers comparing price dispersion online and off line
could be explained by the non-monotonic relation between search cost and price dispersion
often found in the theoretical literature on consumer search. In addition, to study the effects
of competition policy measures such as the increase of a sales tax, the softening of barriers
to entry or the imposition of a price cap, one needs to have knowledge about the search cost
distribution. Of course one could simply impose some search cost distribution to study the
effects of such measures, but given the sensitiveness of the results to the exact shape of the
search cost distribution, it is worth to study methods that give researchers and practitioners
good estimates of these distributions.
This thesis tries fill the gap in the empirical literature by providing methods to estimate
and identify consumer search costs. So far, in addition to this thesis, only two papers deal
with the estimation of consumer search models. Hong and Shum (2006) were the first to show
how to estimate search costs using only price data. Hong and Shum (2006) estimate both a
mixed strategy sequential search model, and a mixed strategy nonsequential search model. The
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estimation of the nonsequential search model is done nonparametrically while the alternative
model is estimated parametrically, although Hong and Shum (2006) show that if one is also in
the possession of data on the marginal cost of the firms, the sequential search model can also be
estimated nonparametrically. Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) show how to estimate search costs
in a pure strategy sequential search model that allows for vertical product differentiation, using
both price and quantity data. Given the importance of these two papers to the analysis of this
thesis, both papers will be discussed in more detail in later chapters of this thesis.
1.3 Structure of this thesis
This thesis consists of five essays on the structural estimation of consumer search models and
can be roughly divided into three parts. In the first two essays, I explain how to model, identify
and estimate nonsequential search models. The first essay presents a structural methodology to
estimate search cost distributions. The starting point is an oligopolistic version of the nonse-
quential search model presented in Hong and Shum (2006). The oligopoly assumption is useful
because it helps the researcher separate the variation in prices caused by variation in the number
of firms from that caused by variation in search costs. Using the equilibrium conditions derived
from the model, it is shown how to estimate the model by a maximum likelihood procedure.
The method is applied to a data set of online prices for different memory chips. The estimates
suggest that online consumers have either quite high or quite low search costs so they either
search exhaustively in the market or very little, for at most three prices. Search frictions con-
fer a significant amount of market power to the firms: despite that more than 20 firms operate
in each of the markets we study, price-cost margins are around 25%. Kolmogorov-Smirnov
goodness-of-fit tests suggest that the null hypothesis that the observed prices are generated by
the model cannot be rejected. This chapter also illustrates how the structural methodology can
be employed to simulate the effects of policy interventions.
The second essay goes more into the details of the identification of search costs using a
structural estimation approach. The model presented in the first essay is extended to a more
general framework where consumers not only differ in their costs of searching but also in their
valuations. It is shown that the search cost distribution cannot be identified nonparametrically
at all the points of its support when the econometrician observes prices from only one market.
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It is shown that this problem can be solved by studying a richer framework where the econome-
trician has price data from several markets with the same search cost distribution. To exploit the
common feature of the markets, it is proposed to estimate the search cost density function by
a semi-nonparametric (SNP) density estimator whose parameters maximize the joint likelihood
corresponding to all the markets. This essentially nonparametric approach can be used when
all consumers have identical valuations or when valuations differ but are not correlated with
search costs. When there is correlation between search costs and valuations, only parametric
identification obtains.
In the two subsequent essays I focus on the estimation of sequential search models. In the
third essay the paper of Stahl (1989) on oligopolistic pricing and sequential consumer search
is modified by relaxing the assumption that consumers obtain the first price quotation for free.
In the theory part of this chapter it is shown that when all price quotations are costly to obtain,
the unique symmetric equilibrium need not involve full consumer participation. The region of
parameters for which non-shoppers do not fully participate in the market becomes larger as the
number of shoppers decreases and/or the number of firms increases. The comparative statics
properties of this new type of equilibrium are interesting. In particular, expected price increases
as search cost decreases and is constant in the number of shoppers and in the number of firms.
Welfare falls as firms enter the market. It is shown that monopoly pricing never obtains with
truly costly search. In the empirical part of this chapter, using the equilibrium conditions derived
from the model, it is shown how to estimate the model. The estimates show that the model does
not do very good in explaining observed pricing patterns. This is most likely related to the
outcome of the model that in equilibrium consumers either observe all prices or do not search,
which has a big impact on the flexibility of the model.
The fourth essay studies the identification and estimation of a more general sequential search
model. In order to make the setting empirically more meaningful, instead of having a two-
type distribution, consumers now draw their search cost from an atomless distribution with
the positive real line as support. It is shown that the search cost distribution can be identified
nonparametrically using only price data, even with data from only one market. The method is
applied to the same data set of prices for memory chips which was used in the first essay of
the thesis. A comparison of the estimates obtained from the two different models reveals that
estimated search costs are much higher with sequential search than with nonsequential search.
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Moreover, compared to the nonparametric estimation method of Hong and Shum (2006), search
costs are much higher.
Finally, in the last essay of this thesis, I extend the framework to include vertical product dif-
ferentiation as a source of price dispersion as well. In the unique symmetric equilibrium firms
with different characteristics draw utilities from a common utility distribution. Because the
firms differ in their characteristics, they use different price distributions. The model therefore
provides a theoretical rationale for explaining price dispersion as a result of quality differences
and search frictions together. Using the equilibrium conditions derived from the model, it is
shown how to separate the two effects from each other and how to estimate the model. A data
set on prices from Dutch supermarkets reveals that the amount of search has decreased over
the sampling period. Moreover, ignoring vertical product differentiation results in an overesti-
mation of search costs. Although used in a nonsequential search setting, the ideas can also be
applied to sequential search models.
The five essays provide a variety of models on consumer search behavior and the effects
of search frictions on pricing strategies of firms. Which model is the most appropriate to use
depends on the characteristics of the market under study and is up to the choice of the econo-
metrician. For example, the nonsequential search model might be more appropriate in markets
where the search outcome is observed with some delay, like in markets for labor, mortgages,
refurbishing services, etc. Also, the choice which model to estimate depends on what kind of
data is available. For example, compared to Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004), for estimation of
the vertical product differentiation model presented in the last essay of this thesis less data is
needed. However, the use of only price data comes at a cost, since the model presented here is
less general than the model presented in Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004). Therefore, if one has
both price and quantity data a model like the one presented in Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004)
might be the best choice.

2Estimation of a nonsequential search
model
NOTE: This chapter is based on Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2006).
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2.1 Introduction
As argued in Chapter 1, in spite of the considerable theoretical effort, somewhat surprisingly,
very little empirical work has focused on identifying and measuring search costs in real-world
markets. From an applied point of view, this is certainly an omission because the predictions of
the various theoretical models are quite sensitive to the height of the search cost in the market.1
Since competition policy recommendations may depend on the amount of search in an industry,
there is a need to develop methods to quantify search costs.
This essay presents methods to estimate a nonsequential search model. It builds on Hong
and Shum (2006), who present structural methodologies to retrieve information on search costs
in markets for homogeneous goods. Hong and Shum (2006) show that firm and consumer
equilibrium behavior imposes enough structure on the data to allow for the estimation of search
costs using only observed prices.
The nonsequential search model studied by Hong and Shum (2006) generalizes Burdett and
Judd (1983) seminal paper by introducing search cost heterogeneity. The market is operated by
a continuum of firms, which compete by setting prices. Consumers with heterogeneous search
costs search to discover prices and buy from the cheapest firm they observe. In equilibrium,
some consumers do not search whereas others do and this leads to price dispersion. Hong and
Shum formulate the estimation of the unknown search cost distribution as a two-step procedure.
They first estimate the parameters of the equilibrium price distribution by maximum empirical
likelihood (MEL). To do this, they exploit equilibrium behavior to obtain a (potentially infinitely
large) number of moment conditions. The estimates of the parameters of the price cdf give the
height of the search cost distribution evaluated at a series of cut-off points. In the second step,
these cut-off points are estimated directly from the empirical cdf of prices. This method is
interesting but it requires to solve a highly dimensional optimization problem, which is compu-
tationally quite demanding. Indeed, in practice, only a few parameters of the price distribution
can be estimated; without a priori good information about search costs, discarding parameters
has the problem of introducing biases in the estimates.2
1See e.g. Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) for the influence of the height of the search cost on equilibrium
search intensity and market performance.
2For example, in the empirical examples presented in Hong and Shum (2006) low search cost consumers are
ignored because the number of searches a consumer can make is (artificially, by the econometrician) limited.
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In this chapter we present an alternative way, by maximum likelihood (ML), to estimate
an oligopoly version of the nonsequential search model of Burdett and Judd (1983). We first
estimate the parameters of the price distribution byML. To do this, we compute the likelihood of
a price as a function of the distribution of prices and exploit the equilibrium constancy-of-profits
condition to numerically calculate the value of the price cdf. Once we obtain a ML-estimate of
the price distribution, we introduce a method to calculate the cut-off points of the search cost
distribution as a function of the ML estimate of the price cdf. In this way, by the invariance
property of ML estimation, the estimates of the cut-off points of the search cost distribution are
also ML so the asymptotic theory for computing standard errors of and for conducting tests of
hypotheses on the estimates of the search cost distribution remains standard. In addition, our
method is relatively easy to implement in practice and we have not observed any numerical
difficulties.
The model we study is an oligopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983). Vis-a`-vis the
competitive case studied by Hong and Shum (2006), the oligopoly model has the advantage that
it captures variation in prices that is due to variation in the number of competitors; this makes
our model useful for the study of competition policy issues. If the econometrician knows there
are N firms operating in a market then he/she knows consumers will search up to a maximum
of N prices. As a result, independently of the number of prices the econometrician actually
observes, we can estimate the relevant number of parameters of the price distribution. In this
way we learn about the distribution of search costs at all relevant quantiles. In particular, we
find out how much search is conducted by consumers who search thoroughly and how low their
search costs are.3
To estimate the parameters of the price distribution, all we need is to observe the prices
firms charge over some period of market interaction. We perform Monte Carlo simulations and
show that, with relatively few data, the estimate of the price distribution is very accurate while
the estimate of the search cost distribution is biased towards high search costs. In addition,
ignoring low search cost consumers leads to significant biases in the estimates: search costs are
substantially overestimated and price-cost margins largely exaggerated. These biases result in
3Brown and Goolsbee (2002) argue that prices of life insurance policies did not fall with rising Internet usage
(which probably meant an upward shift of the search cost distribution) but with the emergence of price comparison
sites (which most likely meant a more radical change of the shape of the distribution). Picking up such an effect
requires information on how the Internet has affected search costs for all quantiles.
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a poor fit of the model to the data and goodness-of-fit tests reject the null hypothesis that the
empirical and the estimated distribution of prices are equal.
If the fraction of low search cost consumers were negligible in real-world markets, this
would not be a problem. However, it turns out that the fraction of consumers searching inten-
sively in real-world markets is sizable. We apply our method to a data set of prices for four
personal computer memory chips. For all the products, we observe significant price dispersion
as measured by the coefficient of variation. On average, relative to buying from one of the firms
at random, the gains from being fully informed in these markets are sizable, ranging from 21.56
to 32.89 US dollars. Our estimates of the parameters of the price distribution yield an inter-
esting finding: consumers either search very intensively in the market (between 4% and 13%
of the consumers) or search very little, namely for at most three prices. Very few consumers
search for an intermediate number of prices. The search cost distribution consistent with these
estimates implies that consumers have either quite high or quite low search costs. The estimates
suggest that the search cost of consumers who search thoroughly in the market is at most 17 US
dollar cents.4
Consumer search behavior confers substantial market power to the firms. In spite of the
fact that in each of the markets studied we observe more than 20 retailers, we estimate that
the average price-cost margin ranges between 23% and 28%. This suggests that demand side
characteristics like search frictions might be even more important than market structure to assess
market competitiveness (Waterson, 2003).
The validity of the theoretical model is tested, first, by checking whether the data support
each of the assumptions of the model and, second, by conducting Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of
the goodness of fit. According to the test results, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
observed prices are generated by the model.
This chapter also illustrates how the structural methodology can be employed to simulate
the effects of policy interventions. In particular, we study how the introduction of a sales tax
would affect the equilibrium outcome in the market for one of the memory chips. We find that
sales taxes may affect the equilibrium in non-trivial ways. As a matter of fact, we observe that
the tax shifts the price cdf to the right and, depending on the height of the tax rate, this may
4Using a different methodology, Sorensen (2000) finds that between 5% to 10% of the consumers conduct an
exhaustive search for prices in the market for prescription drugs.
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change significantly the search profile in the economy. For example, a 15% sales tax reduces
search in such a way that the tax ends up being passed on to the consumers more than fully and
after-tax firms profits increase.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, we review and modify the
nonsequential consumer search model studied in the paper of Hong and Shum (2006). In Sec-
tion 2.3 we discuss our maximum likelihood estimation method. Section 2.4 presents a Monte
Carlo study that, among other issues, compares our estimation method with that of Hong and
Shum. In Section 2.5 we estimate the search cost distribution underlying price data obtained
from some online markets for memory chips; in addition, this section shows how the market
would be affected if a sales tax was introduced. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The consumer search model
We study an oligopolistic version of the model proposed in Hong and Shum (2006); their model
generalizes the nonsequential consumer search model of Burdett and Judd (1983) by adding
consumer search cost heterogeneity.5 Assume there are N retailers selling a homogeneous
good. Let r be the common unit selling cost of each retailer. There is a unit mass of identical
buyers. Each consumer inelastically demands one unit of the good. Let p be the consumer
valuation. Beyond the first price, a consumer incurs a search cost c to obtain further price
information. Consumers differ in their search costs. Assume that the cost of a consumer is
randomly drawn from a distribution of search costs Fc. A consumer with search cost c sampling
i firms incurs a total search cost ic.
Denote the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium by the distribution of prices Fp, with
density fp(p). Let p and p be the lower and upper bound of the support of Fp.6 Given firm
behavior, the number of prices i(c) a consumer with search cost c observes must be optimal,
i.e.,
i(c) = argmin
i>1
c(i− 1) +
∫ p
p
ip(1− Fp(p))i−1fp(p)dp. (2.1)
5The oligopoly case is also studied in Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004) but with a two-point search cost
distribution.
6It will become clear later that the upper bound of the price distribution must be equal to the consumer valuation.
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Since i(c) must be an integer, the problem in equation (2.1) induces a partition of the set of
consumers into N subsets of size qi, i = 1, 2, ..., N , with
∑N
i=1 qi = 1; thus, the number qi is
the fraction of buyers sampling i firms and is strictly positive for all i. This partition is calculated
as follows. Let Ep1:i be the expected minimum price in a sample of i prices drawn from the
price distribution Fp. Then
∆i = Ep1:i − Ep1:i+1, i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1 (2.2)
denotes the search cost of the consumer indifferent between sampling i prices and sampling
i + 1 prices. Note that ∆i is a decreasing function of i. Using this, the fractions of consumers
qi sampling i prices are simply
q1 = 1− Fc(∆1); (2.3a)
qi = Fc(∆i−1)− Fc(∆i), i = 2, 3, ..., N − 1; (2.3b)
qN = Fc(∆N−1). (2.3c)
Given consumer search behavior it is indeed optimal for firms to mix in prices. The upper
bound of the price distribution must be p because a firm which charges the upper bound sells
only to the consumers who do not compare prices (consumers in q1), who would also accept
p. The equilibrium price distribution follows from the indifference condition that a firm should
obtain the same level of profits from charging any price in the support of Fp, i.e.,
(p− r)
[
N∑
i=1
iqi
N
(1− Fp(p))i−1
]
=
q1(p− r)
N
. (2.4)
From equation (2.4) it follows that the minimum price charged in the market is
p =
q1(p− r)∑N
i=1 iqi
+ r. (2.5)
As shown in Hong and Shum (2006), equations (2.2) to (2.5) provide enough structure to allow
for the estimation of the search cost distribution using only price data. Since quantity informa-
tion is often hard to obtain, this will also be the focus of our next section.
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2.3 Maximum likelihood estimation
Assume the researcher observes the prices of the N firms operating in the market.7 The objec-
tive is to estimate the collection of points {∆i, qi}Ni=1 of the search cost distribution by maximum
likelihood. Once we get these estimates we can construct an estimate of the search cost distri-
bution by spline approximation. A difficulty here is that equation (2.4) cannot be solved for the
equilibrium price distribution Fp and this makes it difficult to calculate the cut-off points
∆i =
p∫
p
p[(i+ 1)Fp(p)− 1](1− Fp(p))i−1fp(p)dp, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
Hong and Shum (2006) propose to use the empirical price distribution to calculate the ∆i’s.
Even though this approach is practical, it does not necessarily provide minimal variance esti-
mates. We proceed differently and obtain ML estimates of the cut-off points. To do this, we
rewrite ∆i as a function of the ML estimates of the parameters of the price distribution. This
has the advantage that the asymptotic theory for computing the standard errors of ∆i and for
conducting tests of hypotheses remains standard.8 We first rewrite the cut-off points as (by
integration by parts)
∆i =
p∫
p
Fp(p)(1− Fp(p))idp, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (2.6)
Since the distribution function Fp(p) is monotonically increasing in p, its inverse exists. Using
equation (2.4) we can find the inverse function:
p(z) =
q1(p− r)∑N
i=1 iqi(1− z)i−1
+ r. (2.7)
7In practice, sometimes not all the firms are observed by the researcher; our Monte Carlo study in Section 2.4
examines the implication of this lack of data.
8Note that for our asymptotic arguments we need that prices are independently and identically distributed in
different periods, and since the number of firms is fixed and finite, that the number of periods goes to infinity.
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Using this inverse function, a change of variables in equation (2.6) yields:
∆i =
1∫
0
p(z)[(i+ 1)z − 1](1− z)i−1dz, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (2.8)
If we obtain ML estimates of r, p, p and qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, then, by the invariance property
(see Greene, 1997), we can use equations (2.7) and (2.8) to calculate ML estimates of the cut-
off points of the search distribution. This procedure yields a ML estimate of the search cost
distribution Fc(c).
We now discuss how to estimate r, p and qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , by maximum likelihood,
assuming that the researcher has only price data, which will often be the situation. Since the
price density cannot be obtained in closed form, we apply the implicit function theorem to
equation (2.4), which yields
fp(p) =
∑N
i=1 iqi(1− Fp(p))i−1
(p− r)∑Ni=1 i(i− 1)qi(1− Fp(p))i−2 . (2.9)
Let {p1, p2, . . . , pM} be the vector of observed prices. Without loss of generality, let p1 < p2 <
. . . < pM . Following Kiefer and Neumann (1993) we take the minimum price in the sample p1
and the maximum one pM to estimate the lower and upper bounds of the support of the price
distribution p and p, respectively. These estimates of the bounds of the price cdf converge super-
consistently to the true bounds.9 Using the estimates of p and p, equation (2.5) can be solved to
obtain the marginal cost r as a function of the other parameters:
r =
p1
∑N
i=1 iqi − q1pM∑N
i=2 iqi
. (2.10)
Plugging this formula into equation (2.9) and using the fact that qN = 1 −
∑N−1
i=1 qi we can
9See also Donald and Paarsch (1993) on using order statistics to estimate the lower and upper bound of bid
distributions.
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solve numerically the following maximum likelihood estimation problem:10
max
{qi}N−1i=1
M−1∑
`=2
log fp(p`; q1, q2, ..., qN)
where
F (p`) solves (p` − r)
[
N∑
i=1
iqi
N
(1− Fp(p`))i−1
]
=
q1(p− r)
N
, for all ` = 2, 3...,M − 1
We note that in this formulation the estimate of r is obtained from equation (2.10) as a function
of the estimates of the other parameters. This procedure introduces some dependence between
the price observations. Our Monte Carlo study next shows that this approach works reasonably
well, as the upper and lower bounds of the price distribution converge to the true values at a
super-consistent rate.
The standard errors of the estimates of qi, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 are calculated in the usual
way, i.e., by taking the square root of the diagonal entries of the inverse of the negative Hessian
matrix evaluated at the optimum. Since qN = 1−
∑N−1
i=1 qi, we can calculate the standard error
of the estimate of qN using the Delta method. The same applies to the standard errors of the
estimates of the marginal cost r and the ∆i’s since they are obtained as transformations of the
estimated qi’s.
2.4 A Monte Carlo study
The study in this section has various purposes. First, we investigate how precise the maximum
likelihood estimates of the price distribution and of the search cost distribution are when the
number of price observations is limited. In particular we are interested in the type of bias that
the estimation of the upper and lower bound of the price distribution by the maximum and the
minimum prices observed in the data may cause. Secondly, we investigate the impact of some
measurement error in the number of firms N that operate in the market, since this may be a
10The numerical procedure is as follows. We take arbitrary starting values {q0i }N−1i=1 . Then for every price p` in
the data set we calculate Fp(p`) using the equilibrium condition (2.4), which in turn allows us to calculate fp(p`)
using (2.9). We use a trust region PCG method, which proceeds by changing the qi’s until the log-likelihood
function is maximized.
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problem in real-world applications. Finally, we compare our estimation method to that of Hong
and Shum (2006).
2.4.1 Performance of the estimates
The general setup of the Monte Carlo experiment is as follows. We assume that consumers’
search costs are drawn independently from a log-normal distribution with parameters ν = 0.5
and σ = 5. Further, the value of the product p is assumed to be 100 and the unit cost r to
be 50. To solve for equilibrium, we compute numerically the fractions {q1, q2, . . . , qN} for
which equations (2.3a)-(2.3c) and (2.8) hold simultaneously. Next, we use these parameters to
construct the equilibrium price distribution, implicitly defined by equation (2.4). After this, we
draw prices randomly from the cdf of prices, which serve as input for the maximum likelihood
estimation procedure described in the previous section. We replicate each of our experiments
1000 times and report the mean and the 90% confidence interval of the estimates we obtain.
In this subsection we set N = 25. The first column of Table 2.1 gives the true parameter
(equilibrium) values. We see that the primitives chosen lead to an equilibrium where price
dispersion is substantial. In particular, the lowest price of the equilibrium price distribution is
51.68, which is about half the maximum price, 100. Thus, in equilibrium gains from search are
quite significant. We also note that a firm charging the minimum price has a relative price-cost
margin (Lerner index) of only 3.36% while for the firm charging the maximum price the same
index is 50%.
In equilibrium a great deal of the consumers, about 38%, search for only one price; another
important group of buyers searchers for all the prices in the market (about 31% of the con-
sumers). The fractions of consumers searching for an intermediate number of prices (from 2 to
24 firms) are pretty small, in all cases less than about 3% and often close to zero.11
As discussed above, for the estimation of the model we need to assume that market interac-
tion evolves over a finite number of T ≥ 2 periods. We take the equilibrium of the static game
described in Section 2.2 as the equilibrium of the repeated game with finite horizon. Our first
11This feature of the equilibrium partition of the set of consumers that few consumers search for an intermediate
number of firms is somewhat special and has to do with the choice of search cost distribution. For example, in a 10
firm market where the search cost distribution is a twenty-eighty percent mixture of a log-normal with parameters
0.5 and 2 and a gamma distribution with parameters 0.5 and 0.2, the equilibrium has most of the consumers
searching intensively (around 75% more than 8 times) and very few consumers not searching at all (around 4%).
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TRUE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3
T - 4 10 20
N 25 25 25 25
M - 100 250 500
r 50.00 47.50 (6.53) 49.16 (2.03) 49.47 (1.31)
p 51.68 52.06 (0.42) 51.83 (0.16) 51.75 (0.07)
v 100.00 99.91 (0.09) 99.97 (0.03) 99.98 (0.02)
q1 0.380 0.451 (0.154) 0.417 (0.098) 0.405 (0.072)
q2 0.032 0.037 (0.017) 0.035 (0.012) 0.035 (0.009)
q3 0.026 0.025 (0.032) 0.024 (0.026) 0.025 (0.022)
q4 0.022 0.025 (0.041) 0.024 (0.033) 0.027 (0.032)
q5 0.020 0.022 (0.042) 0.027 (0.042) 0.022 (0.034)
q6 0.018 0.022 (0.046) 0.018 (0.036) 0.016 (0.030)
q7 0.016 0.018 (0.046) 0.015 (0.035) 0.016 (0.032)
q8 0.015 0.011 (0.038) 0.015 (0.036) 0.016 (0.034)
q9 0.014 0.013 (0.046) 0.012 (0.033) 0.013 (0.032)
q10 0.013 0.013 (0.049) 0.014 (0.041) 0.013 (0.033)
q11 0.013 0.011 (0.051) 0.010 (0.035) 0.011 (0.031)
q12 0.012 0.013 (0.054) 0.011 (0.037) 0.011 (0.033)
q13 0.011 0.010 (0.044) 0.010 (0.032) 0.009 (0.027)
q14 0.011 0.009 (0.043) 0.011 (0.036) 0.010 (0.032)
q15 0.010 0.013 (0.052) 0.017 (0.055) 0.010 (0.033)
q16 0.010 0.011 (0.045) 0.015 (0.046) 0.013 (0.042)
q17 0.009 0.012 (0.057) 0.013 (0.043) 0.014 (0.041)
q18 0.009 0.016 (0.072) 0.014 (0.044) 0.017 (0.045)
q19 0.008 0.012 (0.053) 0.014 (0.044) 0.019 (0.050)
q20 0.008 0.011 (0.052) 0.017 (0.053) 0.020 (0.052)
q21 0.008 0.010 (0.049) 0.017 (0.051) 0.022 (0.056)
q22 0.007 0.011 (0.058) 0.016 (0.050) 0.021 (0.054)
q23 0.007 0.012 (0.069) 0.018 (0.056) 0.018 (0.050)
q24 0.007 0.012 (0.060) 0.029 (0.066) 0.019 (0.047)
q25 0.314 0.199 (0.216) 0.186 (0.175) 0.197 (0.182)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.1: True and estimated parameter values
set of estimations assumes the market evolves over T = 4 periods so we draw a total of 100
price observations each time we run the estimation procedure.
The second column of Table 2.1 gives the results of our first set of estimations. The numbers
reported are the mean of the 1000 estimates of the parameters with corresponding standard
errors in parenthesis. We observe that the estimate of the fraction of consumers who search
for one price only is about 45% and highly significant. This estimate is about 7% higher than
the true value so the fraction of consumers who do not compare prices at all is overestimated.
The estimate of the fraction of consumers searching for two prices is also significant and again
overestimated (3.7% instead of 3.2%). The estimate of the fraction of consumers searching for
all prices in the market is about 20%, somewhat lower than the true parameter (31.4%). The
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estimates of the rest of the parameters are not significantly different from zero (at the 5% level).
Since the true parameters are close to zero anyway, it turns out that this does not represent
a problem for the estimate of the price distribution to exhibit a good fit. In sum we see that
the fractions of consumers searching little are overestimated while the fractions of consumers
searching a lot are underestimated. Arguably the implication of these biases is that the estimate
of the search cost distribution will be biased towards high search costs.
TRUE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3
T - 4 10 20
N 25 25 25 25
M - 100 250 500
∆1 7.60 7.40 (0.63) 7.54 (0.40) 7.57 (0.28)
∆2 5.01 4.85 (0.34) 4.95 (0.21) 4.98 (0.15)
∆3 3.59 3.47 (0.21) 3.55 (0.13) 3.57 (0.09)
∆4 2.71 2.62 (0.16) 2.68 (0.09) 2.69 (0.07)
∆5 2.12 2.04 (0.13) 2.09 (0.08) 2.10 (0.06)
∆6 1.69 1.64 (0.12) 1.67 (0.07) 1.68 (0.05)
∆7 1.38 1.33 (0.11) 1.36 (0.07) 1.36 (0.05)
∆8 1.14 1.11 (0.11) 1.12 (0.07) 1.13 (0.05)
∆9 0.95 0.93 (0.10) 0.94 (0.07) 0.94 (0.05)
∆10 0.80 0.79 (0.10) 0.80 (0.06) 0.80 (0.05)
∆11 0.69 0.68 (0.09) 0.68 (0.06) 0.68 (0.04)
∆12 0.59 0.58 (0.09) 0.59 (0.06) 0.59 (0.04)
∆13 0.51 0.51 (0.08) 0.51 (0.05) 0.51 (0.04)
∆14 0.45 0.45 (0.08) 0.44 (0.05) 0.44 (0.04)
∆15 0.39 0.39 (0.07) 0.39 (0.05) 0.39 (0.04)
∆16 0.34 0.35 (0.07) 0.34 (0.04) 0.34 (0.03)
∆17 0.31 0.31 (0.06) 0.31 (0.04) 0.30 (0.03)
∆18 0.27 0.28 (0.06) 0.27 (0.04) 0.27 (0.03)
∆19 0.24 0.25 (0.06) 0.24 (0.04) 0.24 (0.03)
∆20 0.22 0.22 (0.05) 0.22 (0.04) 0.22 (0.03)
∆21 0.20 0.20 (0.05) 0.20 (0.03) 0.20 (0.02)
∆22 0.18 0.19 (0.05) 0.18 (0.03) 0.18 (0.02)
∆23 0.16 0.17 (0.05) 0.16 (0.03) 0.16 (0.02)
∆24 0.15 0.15 (0.04) 0.15 (0.03) 0.15 (0.02)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.2: True and estimated critical search cost values
The first column of Table 2.2 reports the true cut-off points of the search cost distribution.
The second column gives the estimated ones when we set T = 4. We see that all the estimates
of the cut-off points are highly significant, and quite close to the true ones.
The price and search cost cdf’s as well as their mean estimates are plotted in Figure 2.1(a)
and 2.1(b) respectively. In both graphs the thick curves are the true distributions while the
thick dashed curves show the mean of the 1000 estimated distributions. The dashed curves
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(a) Price cdf (b) Search cost cdf
Figure 2.1: Estimated price and search cost cdf’s (# periods T = 4; # obs. M = 100)
are respectively the 5% percentile and the 95% percentile of the estimates. We observe that the
estimate of the price distribution is remarkably close to the true price cdf. However, the estimate
of the search cost distribution lies below the true one. In spite of this, the true distribution falls
(for its most part) within the 90% confidence interval.12
The fact that the estimate of the search cost distribution lies below the true cdf might be a
reflection of the fact that the fractions of consumers searching little are overestimated. Since the
estimate of the upper bound of the price cdf with a limited amount of data will be lower than
the true one, while, at the same time, the estimate of the lower bound of the price cdf will be
higher than the true one, the price distribution might very well be less dispersed than the true
one. This implies that gains from search might very well be lower than in equilibrium, which
is consistent with estimates of the search cost distribution being biased towards higher search
costs.
To see whether the downward bias of the estimated search cost distribution can be attributed
to the biased estimation of the upper and lower bound of the price cdf, we conduct the following
experiment. We assume that the econometrician knows the true upper and lower bounds and
then re-estimate the model. The thick dashed curve in Figure 2.2(a) shows the new estimate of
the search cost distribution. To compare with the previous estimates, we also plot in gray the
search cost distribution when the upper and the lower bounds are estimated by the minimum
and the maximum price. The graph reveals that the new estimate is much closer to the true
distribution than the previous one. The average estimate of q1 goes down 0.04 points and this
12The last cut-off point of the search cost distribution we can estimate is ∆1 and therefore we do not have
information about search costs beyond that point.
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results in an upward shift of the estimated search cost cdf.
(a) p and p¯ set at true values (b) N underestimated (N = 20)
Figure 2.2: Estimated search cost cdf (# periods T = 4; # obs. M = 100)
An alternative explanation for the bias we observe is simply based on the fact that the max-
imum likelihood estimator is biased for finite samples. Indeed, we see that the gap between the
true and the estimated search cost cdf’s becomes smaller as we increase the number of observa-
tions. This can be seen in columns 3 and 4 of Tables 2.1 and 2.2 where the number of periods
over which the market develops is set equal to 10 and 20, respectively (correspondingly, the
number of observations in each simulation goes up to 250 and 500). The tables show that the
estimates of the parameters of the price distribution (including the upper and lower bound) be-
come more precise and this leads to more accurate estimates of the search cost cdf. The effect
of an increase in the number of observations on the estimates can be seen in Figures 2.3(a) and
2.3(b).
(a) # periods T = 10 (# obs. M = 250) (b) # periods T = 20 (# obs. M = 500)
Figure 2.3: Estimated search cost cdf
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2.4.2 Measurement error in the number of firms
The econometrician might often encounter the problem that he/she does no know the exact
number of retailers operating in a market. To investigate the impact of measurement error in
the number of firms N , we conducted two experiments. In the first experiment we set N equal
to 20 instead of equal to the true value 25. This experiment captured a situation where the
econometrician observes N with some but not very large error (20% fewer firms). The results
can be seen in Figure 2.2(b). As the graph shows, the underestimation of the number of firms
did not change the shape of the search cost distribution. The average estimate of q1 went up
from 0.451 to 0.487 and this led to a greater downward bias in the estimate of the search cost
distribution.
(a) price cdf (b) search cost cdf
Figure 2.4: Estimated equilibrium price and search cost cdf (N = 4; # periods T = 4)
In the second experiment, we setN equal to 4 instead of equal to 25. In this case, the econo-
metrician measures the number of firms with a pretty large error. Note that this is equivalent
to assuming that low search cost consumers are ignored altogether, which should be reflected
in the estimate of the search cost distribution. Figure 2.4 gives the estimation results. In panel
2.4(a) we plot the estimated price cdf and the true empirical price distribution. Clearly, the fit is
much worse than if we had estimated N more or less correctly (see Figures 2.1(a) and 2.2(b)).
This has a large impact on the estimates of search cost and marginal cost parameters. As can
be seen in Figure 2.4(b), the estimated search cost cdf is far from the true one. In particular, the
estimates lead to the wrong conclusion that search costs are much higher than what they actu-
ally are. Likewise, this translates into an average price-cost margin being largely exaggerated;
in particular around 100%, while the true price-cost margin of a typical firm is 42%.
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In sum, this subsection suggests that the estimates of the search cost cdf are meaningful
even when the econometrician does not know the exact number of firms operating in the mar-
ket but has a fair estimate of it, and clarifies the nature of the bias introduced by this type of
measurement error.
2.4.3 Comparison of the ML estimation method and Hong and Shum
(2006) method
Hong and Shum (2006) propose to estimate the parameters of the price distribution by maximum
empirical likelihood (MEL) and the cutoff points of the search cost distribution by using the
empirical distribution of prices. In this subsection we compare the performance of our method
relative to the one of Hong and Shum.
Before proceeding with the simulation results, let us revise briefly their approach.13 Sup-
pose we have a data set containing M prices. Consider the discrete price distribution F̂p(p) =∑M
j=1 pij1(pj ≤ p) with M mass points, each price pj charged with probability pij . Using the
equilibrium condition (2.4), each price i = 1, 2, ...,M − 1 in the data set satisfies
(pi − r)
 N∑
k=1
kqk
(
1−
[
1
M
M∑
j=1
pij1(pj ≤ pi)
])k−1 = (p− r)q1 (2.11)
where, as before, r and qN can be eliminated from these expressions using the formula for the
lower bound of the price distribution and the summing up condition
∑N
k=1 qk = 1, respectively.
The equations in (2.11) can be transformed into moment conditions as follows. For s` ∈ [0, 1],
` = 1, 2, ..., L we have
F−1p (s`) = r +
(p− r)q1∑N
k=1 kqk (1− s`)k−1
≡ gs`(q1, q2, ..., qN)
Hong and Shum (2006) write these population quantile restrictions as
1
M
M∑
j=1
pij
[
1
(
pj ≤ r + (p− r)q1∑N
k=1 kqk (1− s`)k−1
)
− s`
]
= 0 (2.12)
13For details, we refer to the Appendix of Hong and Shum (2006).
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The empirical likelihood problem consists of maximizing
∑M
j=1 log pij subject to the constraints
in (2.12) and the condition
∑M
j=1 pij = 1with respect to the probabilities pij’s and the parameters
{q1, q2, ..., qN−1}. It turns out that the MEL estimates of the parameters can be obtained from
solving the saddle-point problem:
max
{qi}N−1i=1
min
{tm}M−1m=1
M∑
j=1
log
(
1 + t′
[
1
(
pj ≤ r + (p− r)q1∑N
k=1 kqk (1− s`)k−1
)
− s`
])
where t denotes the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints in equation (2.11).
The MEL estimates of the parameters of the price distribution form the ordinates of the cutoff
points of the search cost distribution. To find the abscissas of the cutoff points Hong and Shum
propose to use the empirical cdf of prices in equation (2.6) above.
The maximum empirical likelihood method of Hong and Shum requires to solve a con-
strained optimization problem where the number of constraints equals, potentially, the number
of price observations. Essentially, this requires the optimization of a Lagrangian function in
N − 1 +M parameters, where M is the number of Lagrange multipliers. When N and/or M
is relatively large, the dimension of the problem makes it computationally difficult. In fact, we
have often witnessed the algorithm not to converge, unless the starting point was very close to
the true vector of parameters. The same sort of numerical problems have been reported by Hong
and Shum themselves (see footnote a of their Table 2) and by other authors (see, e.g., Owen,
1990; Qin and Lawless, 1994). To overcome the numerical problems, Hong and Shum (2006)
suggest not to use all moment conditions but a small subset of them; we followed this approach
in our initial set of simulations and still encountered difficulties. The reason is that in our initial
set of simulations we considered a market operated by a large number of firms, in particular
N = 25.
To be able to perform a comparison of the two methods, we studied a market with fewer
firms, in particular we set N = 10; the rest of the parameters were kept the same as in the main
set of simulations. Even in this case of 10 firms, we experienced some numerical difficulties
but, fortunately, they became salvageable in limited time by trying several starting values in
case of no-convergence. The results of the simulations are reported in Tables 2.3(a) and 2.3(b).
Table 2.3(a) reports the true parameters of the price distribution along with the MEL and
ML estimates. As in the above experiments, the equilibrium has the features that the group of
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TRUE MEL ML
T - 10 10
N 10 10 10
M - 100 100
r 50.00 48.37 (3.68) 47.97 (7.27)
p 53.29 53.56 (0.27) 53.56 (0.27)
v 100.00 99.89 (0.11) 99.89 (0.11)
q1 0.370 0.376 (0.142) 0.421 (0.111)
q2 0.038 0.040 (0.029) 0.043 (0.018)
q3 0.032 0.060 (0.042) 0.033 (0.039)
q4 0.029 0.066 (0.046) 0.025 (0.045)
q5 0.026 0.070 (0.048) 0.027 (0.060)
q6 0.023 0.071 (0.048) 0.036 (0.088)
q7 0.021 0.079 (0.050) 0.050 (0.107)
q8 0.020 0.079 (0.050) 0.058 (0.114)
q9 0.018 0.080 (0.050) 0.051 (0.102)
q10 0.422 0.080 (0.051) 0.257 (0.221)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
(a) True and estimated parameter values
TRUE Empirical cdf ML
T - 10 10
N 10 10 10
M - 100 100
∆1 8.640 8.556 (0.464) 8.470 (0.463)
∆2 5.264 5.193 (0.197) 5.135 (0.196)
∆3 3.484 3.432 (0.178) 3.392 (0.154)
∆4 2.428 2.393 (0.184) 2.366 (0.153)
∆5 1.756 1.734 (0.177) 1.716 (0.147)
∆6 1.309 1.295 (0.162) 1.284 (0.136)
∆7 0.999 0.992 (0.146) 0.985 (0.123)
∆8 0.779 0.776 (0.129) 0.773 (0.110)
∆9 0.619 0.619 (0.114) 0.617 (0.098)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
(b) True and estimated ∆i’s
Table 2.3: Estimation results (ML vs Hong and Shum (2006) method)
consumers searching only once is fairly large (about 37%) and that the fraction of consumers
searching thoroughly is also sizable (about 42%). The second column of the Table shows that
the MEL method is unable to capture the effect on prices of the consumers who search in-
tensively; in fact, this parameter is quite poorly estimated, which would wrongly suggest that
search costs are higher than what they really are. By contrast, as it can be seen in the third
column of the Table our ML procedure yields a pretty good estimate of this parameter, as well
as the others; in fact it can be seen that except for the estimates of q1 and q2, all ML estimates
are closer to the true parameters than the MEL estimates.
Table 2.3(b) shows the true cutoff points of the search cost distribution, along with corre-
sponding estimates based on the empirical cdf of prices and maximum likelihood. It can be
seen that the estimates using the empirical price cdf are closer to the true parameters but they
generate larger standard errors than the ML estimates.
These differences between the two methods are reflected both in the estimate of the price
cdf as well as in the estimate of the search cost distribution, which can be seen in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5(a) shows the MEL estimate of the price cdf along with the true equilibrium price
distribution. The graph reveals that the estimated price cdf has prices larger than what they
really are; this is consistent with the fact that the MEL method underestimated the extent of
price comparison in the market. The fit of our ML estimate of the price cdf can be seen in
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(a) Price cdf MEL method (b) Search cost cdf Hong and Shum method
(c) Price cdf ML method (d) Search cost cdf ML method
Figure 2.5: True and estimated price and search cost cdf (ML vs. Hong and Shum (2006) method)
Figure 2.5(c); the graph reveals that the fit is remarkably good and clearly outperforms the
alternative MEL estimate.
Figure 2.5(b) shows the estimate of the search cost distribution using Hong and Shum pro-
cedure, along with the true lognormal distribution with parameters 0.5 and 5. While the fit of
the estimate is pretty good at relatively high quantiles, the estimate suggests search costs are
higher than what they really are at low quantiles. Again, this is consistent with the fact that the
MEL method underestimated the amount of search in the market. The alternative ML method
generates an estimate of the search cost cdf that can be seen in Figure 2.5(d). This estimate
resembles closely the estimate we obtained for the earlier simulations with 25 firms. Again,
search costs are underestimated but to a lower extent than in the case of the estimate based on
Hong and Shum’s method.
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that our ML procedure outperforms the hybrid
procedure described in Hong and Shum, both from a numerical as well as from a goodness-of-fit
point of view.
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2.5 Empirical application
2.5.1 Data and empirical issues
In this section we apply our estimation procedure to data obtained from real-world markets.
Before presenting the results, we discuss the data set and, following Lach (2002), check one
by one the assumptions of the theoretical model. This also serves to identify the potential
weaknesses and caveats of this empirical exercise.
The focus of the study is on on-line consumer markets for personal computer memory chips.
At the time of data collection, the four memory chips we study were sold in stores advertising
prices on the price comparison site www.shopper.com so we used this site to sample the prices
of the firms over time.14
Shopper.com is one of the largest price comparison sites on the Internet.15 Internet shops
get listed on shopper.com by subscribing to CNET, the owner of shopper.com. Stores can
choose between three types of listing schemes, general, preferred or premier. Preferred or
premier listing allows a shop to add a store logo. Shops can provide once or twice a day price
information by uploading a so-called “price feed,” but it is not necessary to do so if a shop does
not desire to alter its price. The feed is collected four times a day and published on shopper.com.
Shops are required to fill in eight fields in the feed: credit card price, manufacturer name,
manufacturer Stock Keeping Unit (SKU), product URL, product name, availability, shipping
and handling cost, and category.
By using a so-called “spider” computer code, we automatically collected this information
for the four memory chips directly from shopper.com, from the beginning of August 2004 till the
end of September 2004. Unfortunately we could not collect more data because the IP address
of the computer we were using to download the data was blocked by the system managers of
shopper.com at the end of September 2004.
14Since some consumers may proceed as we did and use the search engine to sample prices, an implicit assump-
tion for our sampling method to be reasonable is that firms do not price discriminate between regular visitors to
their web sites and visitors of search engines. We have manually checked this assumption and found overwhelming
evidence that firms announce the same price in their web sites and in the search engines. Our estimate of qN will
of course include those individuals who use the search engine so our interpretation for these consumers is that they
have search costs less than∆N−1. Under this interpretation, our estimates give the search costs of those consumers
buying memory chips online.
15We are implicitly assuming that retailers, dealers, computer manufacturers, etc. buy from agents in the value
chain other than the firms advertising in shopper.com, or directly from the memory chip manufacturers.
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A first caveat of the study is that fitting the model in Section 2.2 to data from on-line markets
assumes implicitly that consumers search for prices nonsequentially. Even though nonsequen-
tial search may be a good approximation of buyer behavior when consumers use web sites, web
forums, and search engines to find price information, a caveat of the analysis is that sequential
search might be a more adequate search protocol to model search activity on the World Wide
Web.16
We selected four memory chips all manufactured by Kingston, which is by far the largest
producer in the sector (the 2004 market share of Kingston was 27.0%, while the second biggest
producer of memory chips Smart Modular Technologies had a 2004 market share of 8.1%). The
details of these four products are given in Table 2.4.
Ellison and Ellison (2005) have pointed out that in these types of market firms often engage
in “bait and switch” strategies. We selected the memory chips to avoid this potential problem:
chosen chips were at the moment of data collection somewhat at the top of the product line,
exhibiting relatively large storage capacity (512 megabytes) and fast speed of operation (above
266MHz). Two of the memory chips are of the SO-DIMM (Small Outline Dual In-line Memory
Modules) type, which are intended for notebooks only.
It may be argued that different memory chips are in the same relevant market so a differen-
tiated products market model is more appropriate than our model with homogeneous products.
To avoid this problem to the extent possible, we included in the analysis only memory chips
intended for particular PC’s. More concretely, we chose two memory chips for notebooks,
one intended for Toshiba notebooks and the other for Dell Inspiron notebooks. Arguably, con-
sumers who own for example a Toshiba Satellite 5105 notebook and are contemplating to extend
its memory by 512 MB would most likely consider to buy only the Kingston KTT3614 mem-
ory chip (see www.toshiba.com).17 The other two memory chips are intended for Dell desktop
computers, in particular for the Dimension series.
Another form of heterogeneity we are ignoring is store differentiation. Like in Hortac¸su and
Syverson (2004), it would be reasonable to assume that consumers may sample the firms with
unequal probability, simply because some firms are more popular than others, or because they
16For details on the optimality of nonsequential and sequential search see Morgan and Manning (1985).
17The information available at www.toshiba.com suggests that Kingston memory chips are original parts used
by Toshiba. For many consumers buying the same part as the original part is important (see Delgado and Waterson
(2003) study of the UK tyre market).
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advertise more effectively than others. The main problem with this extension is that we would
need quantity data to estimate the model, which we do not have.
We view the markets under study as consumer markets, where the typical buyer is an in-
dividual consumer. In this sense, the usual buyer is expected to buy a single chip to upgrade
the memory capacity of his/her computer; indeed, often computers have just a single slot avail-
able for memory upgrades. As a result, the inelastic demand assumption of the model seems
reasonable here.
Product name KTT3614 KTDINSP8200 KTD4400 KTD8300
Manufacturer Kingston Kingston Kingston Kingston
PC Toshiba notebooks Dell Inspiron 8200 Dell Dimension 4400 Dell Dimension 8300
MB 512MB DDR SDRAM 512MB DDR SDRAM 512MB DDR SDRAM 512MB DDR SDRAM
Memory Speed PC2100 (266 MHz) PC2100 (266 MHz) PC2100 (266 MHz) PC3200 (333 MHz)
Type SO-DIMM SO-DIMM DIMM DIMM
Notes: SO-DIMM memory chips are for notebooks while DIMM memory chips are for desktop computers.
Table 2.4: List of products
Product name KTT3614 KTDINSP8200 KTD4400 KTD8300
Total No. of Stores 25 24 24 23
Mean No. of Stores (Min, Max) 22.4 (20, 24) 21.8 (19, 23) 21.8 (19, 23) 20.3 (17, 22)
Mean Weeks in Sample (Std) 7.16 (1.72) 7.25 (1.70) 7.25 (1.73) 7.04 (1.74)
No. of Observations 179 174 174 162
Mean Price (Std) 142.96 (24.34) 142.09 (21.33) 117.56 (18.34) 126.02 (20.58)
Max. and Min. Prices 208.90, 105.00 200.50, 109.20 170.50, 96.00 182.50, 102.00
Coefficient of Variation (as %) 17.02 15.01 15.60 16.33
Notes: Prices are in US dollars. Pooled data is used for the estimates of the mean, max. and min. prices
and the coefficient of variation.
Table 2.5: Summary statistics
The summary statistics of the data can be found in Table 2.5. We found distinct numbers
of stores operating in different markets but in all cases the number was quite high. For the
KTT3614 memory chip, 25 firms were seen quoting prices over the period under study; for the
KTDINSP8200 and KTD4400 chips we collected prices from 24 different stores and for the
KTD8300 chip we found 23 stores.
In our study, we estimatedN by the total number of firms which were listed in shopper.com.
This number is based on the sample of firms that advertise in shopper.com and is probably
lower than the true number of stores in the relevant market. Our Monte Carlo simulations above
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show the extent of the bias introduced by measurement errors in N . If the true number of
retailers is not dramatically different than our estimate of N the results, though biased, will be
economically meaningful.18
Not every firm was quoting a price every week. For example, for the KTT3614 memory
chip we saw an average of 22.4 stores quoting a price in a typical week. The lowest number of
stores for this product was 20 and the highest number of stores was 24. Similar figures were
found for the other products (see Table 2.5). There might be several reasons for this variation.
For some stores there were missing values somewhere in the middle of the sampling period.
This might be due to technical problems when uploading the price feed to shopper.com. We
also observed that some stores appeared in the sample only after some weeks had passed. In
any case, on average, a typical firm was quoting prices during more than 88% of the sample
period (7 weeks out of 8).
The estimations are conducted under the assumption that firms play a stationary repeated
game of finite horizon so the data in every period should reflect the equilibrium of the static
game analyzed in Section 2.2. This assumption has some testable implications. One, since
the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, prices should be dispersed at any given moment in time.
Two, since firms are supposed to draw prices from the same price cdf period after period, there
should be variation in the position of a typical firm in the price ranking and prices should not
exhibit serial correlation. Third, stationarity of the environment implies that price cdf’s should
be similar across periods, i.e., that supply or demand shocks have been absent during the sample
period. We now examine how these three features appear in the data.
Table 2.5 shows the mean price and corresponding standard deviation of prices, for each
product. As expected, memory chips for notebooks are on average more expensive than those
intended for desktop computers; moreover, the KTD8300 chip is more expensive than the
KTD4400 chip due to its faster speed of operation. For all the products, we observe signifi-
cant price dispersion as measured by the coefficient of variation. On average, relative to buying
from one of the firms at random, the gains from being fully informed in this market are sizable,
ranging from 21.56 to 32.89 US dollars.
A careful examination of the data reveals that most stores certainly change their price from
18For robustness purposes, we also estimated the model taking 5 more firms than those seen in the data. The
qualitative nature of our results did not change significantly.
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time to time, but we observe that they do not do it synchronously, that is, the length of time
between price revisions changes from firm to firm. For example, in the market for the KTT3614
memory chip, 20 stores out of 25 changed their price at least once during the period under study.
On average, a typical firm selling the KTT3614 chip changed the price once every 5 weeks but
while some firms did change their prices several times over the sample period (up to 5 times),
other firms did not. For the other memory chips, we found similar patterns.19 The reason for
this variation may be due to menu cost dispersion across firms.
We also observe some variation in the price ranking of a typical firm. For example, for the
KTT3614 memory chip the standard deviation of the ranking of a firm ranges from 0 to 3.77.
This is somewhat smaller than what we would expect on the basis of the theoretical model. One
reason for these findings might be the short length of time of the sample period because some
of the firms did not alter their prices.20 To check this hypothesis, we gathered prices at the time
of writing this chapter and compared the current ranking of a typical firm with that at the time
of data collection (one year ago). For example, for the KTT3614 memory chip, we found 21
stores quoting prices so some stores are no longer active in this market. This is not surprising
since this market evolves very rapidly so after one year a product may be somewhat outdated.
Of these 21 stores, 16 stores were either higher or lower in the ranking compared to one year
ago. The difference in ranking ranged from 0 to 7 and was on average of 2.48. Finally, 9 stores
out of 21 are now in a different quartile of the ranking distribution. Similar figures apply to the
other memory chips.21
To check for serial correlation, we calculated autocorrelations for each product at each store,
i.e.,
τ =
∑T
t=2(pt − pav)(pt−1 − pav)∑T
t=2(pt − pav)2
,
19A typical firm selling the KTDINSP8200 chip changed its price once every 6 weeks, once every 7 weeks for
the KTD4400 chip and once every 6 weeks for the KTD8300 memory chip.
20Lach (2002) examined the Israeli markets for chicken, coffee, flour and refrigerators during 48 months. The
median duration of a store’s ranking in a given quartile ranged from 1 month for coffee and chicken to 2 to 3
months for flour and refrigerators; in that period most of the firms were seen quoting prices in all quartiles of the
price distribution.
21For the KTDINSP8200 memory chip 11 out of 22 stores were in a different quartile, with an average difference
in ranking of 3.35. For the KTD4400 chip 14 out of 23 stores were in a different quartile, with an average difference
in ranking of 3.39. Finally, for the KTD8300 chip 11 out of 22 stores were in a different quartile, while the average
difference in ranking is 3.55.
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where pav denotes the store’s average price for the product. Excluding the store-product pairs
for which we had fewer than eight observations, we found that for 71% of the store-product pairs
autocorrelations were not significantly different from zero at a 5% significance level. Although
the number of observations for each store-product pair is limited, this evidence suggests that
serial correlation is not a serious issue in our data set.22
To check whether absence of demand and supply shocks is a reasonable assumption in our
data set we tested the null hypothesis that price distributions in two different periods were
equal using two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The results indicate that for the KTD4400
and KTD8300 memory chips, the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same cannot be
rejected for any possible pair of periods, at a 5% significance level. For the other two memory
chips, the KTT3614 and the KTDINSP8200, the null hypothesis was rejected only for pairs of
periods that included the last period, which suggests that for these memory chips the last period
is somewhat different than earlier periods.
The prices used for our estimations include neither shipping costs nor sales taxes. One
reason for not including shipping costs in the main analysis is that we do not have the data for
all the stores.23 Another reason is that shipping costs and sales taxes depend on the state in
which the consumer lives, which makes it difficult to compare total prices. In spite of these
considerations, for robustness purposes, we also estimated the model neglecting sales taxes but
using the shipping costs as if we were living in New York. Since a store not providing shipping
cost information cannot be considered to ship for free (otherwise they would announce it as a
promotional strategy), either we visited the web sites to discover shipping costs or we attributed
average shipping costs to the missing values. The qualitative nature of the results did not change
in these two cases.24
Some of the variation in prices may be due to store differentiation. Consumers might view
some stores more appealing than others and base this view on observable store characteristics
like firm reputation, return policies, stock availability, order fulfillment, payment methods, etc.
22In a recent study of retail price variation, Hosken and Reiffen (2004) find that prices of most grocery products
are at their annual mode more than 55% of the time and that temporary discounts account for 20% to 50% of
the annual variation in retail prices, which suggests a large degree of serial correlation in their data set. See also
Pesendorfer (2004) for a related finding.
23Actually stores may choose to report blank in the shipping and handling cost field of the price feed form. As
a result, shopper.com reports “See Site” in the shipping and handling column for that particular store.
24Tables containing the estimates using the data including shipping costs, as well as plots of the resulting search
cost distributions and fitted price cdf’s can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Unfortunately, we do not have information on all these indicators. But we do have information
on whether the item was in stock or not, on whether firms disclosed shipping cost on shop-
per.com or not and on the CNET certified ranking of a store, which is a store quality index
computed by CNET on the basis of consumer feedback. To see the impact of these (observable)
variables on the prices of each memory chip in our data set, we estimated the following model:
PRICEjt = β0 + β1 ·RATINGjt + β2 · SHIPjt + β3 · STOCKjt + εjt, (2.13)
where, for each product, PRICEjt is the list price of store j in week t, RATINGjt is the
CNET certified ranking of store j in week t, SHIPjt is a dummy for whether shop j disclosed
shipping cost in week t, and STOCKjt is a dummy for whether shop j had the item in stock in
week t. We estimated equation (2.13) by OLS. The resultingR-squared values indicate that only
between 6% and 17% of the total variation in prices can be attributed to observable differences
in store characteristics.25 This suggests that the rest of the price variation can be due to strategic
price setting in the presence of search costs or to unobserved firm heterogeneity.
The finding that quite a few stores do change their price often and also that store rankings
change from week to week gives an indication that store heterogeneity cannot be the only factor
in explaining price setting behavior. To check to what extent unobserved heterogeneity across
shops (e.g. based on brand recognition, or on marginal cost) plays an important role in explain-
ing price setting behavior in our data set, we regressed prices on a constant and a set of store
dummies. In this case the R-squared was very high, ranging from 0.93 to 0.99. However, given
the short period of data collection and given the observation that within this 8 week period
quite a few firms either did not change their price at all, or changed it only once, these high
R-squared values are not very surprising. Actually, in a related study of online prices, using a
similar kind of data set which extends over a much longer period of time (monthly data from
November 1999 to May 2001), Baye et al. (2007) find that unobserved firm heterogeneities (in
costs, branding, trust, etc.) can only explain up to 72% of the variation in prices.26 Still, a caveat
25For all memory chips, the OLS estimates of the coefficient of SHIPjt are negative and highly significant. The
estimates of the coefficient of RATINGjt are positive and significant on a 1% level for the KTDINSP8200 chip,
significant on a 10% level for the KTT3614 and KTD4400 chips and not significant for the KTD8300 chip. The
coefficient of STOCKjt was not significant for any of the products, but this could be due to the lack of variation
of this variable in our data (upon reporting on shopper.com, almost all stores had the product in stock).
26Lach (2002) presents a similar finding for a data set of prices for goods sold in physical stores located in Israel.
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of the current model is that it cannot control for this unobserved firm heterogeneity and that it
treats all variation in the price data as variation due to search frictions.
2.5.2 Estimation results
The estimation results for the four different memory chips are presented in Table 2.5. An inter-
esting observation is that even though the products differ in their characteristics, the estimates
are quite similar across memory chips. This suggests that the consumers acquiring these prod-
ucts have similar search cost distributions.
KTT3614 KTDINSP8200 KTD4400 KTD8300
p 115.00 109.20 96.00 102.00
v 208.90 200.50 170.50 182.50
N 25 24 24 23
M 179 174 174 162
q1 0.22 (0.05) 0.29 (0.04) 0.24 (0.05) 0.30 (0.04)
q2 0.39 (0.15) 0.58 (0.02) 0.68 (0.01) 0.66 (0.03)
q3 0.31 (0.14) 0.00 0.00 0.00
q4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
...
...
...
...
...
qN−1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
qN 0.08 (0.07) 0.13 (0.05) 0.09 (0.05) 0.04 (0.01)
r 109.69 (1.43) 103.15 (0.84) 90.91 (1.16) 90.55 (1.91)
LL 715.42 677.81 644.64 616.39
KS 1.07 1.01 1.11 1.26
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.6: Estimation results
The estimates of the share of consumers who search once, q1, range from 22% to 30% and
are all highly significant.27 These consumers do not compare prices and thus confer monopoly
power to the firms. Firms compete for the rest of the consumers, who happen to search for 2 or
3 prices or for all the prices in the market. In particular, the estimates of q2 range from 39% for
the KTT3614 memory chip to 68% for the KTD4400 chip and are highly significant as well.
The KTT3614 chip has also a sizable share of consumers comparing three prices, about 31%.
For all the products, the estimates of parameters q4 till qN−1 are all approximately zero. Finally,
the estimates of the fraction of consumers comparing all the prices in the market, qN , range
27To be able to calculate the standard errors, we deleted the columns and rows of the Hessian for which the
corresponding parameter estimates were zero.
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from 4% to 13% and are, except for the KTD3614 memory chip, significant at a 5% level.28
These results suggest a clear picture of consumer search costs. The entire consumer popula-
tion can roughly be grouped into three subsets: buyers who do not search, buyers who compare
at most three prices and buyers who compare all the prices in the market. This is consistent with
the view that consumers have either quite high search costs or quite low search costs.
KTT3614 KTDINSP8200 KTD4400 KTD8300
∆1 12.26 (1.42) 10.94 (0.28) 8.34 (0.47) 9.76 (0.28)
∆2 4.41 (1.19) 4.25 (0.27) 2.91 (0.32) 3.49 (0.17)
∆3 2.21 (0.81) 2.37 (0.20) 1.50 (0.20) 1.78 (0.10)
∆4 1.34 (0.58) 1.59 (0.16) 0.96 (0.14) 1.10 (0.07)
∆5 0.92 (0.44) 1.19 (0.13) 0.69 (0.11) 0.77 (0.05)
∆6 0.68 (0.35) 0.94 (0.11) 0.54 (0.09) 0.58 (0.04)
∆7 0.53 (0.29) 0.78 (0.09) 0.44 (0.07) 0.46 (0.03)
∆8 0.43 (0.24) 0.67 (0.08) 0.37 (0.06) 0.38 (0.02)
∆9 0.36 (0.21) 0.58 (0.07) 0.32 (0.06) 0.32 (0.02)
∆10 0.31 (0.18) 0.51 (0.06) 0.28 (0.05) 0.28 (0.02)
∆11 0.27 (0.16) 0.45 (0.06) 0.24 (0.04) 0.24 (0.02)
∆12 0.24 (0.15) 0.41 (0.05) 0.22 (0.04) 0.22 (0.01)
∆13 0.21 (0.13) 0.37 (0.05) 0.20 (0.04) 0.19 (0.01)
∆14 0.19 (0.12) 0.33 (0.04) 0.18 (0.03) 0.17 (0.01)
∆15 0.17 (0.11) 0.30 (0.04) 0.16 (0.03) 0.16 (0.01)
∆16 0.16 (0.10) 0.28 (0.04) 0.15 (0.03) 0.15 (0.01)
∆17 0.14 (0.09) 0.26 (0.03) 0.14 (0.03) 0.13 (0.01)
∆18 0.13 (0.08) 0.24 (0.03) 0.13 (0.02) 0.12 (0.01)
∆19 0.12 (0.08) 0.22 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02) 0.11 (0.01)
∆20 0.11 (0.07) 0.20 (0.03) 0.11 (0.02) 0.11 (0.01)
∆21 0.11 (0.07) 0.19 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.10 (0.01)
∆22 0.10 (0.06) 0.18 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01)
∆23 0.09 (0.06) 0.17 (0.02) 0.09 (0.02) -
∆24 0.09 (0.06) - - -
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.7: Estimated critical search cost values
The estimated cut-off points of the search cost distribution,∆i, with corresponding standard
errors are presented in Table 2.7. All the cut-off points are highly significant and notice again
that there is very little variation in the estimates across products. The estimated critical search
cost values in combination with the estimated shares of consumers searching i times allow us
to construct estimates of the search cost distributions underlying firm and consumer behavior.
Figure 2.6 gives the estimated cumulative search cost distributions for the four memory
chips. For example for the KTT3614 memory chip we see that around 22% of the consumers
28In a study of the consumer click-through behavior online, Johnson et al. (2004) also point out that many
consumers search quite little.
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(a) KTT3614 (b) KTDINSP8200
(c) KTD4400 (d) KTD8300
Figure 2.6: Estimated search cost cdf
have search costs higher than 12.26 US dollars; these costs are so high that these consumers
only search once in equilibrium. Around 70% of the consumers have search costs in between
2.21 and 12.26 US dollars and for these consumers it is worth to search 2 or 3 times. Finally,
around 8% of the buyers have search costs that are at most 9 dollar cents; these costs are so
low that these buyers check the prices of all vendors. In sum, these estimates imply that typical
on-line consumers have either very high search costs or very low search costs.
In spite of having more than 20 stores operating in each of the markets, we observe that
market power is substantial. The estimates of r indicate that unit costs are between 50% and
53% of the value of the product so the average price-cost margins range between 23% and
28%.29 This is of course the consequence of search costs, suggesting that demand side charac-
teristics might be even more important than supply side ones to assess market competitiveness
(Waterson, 2003).
We finally test the goodness of fit of the model. To see how well the estimated price den-
29These margins are similar to those found in the book industry (Clay et al., 2001).
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sity function fits the data, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (KS-test) to compare the actual
distribution to the fitted distribution.30 The KS-test is based on the maximum difference be-
tween the empirical cdf and the hypothesized estimated cdf. The null hypothesis for this test is
that they have the same distribution, the alternative hypothesis is that they have different dis-
tributions. As Table 2.6 shows, since all KS values are below the 95%-critical value of the
KS-statistic, which is 1.36, for all four memory chips we cannot reject that the prices are drawn
from the estimated price distribution.31 The goodness of fit of the model to the data can be vi-
sualized in Figure 2.7. A solid curve represents an empirical price distribution, while a dashed
curve represents an estimated one.32
2.5.3 The effects of a sales tax
The value of estimating a structural model of demand and supply is that the aggregate im-
plications of policy changes can be computed by generating what would be the after-policy
equilibrium. To illustrate this feature, in this section we study the effects of a sales tax in the
market for the KTDINSP8200 memory chip.
Denoting by t the ad valorem tax rate, a firm charging p receives a price pˆ = (1 − t)p.
Therefore, in the presence of a sales tax, the equilibrium equation (2.4) is rewritten as
((1− t)p− r)
[
N∑
i=1
iqi
N
(1− Fp(p))i−1
]
=
q1((1− t)p− r)
N
.
The upper bound of the price distribution continues to be equal to p¯ while the lower bound of
30In this table KS is calculated as
√
M · τM , whereM is the number of observations and τM is the maximum
absolute difference over all prices between the estimated price cdf and the empirical price cdf.
31Because some of the parameters that enter the test are estimated we also calculated the Rao-Robson Statistic,
which is a kind of chi-squared test corrected for the uncertainty involved in estimating some of the parameters of
the distribution that has to be fitted (for more details see Moore, 1986). The Rao-Robson statistics for two of the
four products are below their corresponding critical values (KTT3614 and KTD4400), which means that for these
products we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated and empirical price cdf are the same.
32We also tried to estimate the model using the method of Hong and Shum (2006). Unfortunately, we were
unable to obtain meaningful estimates. We encountered exactly the same problems as those reported in Section
2.4.3, i.e., the algorithm either did not move away from the starting values or did not converge. The reason is that
the number of stores we observe in the data is quite high.
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(a) KTT3614 (b) KTDINSP8200
(c) KTD4400 (d) KTD8300
Figure 2.7: Estimated and empirical price cdf
the price cdf changes to
p =
1
1− t
(
q1((1− t)p− r)∑N
i=1 iqi
+ r
)
Using these two equations, we can simulate the implications of sales taxes on equilibrium.
Before moving to the results, we note that we first need to have a suitable (smooth) estimate of
the search cost distribution. For this purpose, we fit a mixture of lognormals to the search cost
points obtained in the estimation section (see Figure 2.6(b)). The fitted search cost density we
obtain is
fˆc(c) = 0.36 · lognormal(c/8.64, 0.27, 9.76) + 0.64 · lognormal(c/8.64, 0, 0.24)
The fitted curve and the estimated points of the search cost distribution can be seen in Figure
2.8(a).
Using this estimate, we simulate the effects of a 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% sales tax. The
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(a) Fitted search cost cdf (b) Price cdf’s after taxation
Figure 2.8: The effects of a sales tax
results are reported in Table 2.8 while the original and the different post-tax equilibrium price
distributions are drawn in Figure 2.8(b). As the graph shows, the introduction of a tax results
in a rightward shift of the price distribution so all consumers end-up paying higher final prices.
What is interesting is that a tax, by compressing the price distribution, changes the incentives to
search in the economy. Inspection of columns 3 to 6 in Table 2.8 reveals that as the tax increases,
the number of consumers who do not exercise price comparisons increases. For example, when
the tax is 20% (last column of the table) this number is about 83% which implies that firms can
charge prices quite close to monopoly (average price is indeed 194.28 US dollars, quite close to
valuation, which is 200.50 US dollars).
How much of the tax is passed along to the consumers turns out to depend on the height
of the sales tax. A relatively small tax (5%) does not alter significantly the search profile in
the economy and, though prices increase for all consumers, only about 5% is passed on to
them; after-tax firm profits are lower than in the case of no taxation (see columns 2 and 3
of Table 2.8). By contrast, a higher tax, for example 15%, ends-up reducing the gains from
search substantially; in that case, the average price paid by the consumers who only search
once increases by 16%, while the price the consumers who search thoroughly expect to pay
increases by 18.7%. In sum a consumer at random pays a price about 18% higher and this leads
to after-tax profits that are higher than in the absence of taxes (see columns 2 and 5 of Table
2.8).
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KTDINSP8200 KTDINSP8200 KTDINSP8200 KTDINSP8200 KTDINSP8200 KTDINSP8200
estimated fitted 5% tax 10% tax 15% tax 20% tax
p 109.20 108.82 114.48 (+5.2%) 120.92 (+11.1%) 128.49 (+15.3%) 142.27 (+30.7%)
t 0 0 0.05 (+5.0%) 0.10 (+10.0%) 0.15 (+15.0%) 0.20 (+20.0%)
v 200.50 200.50 200.50 200.50 200.50 200.50
N 24 24 24 24 24 24
q1 0.29 (0.04) 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.42 0.83
q2 0.58 (0.02) 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.42 0.01
q3 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
q4 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
qN−1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
qN 0.13 (0.05) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14
r 103.15 (0.84) 103.15 103.15 103.15 103.15 103.15
Ep 140.96 140.17 146.08 (+4.2%) 153.20 (+9.3%) 162.65 (+16.0%) 194.28 (+78.5%)
Ep1:2 130.01 129.01 135.37 (+4.9%) 143.03 (+10.9%) 153.25 (+18.8%) 189.42 (+46.8%)
Ep1:N 113.54 112.71 118.59 (+5.2%) 125.40 (+11.3%) 133.77 (+18.7%) 154.89 (+37.4%)
Epi (net) 1.16 1.10 1.09 (-1.3%) 1.09 (-0.5%) 1.16 (+5.6%) 1.97 (+78.9%)
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.8: The effects of a sales tax: estimated and simulated parameter values
2.6 Conclusions
Consumer search models have shown for example that, depending on the nature of search costs
in the market, an increase in the number of firms can increase or decrease the price levels and
price dispersion. Since competition policy recommendations may depend on the nature of the
search cost distribution, there is a need to develop methods to identify and quantify search costs.
Hong and Shum (2006) were the first to exploit the restrictions equilibrium search models
place on the joint distribution of prices and search costs to structurally estimate unobserved
search cost parameters. Following up on this line of work, this chapter has presented a new
method to estimate search costs. Our method has three important features. First, we use a model
with a finite number of firms, which helps separate variation in prices caused by variation the
number of competitors from variation in search frictions. Second, our method yields maximum
likelihood estimates of search cost parameters, which allows for standard asymptotic theory and
hypothesis testing. Finally, our method is relatively easy to implement in practice, the algorithm
converges very rapidly and we have not observed numerical problems.
Using a data set of prices for four memory chips we find that between 4% and 13% of
the consumers search for all prices in the market. These consumers have a search cost of at
most 17 US dollar cents and obtain sizable gains relative to buying from one of the firms at
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random, namely, from 21 to 33 US dollars. Our estimates of the consumer search cost density
underlying the price observations for the memory chips suggest that consumers have either quite
low or quite high search costs. Even though quite a few firms operate in the markets we study,
search frictions confer significant market power to the firms. The estimates reveal that average
price-cost margins range from 23% to 28%. Finally, according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
goodness-of-fit test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the price observations were drawn
from the distribution functions specified by the theoretical search model.
This chapter also illustrates how the structural methodology can be employed to simulate
the effects of policy interventions. In particular, we study how the introduction of a sales tax
would affect the equilibrium outcome in one of the markets studied above. We find that a sales
tax reduces the gains from search and this may affect the equilibrium in unexpected ways.
3Estimation and identification of
nonsequential search models
NOTE: This chapter is based on Moraga-Gonza´lez, Sa´ndor, and Wildenbeest (2007).
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3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the identification and estimation of the costs of search structurally in
a more general setting than in the previous chapter. More specifically, we take an oligopoly
model where firms are symmetric and sell homogeneous products; on the other side of the
market, consumers, who are heterogeneous in regard to their valuations and their search costs,
search nonsequentially (Burdett and Judd, 1983).1 The firm symmetry assumption along with
the homogeneous products assumption ensure that the price equilibrium is in mixed strategies;
an equilibrium where firms mix provides the econometrician with a first-order condition and a
constancy-of-profits condition, which can both be exploited to estimate the model using only
price data. Relaxing either of these two assumptions leads to another class of search models
where equilibria are in pure strategies so price variation across firms is not only due to search
frictions; as shown in Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004), the estimation of these types of model
require quantity data.
We start our discussion on identification and estimation of search costs by studying a simpler
version of our model where we assume away consumer valuation heterogeneity.2 Given that
prices reflect the search behavior of groups of consumers and not the behavior of individual
buyers, it turns out that the search cost distribution can only be identified at a series of critical
points that are determined by consumers’ optimal search. In fact, if there are N firms operating
in the market then only N points of the search cost distribution can be identified, each point
corresponding to the search cost of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between searching
k and k + 1 times.
The model studied in Hong and Shum (2006) is a particular case of this simpler model
where the number of firms operating in the market is set to infinity. Hong and Shum (2006,
p.262) suggest that when the number of firms goes to infinity, identification of the search cost
distribution in its full support should obtain. We show that this presumption is wrong because
the (infinite) series of critical search costs turns out to be convergent to zero. This property,
which stems from the fact that the marginal gains from an extra search are declining in the
1Nonsequential (or fixed-sample-size) search is appealing when consumers find it more advantageous to gather
price information quickly (Morgan and Manning, 1985). This occurs when the search outcome is observed with
some delay, like in markets for labor (Fershtman and Fishman, 1992), for mortgages, for refurbishing services, for
specialized inputs, etc.
2The simpler model is also studied in Chapter 2.
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number of searches, implies that the set of search cost values the econometrician can retrieve
from the price data is not dense in the support of the search cost distribution so nonparametric
identification of the search cost cdf in its entire support fails.
To overcome this identification problemwe propose to consider a different framework where
the econometrician has price data from several oligopolistic markets, each observed over some
period of time. In particular, we consider markets with the common feature that the search cost
distribution is the same, while consumer valuations differ across markets. We show that the
search cost cdf can be identified fully in such setting; the reason is that every market generates
a distinctive set of search cost values for which the econometrician can retrieve the density of
search costs, and this forces the search cost distribution to be uniquely determined for a larger
set of points.
Given that we need to pool price data from multiple markets to identify and quantify search
costs, the spline approximation methods employed earlier in the literature (cf. Hong and Shum,
2006; Hortac¸su and Syverson, 2004) are not valid in our setting. The reason is that spline
approximations use procedures in which distinct markets are not linked via the same underlying
search cost distribution. To exploit the linkage between markets, we propose to estimate the
search cost density function directly by a flexible polynomial-type parametric function, namely,
a semi-nonparametric (SNP) density estimator (Gallant and Nychka, 1987). In this way, we
obtain an essentially nonparametric estimator of the search cost distribution common to all the
markets, because the SNP density estimators approximate arbitrarily closely any sufficiently
smooth density function (Gallant and Nychka, 1987). Since the parameters of the SNP density
estimator are chosen directly to maximize the joint likelihood corresponding to all the markets,
our SNP maximum likelihood estimator does not have the problem of spline approximations.
The identification problem of the simpler model without valuation heterogeneity of course
carries over to the general model. In this case we also need to pool price data from several
markets if we want to make some progress in the nonparametric identification issue. The nat-
ural proposal is to consider a setting where the econometrician has price data from several
oligopolistic markets all of them with the same joint density of valuations and search costs, but
with variation in the number firms and marginal costs between markets. It turns out that this
is not sufficient for identifying a bivariate density nonparametrically. If search costs and valua-
tions are uncorrelated, we can identify nonparametrically the search cost distribution but for the
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identification of the valuation density we need to make distributional assumptions. By contrast,
if there is correlation between valuations and search costs, only parametric identification of the
joint-density obtains.
The structure of this essay is as follows. In the next section, we present our consumer search
model with valuation and search cost heterogeneity. In Section 3.3 we study the characteriza-
tion of a price dispersed symmetric equilibrium. Section 3.4 is dedicated to the simulation of
the welfare effects of mergers and serves to motivate the identification and estimation of search
costs. Our first set of identification results and our SNP estimation method are presented in
Section 3.5, where we study the simpler version of the model with no valuations heterogene-
ity. In this section we also present some simulation results to illustrate the identification and
estimation issues. Section 3.5 also discusses the estimation and identification of the full model.
Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
We examine a model of firm competition in the presence of consumer search. The model is an
oligopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983) with heterogeneity in consumer search costs
and in consumer valuations. On the supply side of the market there are N firms producing a
homogeneous good at constant returns to scale. Their identical unit cost is equal to r and they
compete in prices. On the demand side of the market there is a unit mass of buyers. Each
consumer wishes to purchase a single unit of the good at most. A consumer is characterized
by his/her valuation and his/her search cost, i.e., a pair (v, c), which is assumed to be a random
draw from a joint distribution function G(v, c), defined over the set R+×R+. Let g(v, c) be the
joint density function and assume that g(v, c) > 0 everywhere. We shall denote the marginal
valuation and search cost distributions as Gv(v) and Gc(c), respectively, with corresponding
densities gv(v) and gc(c).
Consumers must engage in costly search to observe prices. Assume they search non-
sequentially, i.e., they decide before hand how many prices to observe. Once a consumer has
observed the desired number of prices, he/she chooses to buy from the store in his/her sample
charging the lowest price, or not to buy at all. A consumer with search cost c sampling k firms
ESTIMATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF NONSEQUENTIAL SEARCH MODELS 49
incurs a total search cost kc.3
Firms and buyers play a simultaneous moves game. An individual firm chooses its price
taking rivals’ prices as well as consumers’ search behavior as given. A firm i’s strategy is
denoted by a distribution of prices Fi(p). Let F−i(p) denote the vector of prices charged by
firms other than i. The (expected) profit to firm i from charging price pi given rivals’ strategies is
denoted pii(pi, F−i(p)). Likewise, an individual buyer takes as given firm pricing and decides on
his/her optimal search strategy to maximize his/her expected utility. The strategy of a consumer
with search cost c is then a number k of firm prices to sample. Let the fraction of consumers
sampling k firms be denoted by µk, with
∑N
k=0 µk = 1.
We shall concentrate on symmetric Nash equilibria. A symmetric equilibrium is a distribu-
tion of prices F (p) and a grouping of consumers {µ0, µ1, . . . , µN} such that (a) pii(p, F−i(p)) is
equal to a constant pi for all p in the support of F (p), ∀i; (b) pii(p, F−i(p)) ≤ pi for all p, ∀i; and
(c) a consumer sampling k firms obtains no lower expected utility than by sampling any other
number of firms. Let us denote the equilibrium density of prices by f(p), with maximum price
p and minimum price p.
3.3 Theoretical analysis
Our first result indicates that, for an equilibrium to exist, there must be some consumers who
search just once and others who search more than once. The intuition is simple. If all consumers
compared two or more prices in the market then firms would have no other choice than pricing
competitively, in which case consumers would not be willing to search that much. Alternatively,
if no consumer compared prices then firms would charge the same price in equilibrium. In that
case consumers would continue to enter the market until the expected utility from buying v− p
equals search cost, in which case a firm would gain by deviating by increasing its price.
Lemma 3.1 If a symmetric equilibrium exists, then 1 > µ1 > 0 and µk > 0 for some k =
2, 3, . . . , N .
3We note that we are assuming that the first search is also costly, in contrast to most of the literature on
consumer search. This assumption alone implies that not all consumers will participate in the market, and that the
participation rate is endogenous.
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Proof. First, suppose, on the contrary, that µ1 = 0. Then we have two possibilities: (i) either
µ0 = 1 in which case the market does not open, or (ii) µk > 0 for some k = 0, 2, 3, . . . , N
in which case all firms would charge a price equal to the marginal cost r. But if this were so,
consumers would gain by deviating and searching for fewer prices.
Second, suppose, on the contrary, that µ1 = 1. Since equilibrium prices must be above the
marginal cost r and since search is costly, it is obvious that consumers with valuations below r
would not enter the market so all consumers searching once cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Finally, suppose, on the contrary, that 1 > µ1 > 0 and that µk = 0 for all k = 2, 3, . . . , N ,
i.e., µ0+µ1 = 1. Given that consumers observe a single price at most, all firms must charge the
same price in equilibrium. Let p be the equilibrium price. Then, if consumers expect to see a
price p when they venture a store, all consumers with a valuation larger than p and search cost
of at most v − p, i.e., a fraction∫ ∞
p
∫ v−p
0
g(v, c)dcdv
would indeed wish to enter the market. Consider a deviant firm charging p˜ > p; this firm would
make a profit
pii(p˜ > p) =
1
N
(p˜− r)
∫ ∞
p˜
∫ v−p
0
g(v, c)dcdv. (3.1)
Taking the derivative of (3.1) with respect to p˜ we obtain
dpii(·)
dp˜
=
1
N
∫ ∞
p˜
∫ v−p
0
g(v, c)dcdv − 1
N
(p˜− r)
∫ p˜−p
0
g(p˜, c)dc
and evaluating it at p˜ = p we get
dpii(·)
dp˜
∣∣∣∣
p˜=p
=
1
N
∫ ∞
p
∫ v−p
0
g(v, c)dcdv > 0,
which implies that p cannot be an equilibrium price. 
Our next observation is that, given that, conditional on entering the market, some consumers
will search only once while others will search for two prices or more, for an equilibrium to exist
it must be the case that firm pricing is characterized by mixed strategies.
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Lemma 3.2 If a symmetric equilibrium exists, F (p) must be atomless.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that firms did charge a price pˆ > r with strictly positive
probability in equilibrium. Consider a firm i charging pˆ. The probability that pˆ is the lowest
price in the market is strictly positive. This occurs, for example, when all other firms are
also charging pˆ. From Lemma 3.1 we know that in equilibrium there must exist some kˆ ∈
{2, 3, ..., N} for which µkˆ > 0. Consider the fraction of consumers sampling kˆ firms. The
probability that these consumers are sampling firm i is strictly positive; as a result, firm i would
gain by deviating and charging pˆ − ε since in that case the firm would attract all consumers in
µkˆ who happened to sample firm i and were willing to buy at price pˆ. This deviation would give
firm i a discrete increase in its profits and thus rules out atoms at any price pˆ > r.
It remains to be proven that an atom at the marginal cost r cannot be part of an equilibrium
either. Consider a firm charging r. From Lemma 3.1 we know that in equilibrium 1 > µ1 >
0. This implies that some consumers will sample the firm in question with strictly positive
probability and will proceed buying provided their valuation is not lower than r. The firm
would thus obtain positive demand with a strictly positive probability and would however make
zero profits. It is then clear that the firm would have an incentive to deviate by increasing its
price. 
Lemma 3.2 implies that the measure of consumers searching for k prices must be strictly
positive, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N.We now calculate the fractions of consumers µk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N
who sample k prices. We start by calculating the set of consumers who, owing to their high
search costs or to their low valuations, get out of the market and do not search at all.4 Denoting
the expectation operator by E, the expected utility of a consumer (v, c) who searches k times is
v−E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}]− kc. Therefore, the set of consumers who do not participate in the
market is given by S0 = {(v, c) ∈ R+ × R+ such that v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}] − kc ≤ 0,
∀k}, so the fraction of consumers who get out of the market is
µ0 =
∫
S0
g(v, c)dc dv.
4Notice that in this model there will be consumers who a find it optimal to search k = 1, 2, ..., N times but end
up not buying at all simply because their draw of prices is a bad one.
52 CHAPTER 3
We now calculate the fraction of consumers who search k times. For a consumer (v, c) to
search for k prices, the following conditions must hold:
(i) v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}]− kc > 0. (3.2a)
(ii) v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}]− kc > v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk+1}]− (k + 1)c
(3.2b)
(iii) v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}]− kc > v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk−1}]− (k − 1)c
(3.2c)
Condition (i) says that a consumer who decides to search for k prices must obtain a positive
expected utility from doing so and conditions (ii) and (iii) guarantee that the consumer prefers
to search for k prices rather than for k+1 or k− 1, respectively. Notice that conditions (ii) and
(iii) are independent of the valuation v so if a consumer prefers k over k + 1 or k − 1 searches,
this also holds for all consumers with the same search cost but different valuations.
Since F (p) is atomless, the order statisticE[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}] is a decreasing and convex
function of k. Therefore there exists a unique search cost value, denoted ck, corresponding to
the consumer indifferent between searching k times and searching k + 1 times, which satisfies
v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}] − kck = v − E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk+1}] − (k + 1)ck. Isolating ck
from this expression leads to
ck = E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}]− E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk+1}], k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (3.3)
Combining equations (3.2a)-(3.2c) and equation (3.3) leads to the following result.
Lemma 3.3 For any given atomless price distribution F (p), optimal consumer search behavior
leads to a unique partition of the set of consumers where the fraction of buyers searching for k
prices is given by:
µ1 =
∫ ∞
c1
∫ ∞
c+E[p]
g(v, c)dv dc (3.4a)
µk =
∫ ck−1
ck
∫ ∞
kc+E[min{p1,p2,...,pk}]
g(v, c)dv dc; k = 2, . . . , N − 1 (3.4b)
µN =
∫ cN−1
0
∫ ∞
Nc+E[min{p1,p2,...,pN}]
g(v, c)dv dc, (3.4c)
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with µ0 = 1−
∑N
k=1 µk and where ck is given by equation (3.3).
The calculation of the fractions of consumers µk’s who search k times is illustrated in Figure
3.3 for a market where the number of firmsN = 5 and where the distribution of search cost and
valuations is uniform on R+ × R+.
Figure 3.1: The µk’s graphically
We now move to examine firms’ pricing decisions. Taking consumer search behavior µk,
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N as given, an individual firm quotes a price to maximize expected profits.
Consider a consumer who searches for k prices. To write out the payoff of a firm i charging pi
we ask when a consumer buys from firm i. Three events must be realized: one, the consumer
must sample the price of firm i; two, the price of firm i must be lower that the price of the other
k − 1 firms sampled by the consumer; and three, the valuation of the consumer v should not be
lower than pi. As a result, the profit to a firm i charging pi given the strategies of the rivals is:
pii(pi;F (·)) = (pi − r)
[
N∑
k=1
kdk(pi)
N
(1− F (pi))k−1
]
,
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where dk(pi) represents the probability of the joint event that a consumer (v, c) samples firm i
plus k− 1 other firms and has a valuation v greater than pi. These probabilities are given by the
following expressions:
d1(p) =

∫∞
p
∫ v−E[p]
c1
g(v, c)dc dv if p > c1 + E[p]
µ1 otherwise,
and for k = 2, 3, ...N
dk(p) =

∫∞
p
∫ min{ 1
k
(v−E[min{p1,p2,...,pk}]),ck−1}
ck
g(v, c)dc dv if p > kck + E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}]
µk otherwise.
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between charging any price pi
in the support of F (·). Consider, in particular, a firm charging the upper bound of the price
distribution p. Since such a firm will only sell to those consumers who search once, this upper
bound must be equal to the maximizer of
pii(p;F (·)) = (p− r)
N
d1(p)
Or
pii(p;F (p)) =

(p−r)
N
∫∞
p
∫ v−E[p]
c1
g(v, c)dc dv if p > c1 + E[p]
(p−r)
N
µ1 if p ≤ c1 + E[p]
(3.5)
Inspection of this last equation reveals that the upper bound pmust be no lower than c1+E[p]
just because the profit of the firm is strictly increasing in p for all p < c1 +E[p]. Therefore, the
upper bound p is the solution to the following first order condition:
∫ ∞
p
∫ v−E[p]
c1
g(v, c)dcdv − (p− r)
∫ p−E[p]
c1
g(p, c)dc = 0 (3.6)
For a finite upper bound to exist, it is sufficient to assume that limp→∞ p (1−Gv (p)) = 0
(recall Gv(·) is the marginal cdf of valuations). This assumption is satisfied by distributions Gv
with tails as thick as the lognormal distribution. To see that the assumption is sufficient, notice
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that ∫ ∞
p
∫ v−E[p]
c1
g(v, c)dc dv <
∫ ∞
p
∫ ∞
0
g(v, c)dc dv =
∫ ∞
p
gv (v) dv = 1−Gv (p) .
This implies that the profit expression in equation (3.5) goes to 0 as p → ∞, and since it is
strictly positive for p = c1 + E[p] for which d1(p) = µ1 and it is continuous in p, we conclude
that it has a (finite) global maximum.
Given p = argmaxp pii(p;F (·)), the symmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by the
constancy of profits condition: pii(pi;F (·)) = pii(p;F (·)), i.e.,
(pi − r)
[
N∑
k=1
kdk(pi)(1− F (pi))k−1
]
= (p− r)d1(p). (3.7)
Equation (3.7) cannot be solved in closed-form for F (pi). However, the minimum price charged
in the market can be found by setting F (p) = 0 in equation (3.7) and solving it for p. This yields:
p = r + (p− r) d1(p)∑N
k=1 kµk
. (3.8)
To prove uniqueness of F (pi) in equation (3.7), which is useful for estimating the model,
let us rewrite equation (3.7) as
N∑
k=1
kdk(p)(1− z)k−1 = (p− r)d1(p)
p− r . (3.9)
Then we need to prove that for any price p, this equation cannot have more than one solution in
z ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the RHS of equation (3.9) is positive and does not depend on z, while the
LHS of equation (3.9) is a positive-valued function strictly decreasing in z. Therefore, for any
price p, there can exist at most one F (p) that satisfies equation (3.7). These arguments lead to
the following result.
Lemma 3.4 Given consumer search behavior {µk}Nk=0, with µk > 0 for all k ≤ N , a distri-
bution of consumer valuations and search costs G(v, c), as well as a marginal cost r, if there
exists an equilibrium price cdf F (·) with upper bound p then it is unique and it is given by the
simultaneous solution to equations (3.6) and (3.7).
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Lemma 3.4 shows that for any given grouping of consumers, the equilibrium price distribu-
tion is unique. An equilibrium of the game requires the conjectured grouping of consumers to be
the outcome of optimal consumer search given correct conjectures about the price distribution.
It will be useful to rewrite the critical search cost values ck’s given in equation (3.3). Using
the distributions of the order statistics, and after successively integrating by parts, we can rewrite
them as follows:
c0 =
p∫
p
F (p)dp; (3.10a)
ck =
p∫
p
F (p)(1− F (p))kdp, k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (3.10b)
Since F (p) is monotonically increasing in p, its inverse exists. Let p(z) denote the inverse
of F (p). Using this inverse function, a change of variables in equations (3.10a) and (3.10b)
yields:
c0 = p−
∫ 1
0
p(z)dz; (3.11a)
ck =
1∫
0
p(z)[(k + 1)z − 1](1− z)k−1dz, k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (3.11b)
Therefore:
Proposition 3.1 If a symmetric equilibrium of the game described above exists then firms set
prices according to Lemma 3.4, consumers search according to Lemma 3.3, and the numbers
ck’s are given by the solution to the system of equations (3.11a) and (3.11b).
An equilibrium of the full game is given by the simultaneous solution of equations (3.7),
(3.4a)-(3.4c), and (3.11a) and (3.11b). Proving that such a solution exists and is unique turns
out to be very difficult. Our numerical simulations (some of which we present below), however,
suggest that the symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique.
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3.4 Mergers
Economists and practitioners need to take sound public policy decisions and this requires to
have a reasonable knowledge about the market. In this section we illustrate the importance
of estimating models of consumer search; we show how absence of good knowledge about
consumer search costs may lead to wrong (or at least debatable) recommendations. We shall
focus on the impact of mergers on prices and overall welfare but the analysis can be extended
to study other public policies such as price controls, taxes and subsidies, etc.
The price and welfare effects of mergers in our model are difficult to derive analytically
since the equilibrium price distribution cannot be obtained in closed-form. We then proceed by
solving the model numerically. For simplicity, we consider a market where consumer valuations
are identical and we set v = 100; in addition, we assume that the first price quotation is obtained
at no cost. These two assumptions together imply that all consumers buy in equilibrium. This is
convenient since it allows us to isolate the single mechanism through which mergers influence
the aggregate outcome: the amount of search.5 The firms’ marginal cost r is set equal to 50.
Let us assume that search costs follow a log-normal distribution, with parameters (νc, σc).
In what follows, we fix the mean search cost to 50 and compare how the market works for two
different levels of search cost dispersion. In particular, we focus on the effects of mergers on
prices and surplus and study how these effects depend on the amount of search cost dispersion.
We start with a market where search cost dispersion is relatively low. For this we set (νc, σc) =
(2.63, 1.6).6 Given the other data, we solve for the equilibrium of the model for different number
of firms. The results are reported in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 shows how consumer search intensities change as we increase the number of firms.
Remarkably, in this market a large majority of the consumers searches only once. For example,
when there are just two firms in the market the fraction of consumers who do not compare prices
is almost 100%. This number remains high but decreases as we increase the number of firms. A
second important feature is that very few consumers make an exhaustive search in the market;
5The results do not depend on this assumption. Adding consumer valuation heterogeneity obscures the welfare
results because there are several effects at work; in particular, the fraction of consumers not buying at all is en-
dogenous and depends on the number of firms operating in the market so not only the amount of search influences
the aggregate results but also the rate of consumer participation.
6Mean search cost is equal to exp(ν + σ2/2) ' 50 and standard deviation√(exp(σ2)− 1) exp(2ν + σ2) '
172.74. The coefficient of variation (CV) is equal to 172.74/50 = 3.45.
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N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5 N = 6 N = 7 N = 8 N = 9 N = 10 N = 11 N = 12
µ1 1.00 0.86 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77
µ2 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
µ3 - 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
µ4 - - 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
µ5 - - - 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
µ6 - - - - 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
µ7 - - - - - 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
µ8 - - - - - - 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
µ9 - - - - - - - 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ10 - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.00 0.00
µ11 - - - - - - - - - 0.01 0.00
µ12 - - - - - - - - - - 0.01
Table 3.1: Equilibrium search intensities for (νc, σc) = (2.63, 1.6) (mean is 50; CV is 3.45)
in fact for example if there are 10 firms in the industry about 94% of the consumers searches
for a maximum of 4 firms.
The fact that most consumers do not compare prices is reflected in equilibrium prices. Fig-
ure 3.2(a) shows how mean prices change with the number of firms. The average price under
(a) Mean prices (b) Consumer surplus
(c) Producer surplus (d) Welfare
Figure 3.2: Comparative statics of an increase in the number of firms ((νc, σc) = (2.63, 1.6))
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duopoly is very high and it decreases as the number of firms rises. The decrease of the mean
price is due to the fact that the share of consumers comparing two or three prices increases in
the number of firms. The average price is what is important for consumers who do not exer-
cise price comparisons so consumers benefit from the resulting average price decreases. These
gains are also reflected in that consumer surplus, plotted in Figure 3.2(b), increases in N . Fig-
ures 3.2(c) and 3.2(d) show the behavior of aggregate profits and social welfare. The welfare
result is perhaps surprising and it deserves an explanation. Note from Table 1 that the amount of
search increases in N and that, since search costs are wasteful, more search generates a welfare
loss. In sum, mergers in this case of low search cost dispersion would lead to higher average
prices, lower consumer surplus, greater industry profits and greater welfare.
The situation is quite different when search costs are much more dispersed, holding every-
thing else equal. Let us set (νc, σc) = (0.79, 2.5), which implies the new search cost distribution
is a mean-preserving spread of the previous one. The new equilibrium search intensities are re-
ported in Table 3.2. What is different in this case of high search cost dispersion is that a great
deal of consumers conduct an exhaustive search; as before, the extent of price comparison in
the market increases as the number of firms rises.
N = 2 N = 3 N = 4 N = 5 N = 6 N = 7 N = 8 N = 9 N = 10 N = 11 N = 12
µ1 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
µ2 0.63 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
µ3 - 0.54 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
µ4 - - 0.47 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
µ5 - - - 0.42 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
µ6 - - - - 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
µ7 - - - - - 0.33 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
µ8 - - - - - - 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
µ9 - - - - - - - 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.03
µ10 - - - - - - - - 0.25 0.03 0.03
µ11 - - - - - - - - - 0.22 0.02
µ12 - - - - - - - - - - 0.21
Table 3.2: Equilibrium search intensities for (νc, σc) = (0.79, 2.5) (mean is 50; CV is 22.73)
Figure 3.3 plots the equilibrium mean price against the number of competitors in the indus-
try. Under duopoly, the average price is relatively low compared to the previous case. What is
remarkably different is that the mean price increases as more firms enter the industry. Moreover,
we see that consumer surplus can decrease and profits increase as we the number of competi-
tors goes up. The crucial distinction between these two examples is the equilibrium consumer
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(a) Mean prices (b) Consumer surplus
(c) Producer surplus (d) Welfare
Figure 3.3: Comparative statics of an increase in the number of firms (νc = 0.79, σc = 2.5)
search intensity. Table 3.2 shows that most of the consumers (more than 63%) exercise price
comparisons in this case while Table 3.1 showed the opposite evidence. Consumers who con-
duct an exhaustive search in the market become disproportionately less attractive for a firm as
more competitors are around. This effect, which leads to higher prices, has here a dominating
influence and results in lower consumer surplus and greater industry profits. Welfare is again
decreasing in N due to the rise of actually incurred search costs.
In summary, this section shows that mergers can lead to an increase or to a decrease in
average prices and that the direction of the effect depends on the extent of search frictions in
the market. For the econometrician, the question is how to elicit such information on the basis
of observable market variables. This is the question we address in the remaining of the paper.
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3.5 Estimation
In this section we discuss how to estimate the unknown distribution function G (·, ·) of search
costs and consumer valuations if we observe the prices of the products in several markets. As
mentioned in the Introduction, the estimation method employed is maximum likelihood. This
method is well suited for the model presented in Section 3.2 because the model predicts that the
prices in a market are the outcome of a mixed strategy price equilibrium. Therefore, observed
prices are draws from the same equilibrium price distribution. In this section we maintain the
assumption that such an equilibrium price distribution exists in each market. This is not a
restrictive assumption because, without it, any method of estimation of this model fails. The
validity of this assumption can be verified posterior to estimation by comparing the empirical
price distribution with the estimated price distribution in a given market.
Taking these considerations into account, we can write the log-likelihood function corre-
sponding to a market as LL(p) =
∑
i log f(pi), where subscript i stands for firm i in the
market and f is the density function of the prices. Since we assume that prices in different
markets are independent, the log-likelihood corresponding to all markets will be the sum of the
log-likelihoods for the markets.
The density of prices in a market can be found by taking the implicit derivative of equation
(3.7) with respect to p. This gives
f(p) =
∑N
k=1 kdk(p)(1− F (p))k−1 + (p− r)
∑N
k=1 k
∂dk(p)
∂p
(1− F (p))k−1
(p− r)∑Nk=2 k(k − 1)dk(p)(1− F (p))k−2 ,
where
∂d1(p)
∂p
=
 −
∫ p−E[p]}
c1
g(p, c)dc if p > c1 + E[p]
0 otherwise,
and for k = 2, 3, ...N
∂dk(p)
∂p
=
 −
∫ min{ 1
k
(p−E[min{p1,p2,...,pk}]),ck−1}
ck
g(p, c)dc if p > kck + E[min{p1, p2, . . . , pk}]
0 otherwise.
We note that in the expression of the density we will substitute the distribution function F (·)
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computed from equation (3.7), which by Lemma 3.4 is determined uniquely. Regarding the
estimation of the firms’ marginal cost in a market, we use equation (3.8), which yields
r =
p
∑N
k=1 kµk − p¯d1(p¯)∑N
k=1 kµk − d1(p¯)
.
We now make some remarks regarding the consistency of the maximum likelihood estima-
tor. Since we use price data from several markets, it is likely that the distributions of these
prices are different. Therefore, the conditions for consistency of the estimator are slightly dif-
ferent from the iid case. Hoadley (1971) studies the maximum likelihood estimator for non-
identically distributed observations, so one option is to verify the conditions considered there.
The most challenging condition is identification. Since, as we will see, the bivariate val-
uation and search cost distribution function G (·, ·) cannot be identified nonparametrically, we
discuss first the estimation and identification of a special case of the model, namely the model
without valuation heterogeneity. Then we propose some flexible parametric assumptions for
our general model presented above, and discuss the estimation of the valuation and search cost
distribution function in that case.
3.5.1 The simple model: heterogeneous search costs, homogeneous valu-
ations
It is useful to start the discussion on identification and estimation of the unknown parameters
by considering a simpler model where all consumers have identical valuations. Such a model
has been studied by Hong and Shum (2006) and is also studied in Chapter 2. In what follows
we argue that the distribution of search costs cannot be identified in its full support using data
from only one market. This problem, which of course carries over to the more general model, is
dealt with in this paper by pooling data from multiple markets with similar search costs, which
requires the use of a novel estimation technique in this literature.
Let v > 0 denote the common consumer valuation for the good. It is straightforward to see
that the upper bound of the equilibrium price distribution must be equal to v and the equilibrium
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equation (3.7) simplifies to
(pi − r)
[
N∑
k=1
kµk
N
(1− F (pi))k−1
]
=
µ1(v − r)
N
(3.12)
with lower bound
p =
µ1(v − r)∑N
k=1 kµk
+ r. (3.13)
Equation (3.12) can easily be inverted to obtain
p(z) =
µ1(v − r)∑N
k=1 kµk(1− z)k−1
+ r.
so that the critical search cost parameters can be computed from the following system of equa-
tions:
c0 = v −
∫ 1
0
(
(v − r)µ1∑N
k=1 kµk(1− z)k−1
+ r
)
dz; (3.14a)
ck =
1∫
0
(
(v − r)µ1∑N
k=1 kµk(1− z)k−1
+ r
)
[(k + 1)z − 1](1− z)k−1dz, k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
(3.14b)
The price density function is in this case
f(p) =
∑N
k=1
kµk
N
(1− F (p))k−1
(p− r)∑Nk=1 k(k−1)µkN (1− F (p))k−2 . (3.15)
the log-likelihood function is LL(p) =
∑
i log f(pi).
Before discussing how to determine the density function explicitly we make some obser-
vations on it. First, the fraction of consumers µN can be eliminated from equation (3.15) by
substituting it by 1 −∑N−1k=0 µk; here we assume that the econometrician observes µ0, i.e., the
fraction of consumers who do not participate in the market. Second, we can solve equation
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(3.13) for
r =
p
∑N
k=1 kµk − µ1v∑N
k=2 kµk
,
and eliminate it from the price density. Third, we can estimate p and v superconsistently by
taking the minimum price and the maximum price observed in the data, respectively. As a
result, the only parameters unknown in the density function are {µk}N−1k=1 .
One possibility is to estimate these fractions of consumers µk directly by maximum likeli-
hood. Using the ML estimates of these fractions of consumers, and the fact that
µk =
∫ ck−1
ck
dGc(c) = Gc(ck−1)−Gc(ck), for all k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1; (3.16a)
µN =
∫ cN−1
0
dGc(c) = Gc(cN−1). (3.16b)
we can compute ML estimates of {ck}N−1k=0 from equations (3.14a) and (3.14b). Once we have
obtained ML estimates for the {µk}Nk=1 and {ck}N−1k=0 , we can construct a spline approximation
estimate of the search cost distribution Gc(c). This approach can only be applied if the econo-
metrician observes the prices of the firms over an extended period of time, as shown in Chapter
2.7 Here we do not follow this approach because, as we show below, it cannot identify the
search cost distribution in its entire support, not even if we let N →∞.
In this paper we employ a method that is different in essence and which, by pooling price
data from different markets, allows us to identify the whole search cost distribution (for details
we refer to the subsection on identification). More precisely, we estimate the search cost density
function directly by a flexible polynomial-type parametric function. Then we compute {µk}N−1k=1
and {ck}N−1k=0 from the system of equations in (3.14a), (3.14b), (3.16a) and (3.16b) in terms of
the parameters of this function, and using equation (3.12) and then equation (3.15) we express
the F (pi)’s and the f (pi)’s, respectively, in terms of these parameters. This way we obtain the
log-likelihood as a function of the parameters of the polynomial-type parametric function used
7Since there are N − 1 parameters to estimate, observation of a single period cross-section of prices is not
sufficient because after estimating the upper and the lower bound of the price distribution only N − 2 data points
are left. Hong and Shum (2006) propose to estimate only some of the µ′ks but this has the problem that the choice
of µ′ks becomes arbitrary. Alternatively, in Chapter 2 we propose to study a finitely repeated version of the game.
Since the static equilibrium is also the equilibrium of the repeated game, prices observed in a market during certain
time horizon are iid draws from the same distribution.
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to estimate the search cost density.
For the polynomial-type parametric function that estimates the search cost density we em-
ploy the so-called semi-nonparametric (SNP) density estimator (Gallant and Nychka, 1987).
This SNP estimator is based upon a Hermite polynomial expansion. The idea of this is that any
reasonable density can be mimicked by such a Hermite polynomial series. SNP density estima-
tors are essentially nonparametric, just like the spline approximation method described above,
because the set of all Hermite polynomial expansions is dense in the set of density functions
that are relevant (Gallant and Nychka, 1987).
To apply the SNP estimation in our problem, we specify the search cost density as
gc(c; γ, σ, θ) =
[
pn∑
i=0
θiui(c)
]2
pn∑
i=0
θ2i
, θ ∈ Θpn ,Θpn = {θ : θ = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θpn), θ0 = 1},
where pn is the number of polynomial terms,
u0(c) = (cσ
√
2pi)−1/2 exp(−((log c− γ)/σ)2/4),
u1(c) = (cσ
√
2pi)−1/2((log c− γ)/σ) exp(−((log c− γ)/σ)2/4),
ui(c) =
[
((log c− γ)/σ)ui−1(c)−
√
i− 1ui−2(c)
]
/
√
i for i ≥ 2.
This parametric form corresponds to the univariate SNP estimator studied extensively by Fenton
and Gallant (1996). Our expressions are obtained by transforming their random variable x with
the density defined in their Section 4.3 to c = expγ+σx. This transformation is useful in our
case since search costs are positive.
The vector of parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood is {γ, σ, θ0, θ1, . . . , θpn}.
The consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator can be established by verifying the con-
ditions provided by Gallant and Nychka (1987) combined with the conditions from Hoadley
(1971). A condition required by Gallant and Nychka (1987) is that the search cost density is
differentiable and strictly positive on its support.
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Identification of the simple model
In order to study the question whether the model can be identified, we ask whether the model
provides sufficient information to recover the unknowns of interest given that we have full
knowledge of the price distribution. This kind of treatment of the identification problem is in the
spirit of Koopmans and Reiersøl (1950). It should be obvious by now that, since prices reflect
only the behavior of the groups of consumers µk and not the behavior of individual consumers in
this model, considering a market operated by a finite number of firms is not sufficient to identify
the search cost distribution in its entire support. Because of this, in this subsection we consider
markets with infinitely (but countably) many firms, and therefore, we have infinite sequences
(µk)k≥1 of fractions of consumers who search for k firms and (ck)k≥0 of cutoff points.
We prove three results here. Our first result provides conditions for identifying the search
cost distribution at the cutoff points ck when we observe the price distribution from one market.
More precisely, it says that if we know the price distribution F (p), r and µ0 then we can identify
the height of the search cost distribution corresponding to the cut-off points ck’s. This result is
auxiliary to the next two results. The second result shows that we cannot identify the whole
search cost distribution when we observe prices from only one market. The third result shows
that, when we observe prices from several markets, we can identify the search cost distribution
on the interval [0, sup c0], where sup c0 is the supremum of the set of c0-cutoff points from all
markets.8 We place the proofs in the Appendix to ease the reading.
Proposition 3.2 Consider the simple model where all consumers have identical valuations v.
Suppose that the triple of endogenous variables
(
F, (µk)k≥1 , (ck)k≥0
)
is generated by the triple
of exogenous variables (Gc, v, r) and that
(
F ′, (µ′k)k≥1 , (c
′
k)k≥0
)
is generated by (G′c, v
′, r′),
whereGc, G′c are distribution functions with support (0,∞) and positive density on this support.
Suppose also that F is a distribution function with support
(
p, p
)
and that F ′ = F . In addition,
assume the conditions
1. r′ = r,
2. µ′0 = µ0.
8We note that, since the main reason for estimating a search cost distribution is to perform policy analyses,
estimating the search cost distribution on the interval
[
0, ŝup c0
]
is sufficient in most practical applications; here
ŝup c0 denotes the estimate of sup c0 that one obtains from our estimation procedure.
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Then µ′k = µk, c
′
k = ck and G
′
c (ck) = Gc (ck) for any k ≥ 0.
Regarding the conditions we note that, in our belief, Condition 1 is not necessary. We adopt
it here in order to make the problem analytically tractable (see the remark after the proof in
the Appendix for some intuition). With respect to Condition 2 we note that it reflects the need,
already mentioned above, that the econometrician must observe µ0.
Even though the search cost distribution can be identified at the cutoff points, our second
result shows that identification of the whole search cost distribution using data from only one
market is not possible. Intuitively, the reason is that the sequence of critical points (ck)k≥0 is
convergent to zero so we cannot get identification at higher quantiles.
Proposition 3.3 Consider the simple model where all consumers have identical valuations v.
Suppose that
(
F, (µk)k≥1 , (ck)k≥0
)
and
(
F ′, (µ′k)k≥1 , (c
′
k)k≥0
)
are generated by (Gc, v, r) and
(G′c, v
′, r′), respectively, where Gc, G′c are distribution functions with support (0,∞) and posi-
tive density on this support. Suppose also that F and F ′ are distribution functions with supports(
p, p
)
and
(
p′, p′
)
, respectively. In addition, assume the conditions
1. r′ = r and v′ = v,
2. c′k = ck for any k ≥ 0,
3. G′c (ck) = Gc (ck) for any k ≥ 0.
Then F ′ = F .
Proposition 3.3 implies that the search cost distribution cannot be fully identified using price
information form only one market. This is because conditions 2 and 3 allow for two search cost
distributions Gc and G′c, to be different for a non-negligible set of points. This is due to the
fact that the model predicts that the sequence of cut-off points (ck)k converges monotonically
to zero and therefore it is not dense in the support [0,∞) of the search cost distribution.
This observation can be seen in Figure 3.4 where we plot the critical cutoff points ck for
different number of firms (N = 10, 15, 50 and 100). In these plots we set v = 500, r = 50
and assume consumer search costs follow a log-normal distribution with parameters (νc, σc) =
(0.5, 5). The graphs illustrate how the sequence of critical search costs ck is convergent to zero
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(a) N = 10 (b) N = 15
(c) N = 50 (d) N = 100
Figure 3.4: Non-identification from only one market
so increasing the number of firms does not help much to get information of the height of search
costs at high quantiles.
To overcome this problem we propose to consider a richer framework where the econo-
metrician has price data from several markets. In particular, we consider markets where the
consumer valuations are different but the search cost distribution is the same. Intuitively, this
solves the problem of identification because every market generates a distinctive set of cutoff
points, and this forces the search cost distribution to be uniquely determined for a larger set of
search cost values.
More formally, let m be a market index. Assume that in each market m there are infinitely
(countably) many firms. Assume also that there are infinitely (countably) many such markets.
Proposition 3.4 Consider the simple model where all consumers in a marketm have identical
valuations vm. Suppose that search costs have a distribution function Gc with support (0,∞)
and that the conditions in Proposition 3.2 are satisfied so in each marketm the valuesGc (cm,k)
of the search cost distribution corresponding to the cut-off points cm,k, k ≥ 0, are identified. In
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addition assume that
1. the valuations {vm}m≥1 are random variables drawn independently from a distribution
with support (0,∞) and
2. the marginal costs {rm}m≥1 are random variables drawn independently from a distribu-
tion with support denoted Sr.
Then Gc is identified on the interval [0, sup c0], where sup c0 is the supremum of the set of
c0-cutoff points from all markets.
The marginal cost of the firms will naturally vary across markets, but our identification result
needs only variation in consumer valuation. This can be seen explicitly from Condition 2 on the
marginal costs, because the support of their distribution Sr is not specified; it can be an interval,
an infinitely countable set, a finite set, or even a set with a single element. The only requirement
regarding the marginal costs is that they are independently drawn from a distribution with this
support.
We note that in practice the situation that there are many firms in each market is not the
only possibility to identify the search cost distribution nonparametrically. Another situation
is when the markets have only a few firms, whose prices are independent realizations of their
distributions and observed over many periods. This provides sufficient information to estimate
the valuations in each market, and Proposition 3.4 ensures nonparametric identification of the
search cost distribution.
It is also important to note that, in both situations, the number of firms in the market or the
number of time periods over which we observe the firms need not be very large. This is because
these observations serve the estimation of the valuation in the respective market, and this is
done by taking the maximum of the prices observed. This estimator is known to converge in
probability at a rate proportional to the number of observations, so for achieving a reasonable
precision it is not necessary to have a very large number of observations.
The ideas put forward in Proposition 3.4 are illustrated in Figure 3.5, where we plot all the
critical cutoff points ck obtained from different markets, each of them operated by 10 firms. In
these plots we set r = 50 and again assume consumer search costs follow a log-normal distribu-
tion with parameters (νc, σc) = (0.5, 5). We assume that the market with the highest consumer
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(a) M = 1, N = 10 (b) M = 5, N = 10
(c) M = 25, N = 10 (d) M = 50, N = 10
Figure 3.5: Identification from multiple markets
valuation has a vm which is 500 and that the market with the lowest consumer valuation has a
vm equal to 100. Furthermore, when there is only one market, we set vm = 500, when there
are two markets vm = {100, 500}, when there are five markets vm = {100, 200, 300, 400, 500},
and so on. The graphs illustrate how, when we increase the number of marketsM from 1 to 5,
25 and 50, the set of critical search cost points ck becomes denser and denser in the full support
of the search cost distribution.
Given that we need to pool price data from multiple markets to identify and quantify search
costs, the spline approximation method used earlier in the literature (and described above) can-
not be used. The reason is that the spline approximation method uses a two-step procedure
such that markets are not linked via the same underlying search cost distribution. In particular
the set of µk’s in a given market m maximizes the likelihood of prices in that market and not
necessarily the likelihood of all prices. The SNP estimator does not have this problem, because
the parameters of the search cost distribution are chosen directly to maximize the log-likelihood
of all markets together.
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Simulations
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the identification and estimation of search costs in the
simple model using price data. In particular we focus on the effects of using multiple markets
rather than only one market when estimating search costs. To obtain price samples, we assume
that the search cost density is a mixture of a log-normal and a gamma distribution, in particular
gc(c) = 0.3 · lognormal(c, 2, 5) + 0.7 · gamma(c, 5, 2).
Table 3.3 describes the parameters chosen for the simulations. Our first experiment (EXP1)
compares the estimated search cost distribution using data from a single market (EXP1A,M =
1) with that using data from six markets (EXP1B, M = 6). In every market there are five
firms active (N = 5) and the marginal cost is r = 50. In the estimation with one market
(EXP1A) we set v = 70, while in the estimation with six markets (EXP1B) v takes on values
70, 75, 80, 85, 90 and 95. The structure of experiments 2 (EXP2A versus EXP2B) and 3
(EXP3A versus EXP3B) is similar, but we take markets operated by a larger number of firms
(15 and 25 respectively) and at the same time we increase the number of markets (16 and 26
respectively). Note that, to avoid biases related to the sample size, in each experiment the
number of observations in the single-market case is the same as in the multiple-markets case.
The performance of the estimates is evaluated by computing a measure of distance between the
estimated search cost densities and the true density: L1 =
∫∞
0
|gˆc − gc| dx.
EXP1A EXP1B EXP2A EXP2B EXP3A EXP3B
M 1 6 1 16 1 26
N 5 5 15 15 25 25
#obs 30 30 240 240 650 650
r 50 50 50 50 50 50
v1 70 70 70 70 70 70
v2 - 75 - 75 - 75
v3 - 80 - 80 - 80
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
vM - 95 - 145 - 195
Table 3.3: Values for r and v
For our estimations, we set the number of polynomial terms in equation (3.12) equal to
the integer closest to the fifth root of the total number of observations (Fenton and Gallant,
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EXP1A EXP1B EXP2A EXP2B EXP3A EXP3B
M 1 6 1 16 1 26
N 5 5 15 15 25 25
#obs 30 30 240 240 650 650
γ 0.00 1.12 2.23 1.88 14.82 2.50
σ 0.57 1.32 1.76 1.15 9.06 1.25
θ0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
θ1 0.81 0.58 0.16 0.15 7.97 -0.33
θ2 0.83 0.38 -0.03 -0.21 -0.93 -0.28
θ3 - - -0.38 -0.43 -3.47 -0.11
θ4 - - - - -1.21 0.43
LL 38.664 35.976 197.845 596.332 386.207 2016.254
L1 (0,∞) 1.552 0.801 0.932 0.453 1.362 0.409
Table 3.4: Parameter estimates
1996). For example, in our first experiment (EXP1) we estimate two additional polynomial
terms, while experiment 3 has four extra polynomial parameters. Table 3.4 gives the estimates
of the parameters of the SNP distribution for the different experiments. The table shows that the
measure of fit is always lower when we use multiple markets than when we use a single market,
which means that the fit with multiple markets is superior.
The goodness of fit can be seen in Figure 3.6, where we have plotted the estimated search
cost cdf’s and pdf’s together with the true ones. In Figures 3.6(a) and 3.6(b), we present the
cdf’s and pdf’s obtained with data from one market only. It can readily be seen that the fit of the
estimated search cost cdf and pdf gets better as we increase the number of firms and the number
of observations, but only for search costs less than 2, approximately. This is because the search
cost distribution cannot be identified for larger search cost values.
In Figures 3.6(c) and 3.6(d), we present the cdf’s and pdf’s obtained with data from multiple
markets. Like in the case of data from one market only, the fit of the estimated search cost cdf
and pdf gets better as we increase the number of firms and markets. However, the crucial
difference is that multiple markets allow us to identify the search cost distribution not only at
low search cost values but also at high ones. This is reflected by the fact that the estimates of
the unknown distributions are closer to the true ones in the entire support.
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(a) cdf’s one market (b) pdf’s one market
(c) cdf’s multiple markets (d) pdf’s multiple markets
Figure 3.6: Estimated and true search cost cdf’s and pdf’s
3.5.2 The general model: heterogeneous search costs and valuations
In this section we turn our attention to the general model where there is search cost and valu-
ation heterogeneity. We argue here that nonparametric identification of the joint valuation and
search cost distribution function is not possible. The argument builds on the discussion of the
identification of the simple model without valuation heterogeneity. For this simple model the
information from the price distribution, which can be regarded as a continuum, is mapped to a
discrete non-dense set of critical search cost cutoffs ck’s. In order to identify the model we have
shown we have to make up for the information lost by using price observations from many mar-
kets, which enables us to make the set of the critical search cost values dense. For the general
model the situation is similar so by using price observations from many markets we can only
make up for the information lost needed to estimate the search cost distribution, which is not
sufficient for estimating the joint distribution of valuations and search costs.
If the econometrician suspects there is significant variation in consumer valuations, we pro-
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pose to estimate the general model using a flexible parametric joint distribution for valuations
and search costs. The parametric form is a bivariate SNP density function that corresponds to
random variables transformed, as for the univariate nonparametric case described in Section
3.5.1, by the exponential so that
g(v, c) =
[
K∑
i=0
K∑
j=0
αij√
pi
(log v − γv)i(log c− γc)j
]2
exp
[
− (log v−γv)2
2σ2v
− (log c−γc)2
2σ2c
]
2cvσcσv
.
This transformed SNP distribution inherits some computational advantages from the SNP dis-
tribution proposed by Gallant and Nychka (1987) because the corresponding probabilities can
be computed as
∫ bv
av
∫ bc
ac
g(v, c)dc dv =
K∑
i,j,k,l=0
αijαkl
2piσcσv
∫ bv
av
(log v − γv)i+k
v
exp
[
−(log v − γv)
2
2σ2v
]
dv ×
×
∫ bc
ac
(log c− γc)j+l
c
exp
[
−(log c− γc)
2
2σ2c
]
dc,
and the involved univariate integrals can be transformed to univariate Hermite integrals. Since
it is an SNP density, the fact that we can increase the number of its parameters by taking a
larger K allows for the estimation of a large parametric class of joint valuation and search cost
densities. To ensure integration to 1 we scale the density by S, which is defined as
S =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
g(v, c)dcdv.
In this case, identification of the parameters of the joint density of valuations and search
costs is a question of parametric identification of nonlinear models. As such, due to the compli-
cations caused by the nonlinear structure, it is very difficult to give an answer to this question.
The standard intuitive reasoning, however, applies in our setting as well. If we observe a large
number of prices, then equation (3.7) is satisfied for each of them, so we have a large number
of equations with as many unknowns as the number of parameters, which appear in the expres-
sion of the dk’s. Due to nonlinearity, the equations contain sufficient new information about the
parameters, so these equations determine the parameters uniquely. The simulations presented
below illustrate, among others, the parametric identification of the joint density of valuations
and search costs.
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Simulations
To illustrate the parametric identification of the joint density of valuations and search costs we
generate price data using the SNP distribution function given above with K = 1, γv = 5,
γc = 2, σv = 0.3, σc = 1.25, α00 = 1, α01 = 1, α10 = 0.1 and α11 = 0.1. Next we estimate
the model using either 100 price observations (EXP1), 200 price observations (EXP2), or 1000
price observations (EXP3). Because the scale of the α’s is not determined we set α00 = α01 = 1
so the only α’s estimated are α10 and α11. The parameter estimates are given in Table 3.5. In
Figure 3.7(a) the true marginal search cost distribution is plotted together with the estimated
marginal search cost distributions for the several experiments. Similarly, in Figure 3.7(b) the
true marginal valuation distribution is shown together with the estimated marginal valuation
distributions.
TRUE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3
N 5 5 5 5
M - 100 200 1000
γv 5.000 5.049 5.053 5.053
γc 2.000 2.044 1.964 1.955
σv 0.300 0.124 0.163 0.186
σc 1.250 1.172 1.260 1.245
α00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
α01 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
α10 0.100 -0.622 0.090 0.483
α11 0.100 0.742 0.080 0.012
(a) SNP parameters
TRUE EXP1 EXP2 EXP3
N 5 5 5 5
M - 100 200 1000
r 20.00 7.92 16.91 15.84
p 68.82 68.82 68.82 68.82
p 135.51 135.51 135.51 135.51
µ0 0.414 0.286 0.319 0.340
µ1 0.440 0.549 0.511 0.522
µ2 0.066 0.091 0.085 0.083
µ3 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.015
µ4 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
µ5 0.068 0.062 0.073 0.071
(b) µk’s
Table 3.5: Estimation results
As can be seen from Figure 3.7(a), using 1000 price observations gives the best results,
although all the estimated marginal cost distributions are quite close to true marginal distribu-
tion, even when only 100 prices are used for the estimation. The same is true for the marginal
valuation distribution, although the differences are now somewhat bigger.
3.6 Conclusions
Since the seminal contribution of Stigler (1961), economists have dedicated a significant amount
of effort to understand the nature of competition in markets where price information is not
readily available to consumers. One of the lessons learned is that consumer search models may
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(a) Marginal search cost cdf (b) Marginal valuation cdf
Figure 3.7: True and estimated marginal search cost and valuation cdf
lead to predictions different that those from conventional economic theory. For example, in the
model presented in this paper mergers of firms may lead to higher or to lower average prices in
the market, the particular direction depending on the moments of the search cost distribution.
This motivates the development of methods to identify and estimate search costs.
This paper studies the estimation of a class of nonsequential consumer search models, where
symmetric firms sell homogenous products and consumers differ in their valuations and in their
search costs. We find that this model does not allow for the nonparametric identification of
the search cost distribution at all the points of its support when the econometrician observes
prices from only one market. We propose a way to solve this pitfall, namely by considering
a richer framework where the econometrician has price data from several markets with the
same search cost distribution. Pooling price data from multiple markets enables us to iden-
tify nonparametrically the search cost density fully. To take advantage of the common search
cost distribution underlying all the markets, we estimate the search cost density function by a
semi-nonparametric (SNP) density estimator whose parameters maximize the joint likelihood
corresponding to all the markets. This approach can be used when all consumers have identical
valuations. If consumers differ in their willingness to pay but valuations are not correlated with
search costs, still search costs can be identified nonparametrically. When there is correlation,
only parametric identification obtains.
Our model has featured a market where symmetric firms sell homogeneous products. These
two assumptions together imply that the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, with all the com-
petitors drawing prices from the same price distribution. The fact that firms mix in equilibrium
gives the econometrician sufficient information to estimate the model using only price data.
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Relaxing these assumptions is an interesting avenue for further research. The drawback in prac-
tical applications is that firm heterogeneity should lead to pure-strategy equilibria, which would
require the use of market share data for estimation.
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APPENDIX: Proofs identification simple model
Here we summarize the problem of identification in the simple model and give the proofs of
the propositions in Section 3.5.1. Identification seeks an answer to the question whether the
model provides sufficient information to recover the unknowns of interest when we have full
knowledge of the distribution of the observed variables. In the case of our model we study
whether we can determine the search cost distribution Gc, the consumer valuation v and the
firms’ marginal cost r, when we know the price distribution.
For this, we consider infinitely many firms in the model. Then the model can be described
as follows. The exogenous variables are the triplet (Gc, v, r) that generate the endogenous
variables (F, {µk}k≥1, {ck}k≥0). In this section we maintain the assumption that these latter
variables exist. They satisfy
∑
k≥1
kµk (1− F (p))k−1 = µ1p− r
p− r for any p ∈
(
p, p
]
, (A3.17a)
p = v, (A3.17b)
µk = Gc (ck−1)−Gc (ck) for any k ≥ 1, (A3.17c)
ck =
∫ p
p
F (p) (1− F (p))k dp for any k ≥ 0. (A3.17d)
As before in the paper, here we also use the notation µ0 = 1−
∑
k≥1 µk.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. As argued in the text, the upper bound of F must be equal to
the consumer valuation, i.e., p = v, so v′ = v; by Condition 1, r′ = r. First we show that
µ′k = µk for any k. For this we note first that neither µ1 nor µ
′
1 can be equal to zero. If µ1 = 0
then by equation (A3.17a)
∑
k≥2 kµk (1− F (p))k−1 = 0 for any p ∈
(
p, p
]
, which, due to the
fact that F is continuous, can only happen if µk = 0 for any k ≥ 2. This further implies by
equation (A3.17c) that Gc (ck) = Gc (c0) for any k ≥ 1. By equation (3.4b), cn = en − en+1,
where en = E [min {p1, ..., pn}]. Since en ≥ en+1 and en ≥ p for any n, the series (en)n is
convergent. Hence cn → 0 as n → ∞. Because Gc is continuous in 0, Gc (cn) → Gc (0) = 0,
soGc (c0) = 0. Because the density function corresponding toGc is positive on (0,∞), this can
only happen if c0 = 0. But by equation (A3.17d) c0 =
∫ p
p
F (p) dp, which is positive because F
is a continuous cdf with support
(
p, p
)
, so we arrive at a contradiction. Since exactly the same
arguments apply to µ′1, we have shown that µ1 and µ
′
1 are strictly positive.
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From equation (A3.17a) we obtain
∑
k≥1
k
µk
µ1
(1− F (p))k−1 = v − r
p− r =
∑
k≥1
k
µ′k
µ′1
(1− F (p))k−1 for any p ∈ (p, p] .
This is equivalent to
∑
k≥2
λkt
k−1 = 0 for any t ∈ (0, α) , (A3.18)
where λk = k
(
µk
µ1
− µ′k
µ′1
)
for k ≥ 1 and t = 1 − F (p). This latter transformation is possible
because F is strictly increasing on some interval (p˜, p), where 1− F (p˜) = α. We now refer to
Lemma 3.5 below. This lemma implies that equation (A3.18) can only hold if λk = 0 for any
k ≥ 2. Therefore µk
µ1
=
µ′k
µ′1
. On the other hand, by Condition 2, µ1+
∑
k≥2 µk = µ
′
1+
∑
k≥2 µ
′
k =
1− µ0, which implies 1−µ0µ1 =
1−µ0
µ′1
. Therefore µ′k = µk for any k ≥ 1.
The equalities c′k = ck follow from equation (A3.17d). It remains to show that G
′
c (ck) =
Gc (ck) for any k ≥ 0. We do so by showing that theGc (ck)’s for k ≥ 0 are uniquely determined
by the µk’s. By equation (A3.17c) Gc (ck−1) − Gc (ck) = µk for any k ≥ 1. This implies that
Gc (c0) − Gc (cn) =
∑n
k=1 µk. The limit of the right hand side, when n → ∞, exists and
is 1 − µ0. Therefore Gc (c0) − limn→∞Gc (cn) = 1 − µ0. Because Gc is continuous in 0 ,
Gc (cn)→ Gc (0) = 0. Therefore Gc (c0) = 1− µ0 and Gc (cn) = 1−
∑n
k=0 µk for any n ≥ 1.
The result then follows from the equality of the µk’s established above. 
Remark 1 Condition 1 is probably not necessary but we adopt it here for the simplicity of the
proof. If this condition does not hold then equation (A3.17a) implies
p− r
v − r
∑
k≥1
k
µk
µ1
(1− F (p))k−1 = p− r
′
v − r′
∑
k≥1
k
µ′k
µ′1
(1− F (p))k−1 for any p ∈ (p, p] ,
and this cannot be simplified to a power series identity as equation (A3.18). Still intuition
suggests that the equalities µ′k = µk and r
′ = r follow, since we may view this as a system of a
continuum of equations with countably many unknowns r, r′, µk, µ′k for k ≥ 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Conditions 2 and 3 together with equation (A3.17c) imply that
µ′k = µk for any k ≥ 1. From the proof of Proposition 3.2 we know that µ1 > 0, so by equations
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(A3.17a) and (A3.17b), and the first condition we have
∑
k≥1
kµk (1− F ′ (p))k−1 = µ1v − r
p− r for any p ∈
(
p′, p′
]
,
without the right hand side being identically 0. Therefore F ′ (p) = F (p) for any p ∈ (p′, p′].
This implies, by using the continuity of F , that F
(
p′
)
= 0 and F (p′) = 1 so p′ ≤ p and p ≤ p′.
If now we interchange F and F ′ in this argument then we obtain p ≤ p′ and p′ ≤ p, so p′ = p
and p = p′. This implies that F ′ = F . 
Proof of Proposition 3.4. In the proof we write c0 (v, r) to make explicit the dependence
of c0 on v and r. The dependence of c0 (v, r) on v and r is continuous because the dependence
of the price distribution F on v and r is continuous and c0 is given by equation (A3.17d).
Take an arbitrary interval (a, b) ⊂
(
0, supv∈(0,∞)
r∈Sr
c0 (v, r)
)
. Then the pre-image set defined
as c−10 (a, b) = {(v, r) |c0 (v, r) ∈ (a, b)} is a nonempty set, open in (0,∞) × Sr because c0 is
a continuous function of v and r. Therefore, with probability 1, there exists an m such that
(vm, rm) ∈ c−10 (a, b), which means that c0 (vm, rm) ∈ (a, b). Because the interval (a, b) has
been chosen arbitrarily, we have proved that for any interval, with probability 1 we can find an
m such that c0 (vm, rm) is included in the interval. Hence the set {c0 (vm, rm) |m ≥ 1} is dense
in (0,∞) with probability 1. We know thatGc (cm,0) = Gc (c0 (vm, rm)),m ≥ 1, are identified.
Then, since it is continuous, Gc is identified on
(
0, supv∈(0,∞)
r∈Sr
c0 (v, r)
)
. 
Lemma 3.5 (Power Series) Suppose that (an)n≥1 ⊂ R and
∑
n≥1 anx
n = 0 ∀x ∈ (0, α) for
some α > 0. Then an = 0 for any n ≥ 1.
Proof.
∑
n≥1 anx
n = 0 implies a1+x
∑
n≥0 an+2x
n = 0 ∀x ∈ (0, α). This can also be writ-
ten as
∑
n≥0 an+2x
n = −a1
x
∀x ∈ (0, α), which means that the power series∑n≥0 an+2xn con-
verges ∀x ∈ (0, α). Then by Lemma 3.6 below there exists ρ ∈ (0, α) such that∑n≥0 an+2xn
is uniformly convergent on [−ρ, ρ]. Let p1 (x) be its limit, where p1 : [−ρ, ρ] → R, that is,∑
n≥0 an+2x
n = p1 (x) ∀x ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. Therefore
a1 = −xp1 (x) ∀x ∈ [−ρ, ρ] . (A3.19)
The function p1 is continuous because it is the uniform limit of a sequence of continuous func-
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tions, so limx→0 p1 (x) = p1 (0) = a2. This further implies that limx→0 xp1 (x) = 0, so based
on equation (A3.19), for any ε > 0 there is δ (ε) > 0 such that |a1| = |xp1 (x)| < ε for any x
with |x| < δ (ε). This implies that a1 = 0.
So we have obtained that
∑
n≥2 anx
n = 0 ∀x ∈ (0, α), which implies ∑n≥2 anxn−1 =
0 ∀x ∈ (0, α). By renaming the sequence (an)n≥2 as (bn)n≥1 with bn = an+1 we have∑
n≥1 bnx
n = 0 ∀x ∈ (0, α). The arguments of the previous paragraph imply that b1 = 0,
that is, a2 = 0. Going on this way we can show that an = 0 for any n ≥ 1. 
The following lemma is a version of a result also known as Abel’s Uniform Convergence
Test.
Lemma 3.6 (Abel) Suppose that the series
∑
n≥0 anx
n
0 is convergent. Then ∀ρ with 0 < ρ <
|x0| the series
∑
n≥0 anx
n is uniformly convergent ∀x ∈ [−ρ, ρ].
Proof. Let y be arbitrary with 0 < |y| < |x0|. First we note that the convergence of the
series
∑
n≥0 anx
n
0 implies that limn→∞ anx
n
0 = 0 and therefore there existsM with |anxn0 | < M
∀n. The sequence bn =
∑n
k=0 |ak| |y|k is convergent because it is increasing and
n∑
k=0
|ak| |y|k =
n∑
k=0
|ak| |x0|k |y|
k
|x0|k
< M
n∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣ yx0
∣∣∣∣k ≤ M
1−
∣∣∣ yx0 ∣∣∣ ∀n,
that is, (bn)n is bounded above. Let b = limn→∞ bn =
∑
k≥0 |ak| |y|k. Then the sequence∑
k≥n+1 |ak| |y|k = b− bn, and hence it converges to 0.
In particular, by taking y = ρ we have obtained that
∑
k≥n+1 |ak| ρk converges to 0 for
arbitrary ρ with 0 < ρ < |x0| and by taking y = |x| we have obtained that
∑
k≥0 |ak| |x|k is
convergent for ∀x ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. This latter statement means that the series∑k≥0 akxk is absolutely
convergent and hence convergent for ∀x ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. So we can write
sup
x∈[−ρ,ρ]
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k≥0
akx
k −
n∑
k=0
akx
k
∣∣∣∣∣ = supx∈[−ρ,ρ]
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
k≥n+1
akx
k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ supx∈[−ρ,ρ] ∑k≥n+1 |ak| |x|k ≤
∑
k≥n+1
|ak| ρk.
Since the right hand side goes to 0 as n → ∞, we have obtained that∑nk=0 akxk converges to∑
k≥0 akx
k uniformly for x ∈ [−ρ, ρ]. 

4Truly costly sequential search and
oligopolistic pricing
NOTE: This chapter is based on Janssen, Moraga-Gonza´lez, and Wildenbeest (2004, 2005).
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter and the next chapter we move from nonsequential search to sequential search.
The main difference between the two search protocols is that with sequential search consumers
decide after each search whether to continue searching or not, while with nonsequential search
consumers determine how many times to search before they start searching. As shown in Mor-
gan and Manning (1985), which of the two is optimal depends on the market studied.
This chapter is more theory oriented than the other chapters in the thesis, although in the
end of this chapter it will be briefly discussed how to estimate the model presented. The starting
point of this chapter is a celebrated article by Stahl (1989). In this chapter oligopolistic pricing
in the presence of sequential consumer search is being studied. There are two types of con-
sumers in the market. Fully informed consumers (referred to as shoppers in his article) have no
opportunity cost of time and thus search for all prices at no cost; non-shoppers search sequen-
tially, i.e., they first observe one price and then decide whether or not to observe a second price,
and so on.1 Stahl (1989) assumes that consumers observe the first price quotation for free, as
do many other papers in the search literature, which implies that every buyer makes at least one
search. In the first part of this chapter, we study the implications of relaxing this assumption.
The optimal sequential search rule implies that a consumer with a price at hand continues
searching if, and only if, the observed price is higher than a certain reservation price. Know-
ing this, no firm will charge prices above consumers’ reservation price. Therefore, under the
assumption that obtaining the first price observation is costless, buyers ‘search’ exactly once in
equilibrium and buy at the observed price. In this chapter, we refer to this type of equilibrium
as one with full consumer participation. This equilibrium is one of the two possible equilibrium
configurations when the first price quotation is not for free. The new type of equilibrium that
arises with truly costly search is one with partial consumer participation, where some buyers
decide not to search at all as they rationally expect prices to be so high that they are indifferent
between searching and not searching. The existence and characterization of this new type of
equilibrium is one main contribution of this chapter.
Another main contribution is to provide the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium
with partial consumer participation. These comparative statics effects differ from those under
1The functioning of markets in the presence of sequential consumer search is also examined in Anderson and
Renault (1999), Reinganum (1979), Rob (1985) and Stahl (1996).
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full consumer participation in interesting ways. First, the equilibrium distribution of prices with
a given search cost dominates in a first-order stochastic sense the price distribution with a lower
search cost; as a result expected price increases as search cost decreases. This is due to the
fact that a decrease in search cost raises participation of non-shoppers, who happen to search
only once in equilibrium. As firms have monopoly power over these consumers, they raise their
prices. A second result is that an increase in the number of shoppers does not influence the
equilibrium price distribution. This is because more shoppers foster the participation of non-
shoppers in such a way that prices remain the same. Finally, we find that firm entry results in a
mean-preserving spread of prices and in a decrease in welfare because the market participation
rate of non-shoppers falls. The last two results imply that, unlike in Stahl’s model, expected
price does not tend to the monopoly price when the number of shoppers converges to zero,
nor when the number of firms goes to infinity. This is because when the fraction of shoppers
becomes very small, or the number of firms very large, the economy turns into an equilibrium
with partial consumer participation and in such an equilibrium expected price is insensitive to
changes in those parameters.
A third contribution is to provide a maximum likelihood method to estimate the model. The
estimation procedure exploits the structure of the model as in previous chapters. We show that
one cannot easily distinguish between the full and the partial consumer participation equilibrium
empirically. As a matter of fact, to tell whether one equilibrium if more plausible than the other,
one would need to have a priori knowledge of the share of consumers not participating in the
market. We apply the estimation method to the same database of prices as in Chapter 2. The
estimates indicate that the model does not do very well in explaining observed pricing patterns.
Seen together with the results in Chapter 2, this is somewhat surprising because sequential
search seems to be a more usual form of search online than nonsequential. This result, though
striking, should be seen cautiously because the model of this chapter is quite restrictive in the
sense that the search cost distribution is discrete and with only two atoms. Generalizing this
model to the case of a continuous search cost distribution is the subject matter of the next
chapter.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model. A full char-
acterization and an overview of the two types of equilibrium are given in Section 4.3. Section
4.4 presents the different comparative statics results. Section 4.5 presents the estimation pro-
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cedure. In Section 4.6 the method is applied to a data set of online prices. Finally, Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 The model
We examine the model of oligopolistic competition and sequential consumer search presented
in Stahl (1989), but we assume that all price quotations are costly to obtain for non-shoppers.
The features of the model are as follows. There are N firms that produce a homogeneous good
at constant returns to scale. Their identical unit cost can be normalized to zero and prices can
be interpreted as price-to-cost margins.2 There is a unit mass of buyers and we assume that
buyers hold inelastic demands.3 A consumer wishes to purchase at most a single unit of the
good and his/her valuation for the item is v > 0. A proportion µ ∈ (0, 1) of the consumers
has zero opportunity cost of time and therefore searches for prices costlessly. These consumers
are referred to as shoppers. The other 1− µ percent of the buyers, referred to as non-shoppers,
must pay search cost c > 0 to observe every price quotation they get, including the first one.
Non-shoppers search sequentially, i.e., a buyer first decides whether to sample a first firm or not
and then, upon observation of the price of the first firm, decides to search for a second price or
not, and so on. We assume that v > c.
Firms and buyers play the following game. An individual firm chooses its price taking price
choices of the rivals as well as consumers’ search behavior as given. Likewise, an individual
buyer forms conjectures about the distribution of prices in the market and decides on his/her
optimal search strategy. We restrict the analysis to symmetric Nash equilibria. The distribution
of prices charged by a firm is denoted by F (p), its density by f(p) and the lower and the upper
bound of its support by p and p¯, respectively.
2In Section 4.5 we relax this assumption by introducing a identical unit cost r.
3Stahl (1989) considers a more general specification of the demand function. The assumption of inelastic
demand allows us to compute explicitly the reservation price and give a full characterization of which type of
equilibrium exists for which configurations of parameters. Provided that consumer surplus at the monopoly price
does not fully cover the search cost, the main qualitative results of this chapter do not depend on the assumption of
inelastic demand.
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4.3 Equilibrium analysis
We first derive some auxiliary results.
Lemma 4.1 An equilibrium where non-shoppers do not search at all does not exist.
Proof. Suppose non-shoppers did not search. Then, the only consumers left in the market
would be the shoppers. Therefore, competition between stores would drive prices down to
marginal cost. But then, as v − c > 0, the non-shoppers would gain by deviating and searching
once. 
Lemma 4.1 reveals that existence of equilibrium requires the non-shoppers to be active in
the market with strictly positive probability. The next result is provided by Stahl (1989).
Lemma 4.2 In equilibrium non-shoppers will not search beyond the first firm.
Proof. See Lemma 2 of Stahl (1989). 
The idea behind Lemma 4.2 is that pricing above consumers’ reservation price is never
optimal for firms since buyers would continue searching if that were the case; as a result, the
price buyers find at the first store they encounter is always accepted and no further search takes
place.
Let us introduce the following notation. Let θ1 be the probability with which a non-shopper
searches once. Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 together imply that only two candidates for equilibrium
exist: either (a) θ1 = 1, or (b) 0 < θ1 < 1. The first case is similar to Stahl (1989). We
shall refer to this equilibrium as one with full consumer participation. This is because if all
consumers search once, they will all buy the good. This contrasts with case (b) where consumers
mix between not searching at all and searching once so not all consumers enter the market. In
this case, we will speak of partial consumer participation.
The next remark is that, since θ1 > 0 in any equilibrium, the equilibrium price distribution
must be atomless.
Lemma 4.3 Irrespective of the search behavior of non-shoppers, if F (p) is an equilibrium price
distribution, then it is atomless. Hence, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
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Proof. See Lemma 1 of Stahl (1989). The proof extends straightforwardly to the case of
partial consumer participation. 
We note that firms have an incentive to charge low prices in order to attract all the shoppers
but at the same time they also have an incentive to charge high prices to extract income from the
consumers who do not compare prices. These two forces are balanced when firms randomize
their prices. Lemma 4.3 shows that equilibria must necessarily exhibit price dispersion, and that
firm pricing is always characterized by atomless price distributions. In what follows we shall
examine the characterization and the existence of the different types of equilibrium.
Case a: Equilibrium with full consumer participation
Suppose that non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1, i.e., θ1 = 1. This is the
case analyzed by Stahl (1989) with two modifications. First, as Stahl considers a more general
demand structure, an explicit expression for the reservation price cannot be obtained. Second,
as Stahl (1989) assumes the first price quotation to be for free, this full participation equilibrium
exists for all values of the parameters in his model, but not in ours. We will explicitly define the
parameter space for which an equilibrium with full consumer participation exists when the first
price quotation is costly. These two modifications deserve a slightly extended analysis.
Under full consumer participation, the expected payoff to firm i from charging price pi when
its rivals choose a random pricing strategy according to the cumulative distribution F (·) is
pii(pi, F (pi)) = pi
[
1− µ
N
+ µ(1− F (pi))N−1
]
. (4.1)
This profit expression is easily interpreted. Firm i attracts the µ shoppers when it charges a price
that is lower than its rivals’ prices, which happens with probability (1 − F (pi))N−1. The firm
also serves the 1− µ non-shoppers whenever they visit its store, which occurs with probability
1/N .
In equilibrium, a firm must be indifferent between charging any price in the support of F (·).
Let us denote the upper bound of F (·) by p¯. Any price in the support of F (·) must then satisfy
pii(pi, F (·)) = pii(p¯), i.e.,
pi
[
1− µ
N
+ µ(1− F (pi))N−1
]
=
(1− µ)p¯
N
. (4.2)
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Solving this equation for the price distribution yields
F (p) = 1−
(
(1− µ)(p¯− p)
Nµp
) 1
N−1
. (4.3)
Since F (·) is a distribution function there must be some p for which F (p) = 0. Solving for p
one obtains the lower bound of the price distribution p = (1− µ)p¯/(µN + (1− µ)).
The cumulative distribution (4.3) represents optimal firm pricing. We now turn to discuss
optimal consumer behavior. Consider a buyer who has observed a given price p. This consumer
will continue to search if the expected benefits from searching further exceed the search cost.
We can define the reservation price ρ as the price that makes a consumer indifferent between
searching once more and accepting the price at hand; this price satisfies:∫ ρ
p
(ρ− p)f(p)dp = c. (4.4)
No firm will charge a price above ρ since this will lead to continued search (Stahl, 1989). As a
result the upper bound p¯ = ρ. We now derive an expression for ρ. First rewrite equation (4.4)
as
ρ− E[p]− c = 0. (4.5)
To calculate E[p] we solve equation (4.3) for p, which gives
p =
ρ
1 + bN(1− F )N−1 , (4.6)
where b = µ/(1 − µ) > 0. Note that E[p] = ρ − ∫ ρ
p
F (p)dp. By changing variables we can
write E[p] =
∫ 1
0
pdy. Plugging p from equation (4.6) gives, after rearranging,
E[p] = ρ
∫ 1
0
dy
1 + bNyN−1
. (4.7)
Equation (4.7) can be plugged into equation (4.5) to solve for ρ:
ρ =
c
1− ∫ 1
0
dy
1+bNyN−1
, (4.8)
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It can be shown that the reservation price ρ increases in c and in N , decreases in µ and is
insensitive to v.
It must be the case that ρ ≤ v. In addition, non-shoppers must find it profitable to search
once, rather than not searching at all, i.e.,
v − E[p]− c ≥ 0. (4.9)
Inspection of (4.5) and (4.9) implies that ρ ≤ v. It is useful to rewrite condition (4.9) as
1−
∫ 1
0
dy
1 + bNyN−1
≥ c
v
. (4.10)
This equation gives the set of parameters for which an equilibrium where buyers search once
for sure exists. For future reference, let us denote the left-hand-side of equation (4.10) as
Φ(1;µ;N).4 We note that 0 < Φ(1;µ;N) < 1 for all values of the parameters.
Proposition 4.1 Let 0 < c
v
≤ Φ(1;µ,N). Then a market equilibrium with full consumer
participation exists where firms prices are distributed according to equation (4.3) on the set
[(1 − µ)ρ/(µN + (1 − µ)), ρ] and all non-shoppers search once, where ρ = ρ and ρ solves
equation (4.8).
From equation (4.8) it follows that the reservation price ρ converges to v when c/v ap-
proaches Φ(1;µ,N). The question that arises is: What happens when search cost is high, in
particular when c
v
> Φ(1;µ,N)? In what follows we show that the symmetric equilibrium in-
volves partial consumer participation. This type of equilibrium is new in the sequential search
literature and, as we shall see later, its properties are quite interesting.
Case b: Equilibrium with partial consumer participation
Now suppose that non-shoppers randomize between searching once and not searching at all,
i.e., 0 < θ1 < 1. The expected payoff to firm i is
pii(pi, F (pi)) = pi
[
(1− µ)θ1
N
+ µ(1− F (pi))N−1
]
. (4.11)
4The number 1 in the arguments of Φ(·) stands for θ1=1.
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The economic interpretation of this profit function is analogous to that of equation (4.1), except
that now there are only (1− µ)θ1 non-shoppers active, rather than 1− µ. A similar analysis as
above yields the following equilibrium price distribution:
F (p) = 1−
(
θ1(1− µ)(p¯− p)
Nµp
) 1
N−1
, (4.12)
with support [p, p¯] where p = (1 − µ)θ1p¯/(µN + (1 − µ)θ1). We now notice that the upper
bound is no longer equal to ρ, but equal to v. To see this, note that non-shoppers optimal
behavior requires that they are indifferent between searching once and not searching all, i.e., it
must be the case that
v − E[p]− c = 0 (4.13)
It is obvious that conditions (4.5) and (4.13) can only hold together if p¯ = v. Condition (4.13)
can be rewritten as:
1−
∫ 1
0
dy
1 + 1
θ1
bNyN−1
=
c
v
. (4.14)
where b = µ/(1 − µ). For future reference, denote the left-hand-side of equation (4.14) as
Φ(θ1, µ,N). Inspection of this function reveals that Φ(0, µ,N) = 1 and that Φ(θ1, µ,N) is
monotonically decreasing in θ1 and increasing in µ. It can also be shown that Φ(θ1, µ,N)
decreases in N .
Proposition 4.2 Let Φ(1, µ,N) < c
v
< 1. Then a market equilibrium with partial consumer
participation exists where firms prices are distributed according to equation (4.12) on the set
[(1 − µ)θ1v/(µN + (1 − µ)θ1), v] and non-shoppers search once with probability θ1, which
is the solution to equation (4.14) (with the remaining probability, non-shoppers stay out of the
market).
In summary, the game outlined above has a unique symmetric equilibrium where consumers
may either search once surely, or mix between searching and not searching, depending on pa-
rameters. Inspection of the equations above immediately reveals that whether consumers par-
ticipate in the market fully or partially depends on three critical parameters: (i) the value of the
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purchase compared to the search cost c/v, (ii) the number of consumers with zero opportunity
cost of time µ, and (iii) the number of firms N . To illustrate this issue we have represented the
regions of parameters for which the equilibrium exhibits full or partial consumer participation
in Figure 4.1. In these graphs we set N = 2 and vary µ. The left graph exhibits a market with
many shoppers while the right one illustrates a market with just a few of them. The decreasing
curve represents Φ(θ1;µ,N) as a function of θ1. For large search cost parameters, say c1, non-
shoppers participate in the market with probability less than one. This probability is given by
the point at which the curve Φ(·) and the line c1/v intersect. When search cost is low enough,
e.g. c2, non-shoppers search for one price with probability one.
The region of parameters for which there is partial consumer participation is larger the lower
the parameter µ. This is because, as mentioned above, the functionΦ(·) falls as µ decreases (see
equation (4.14)). A similar remark can be made when N increases. Indeed, when µ approaches
0 orN becomes very large, Φ(θ1;µ,N) approaches 0 for all values of θ1. In that case the region
for which consumers participate partially in equilibrium covers almost the entire parameter
space. This indicates that partial consumer participation is relevant when the number of firms
in the market is large and/or there are few shoppers.
(a) µ = 0.8 (b) µ = 0.1
Figure 4.1: Parameter regions for which distinct types of equilibrium exist (N = 2)
4.4 Comparative statics
In this section we study the influence of changes in the parameters of the model on search
intensity θ1, on the equilibrium price distribution, on the average price charged in the market
E[p], and on welfare, denoted W . The main results are summarized in Table 4.1. The results
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for the case of full consumer participation are similar to Stahl (1989); the others are new. An
upwards (downwards) arrow means that the variable under consideration increases (falls); the
symbol ‘−’ means that the variable remains constant. Our discussion shall concentrate on the
most striking and interesting observations concerning the equilibrium with partial consumer
participation.
Partial consumer Full consumer
participation participation
θ1 E[p] W ρ E[p] W
↓ c ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
↑ µ ↑ − ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
↑ v ↑ ↑ ↑ − − ↑
↑ N ↓ − ↓ ↑ ↑ −
Table 4.1: Summary of comparative statics results
a. The effects of a reduction in search cost c
The first result we want to emphasize is that, under partial consumer participation, a reduction
in search cost leads to an increase in expected price. This follows immediately from the equi-
librium condition v − E[p] − c = 0. The intuition behind this result is simple. As Figure 4.1
shows, the intensity with which non-shoppers search in this type of equilibrium rises as c falls.
Note further that these consumers are precisely those who do not exercise price comparisons,
and thus they are prepared to accept higher prices. Consequently, a fall in c increases sellers’
incentives to charge higher prices. Indeed, inspection of equation (4.12) reveals that the dis-
tribution of prices with a high θ1 (lower c) dominates in a first-order stochastic sense the price
distribution with a low θ1 (higher c).
As c decreases further, non-shoppers eventually start participating fully. In such a case,
a decline in c results in a fall in the reservation price ρ (equation (4.8)). Inspection of the
equilibrium price distribution in Proposition 4.1 reveals that F increases as ρ decreases. As a
result, expected price decreases in c under full consumer participation.
These observations are illustrated in Figure 4.2. In Figure 4.2(a) we have simulated an
economy where the number of informed consumers is large (µ = 0.8). This graph shows that
expected price is non-monotonic in relative search cost c/v. When there are few shoppers in the
market (µ = 0.1) expected price decreases in search cost for almost the entire parameter region
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(a) µ = 0.8 (b) µ = 0.1
Figure 4.2: The influence of lower search cost c on expected price (N = 2)
(cf., Figure 4.2(b)). This is because for this parameter constellation the economy is most likely
in an equilibrium with partial consumer participation.
Welfare is given by W = µv + θ1(1 − µ)(v − c) in this market, with θ1 = 1 in the full
consumer participation case. A decrease in search cost c increases the surplus of the non-
shoppers as well as their participation rate; as a result, welfare increases as search cost falls.
Proposition 4.3 summarizes these findings. For this purpose, let ε > 0 be a small enough
number so that if non-shoppers participate fully when the search cost is c, they also do it when
the search cost increases to c+ ε.
Proposition 4.3 If non-shoppers participate partially (fully), the equilibrium distribution of
prices with search cost c dominates (is dominated by) the price distribution with a higher search
cost c+ε in a first-order stochastic sense. As a result, expected price is non-monotonic in search
cost. Moreover, welfare increases as search cost decreases.
b. The effects of an increase in the fraction of shoppers µ
We next consider the effects of an increase in µ. Under partial consumer participation, a change
in the number of shoppers does not influence expected price-to-cost margins as nothing changes
in the equilibrium condition v − E[p] − c = 0. To understand the economic forces underlying
this result, we first note that an increase in µ has in principle a pro-competitive effect. Keeping
the search intensity of non-shoppers constant, firms would tend to charge lower prices as the
number of shoppers in the market becomes higher. However, a change in µ also affects θ1. To
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see how, one can apply the implicit function theorem to equation (4.14) to obtain
dθ1
dµ
= − Φ
′
µ
Φ′θ1
=
θ1
µ(1− µ) > 0, (4.15)
which means that an increase in µ results in an increase in the search intensity of the non-
shoppers. This is because more informed consumers in the market makes searching more at-
tractive for the non-shoppers, as the former buyers put pressure on firms to cut prices. A higher
participation rate of non-shoppers in turn gives firms incentives to increase prices, since non-
shoppers do not compare prices. Interestingly, these two opposite forces offset each other so
that expected price remains constant. Indeed, it is easy to see that the entire distribution of prices
(4.12) does not change in µ. The reason is that, using equation (4.15), the ratio of non-shoppers
to shoppers θ1(1− µ)/µ is constant in µ.
If non-shoppers search for one price for sure, the pro-competitive effects of an increase in
µ mentioned above are strengthened by the fact that the reservation price ρ decreases in µ and
thus expected prices fall (cf., Stahl (1989)). These remarks are illustrated in Figure 4.3. Figure
4.3(a) simulates an economy where product’s valuation is relatively low compared to search
cost (c/v = 0.5). The figure depicts expected price-to-cost margins as a function of µ. As
Φ(1;µ;N) is decreasing in µ, it easily follows that for a given N and c/v, there is a unique µ̂
such that condition (4.10) holds with equality. Therefore, the market equilibrium exhibits partial
consumer participation when µ lies in the interval (0, µ̂) while full participation arises when µ
lies in the interval [µ̂, 1). Starting from full consumer participation, expected price increases as
µ falls. As µ decreases further, the economy eventually moves into an equilibrium with only
partial consumer participation. Even if µ → 0, expected price remains below v, so a Diamond
type of result does not arise in a setting with truly costly search. In Figure 4.3(b) we have
simulated an economy where search cost is relatively low (c/v = 0.05). The only difference
is that the region of parameters for which consumers search once surely is much larger than
before.
Welfare increases in µ in the full consumer participation case simply because consumers
who incur search cost are replaced by zero search cost consumers. If non-shoppers participate
only partially, an increase in µ raises the participation rate of non-shoppers, which implies that
welfare also goes up in this case. These findings are summarized in the following result. As
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(a) c/v = 0.5 (b) c/v = 0.05
Figure 4.3: The influence of µ on expected price (N = 2).
above, let ε > 0 be a small enough number so that if non-shoppers participate partially when
the fraction of shoppers is µ they also do it when the fraction of shoppers increases to µ+ ε.
Proposition 4.4 If non-shoppers participate partially, an increase in the proportion of shoppers
from µ to µ+ε leaves the equilibrium price distribution unchanged; by contrast, if non-shoppers
participate fully, the price distribution with a higher proportion of shoppers µ+ ε is dominated
by the distribution with a fraction of shoppers µ in a first-order stochastic sense. As a result,
expected price is weakly decreasing in µ. Moreover, welfare increases in the proportion of
non-shoppers for all parameters.
c. The effects of an increase in the number of firmsN
Under partial consumer participation, it immediately follows from the equilibrium condition
v − E[p] − c = 0 that an increase in N does not affect expected price. The economic forces
underlying this result are, however, less straightforward. We have noted before that Φ(θ1;µ;N)
is decreasing in N . This means that without a change in θ1 expected price would rise: the
idea is that as N increases it becomes more and more unlikely that an individual firm sells to
the shoppers and, consequently, it concentrates more and more on selling to the non-shoppers.
A higher expected price means, however, that a larger fraction of non-shoppers prefers not to
participate in the market and this effect exactly offsets the first effect.
We now notice that, under partial consumer participation the distribution of prices with
N + 1 firms is a mean-preserving spread of the price distribution with N firms. This follows
from the following two remarks. First, since the equilibrium θ1 falls as a result of an increase
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in N, the lower bound of the price distribution in Proposition 4.2 decreases; the upper bound
does not change. Second, it is easy to see that there exists a unique value of p, denoted by p˜,
such that F (p˜;N, θ∗1(N)) = F (p˜;N + 1, θ
∗
1(N + 1)), where θ
∗
1(N) and θ
∗
1(N + 1) denote the
non-shopper participation rates when there are N and N + 1 firms in the market, respectively.
From equation (4.12), this value is defined by the equality
(
1− µ
µ
v − p˜
p˜
) 1
N(N−1)
=
(
θ∗1(N+1)
N+1
) 1
N
(
θ∗1(N)
N
) 1
N−1
. (4.16)
As expected price remains constant, these two observations imply that F (p;N + 1, θ∗1(N + 1))
is a mean-preserving spread of F (p;N, θ∗1(N)).
Under full consumer participation Stahl (1989) shows that expected price rises in N . Intu-
itively, only the first effect discussed above is relevant here as θ1 is fixed to be equal to 1. Stahl
(1989) also shows that expected price converges to the monopoly price as N → ∞ (Diamond
type of result).
It is then interesting to see which type of equilibrium arises for which values of N . We find
that for any given c/v and µ, the equilibrium is characterized by partial consumer participation
when N is sufficiently large. What happens as N increases is that, if the non-shoppers keep
searching once with probability one, expected price tends to the monopoly price and eventually,
the condition v−E[p]−c > 0 is violated. This is easily seen upon inspection of condition (4.10)
and noting that Φ(1;µ,N) declines monotonically inN and converges to zero asN approaches
infinity. This implies that starting from an equilibrium with full consumer participation, our
model does not yield the Diamond result in the limit when N → ∞ since at some point the
economy turns to a situation of partial consumer participation. Figure 4.4 below illustrates
these comparative statics results.
The effects of firm entry on welfare are straightforward. If non-shoppers participate fully,
firm entry has no bearing on welfare. If non-shoppers participate only partially, an increase in
the number of firms reduces the participation rate of these consumers, which reduces welfare.
These findings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 An increase in the number of firms results in a mean-preserving spread of the
price distribution if non-shoppers participate partially, while if they participate fully the price
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(a) c/v = 0.5 and µ = 0.8 (b) c/v = 0.05 and µ = 0.1
Figure 4.4: The impact of entry of firms on expected price
distribution shifts downwards; as a result, expected price is weakly increasing in N . Welfare
decreases with firm entry under partial consumer participation while it remains constant if
non-shoppers search once surely; as a result, welfare is weakly decreasing in N .
d. The effects of an increase in the value of the purchase v
We next briefly discuss the effects of changes in v. The main difference with the effects of a
change in c is that, under full participation, c affects ρ whereas v does not affect ρ. As a result,
the only difference with the discussion on the comparative statics effects of changes in search
cost c is that now when buyers search for one price for sure, an increase in v does not alter
price-to-cost margins.
(a) c = 0.5 and µ = 0.8 (b) c = 0.5 and µ = 0.1
Figure 4.5: The impact of v on expected price (N = 2)
Figure 4.5 shows the influence of an increase in v on expected prices. In Figure 4.5(a) the
number of informed consumers is relatively high (c = 0.5 and µ = 0.8). When v lies in the
TRULY COSTLY SEQUENTIAL SEARCH AND OLIGOPOLISTIC PRICING 99
interval (c, c/Φ(1)), non-shoppers participate in the market with probability less than one. In
this parameter area, expected price rises as v increases. When v is above c/Φ(1) non-shoppers
search once surely. For this region of parameters expected price is unaffected by a change in v.
Figure 4.5(b) shows the case of an economy with relatively few shoppers.
4.5 Estimation
In this section we discuss how to estimate the model by maximum likelihood. To make the
exercise empirically more meaningful, we introduce a marginal cost r by subtracting r from v,
ρ and p, respectively. This changes the price distribution of the partial consumer participation
equilibrium to
F (p) = 1−
(
θ1(1− µ)(p¯− p)
Nµ(p− r)
) 1
N−1
. (4.17)
Notice that setting θ1 = 1 gives the equilibrium with full consumer participation. Similarly, the
lower bound becomes p = (1− µ)θ1(p¯− r)/(µN + (1− µ)θ1) + r, which can be solved for r
to characterize r as a function of the parameters of the model, i.e.,
r = p− (p¯− p)θ1(1− µ)
µN
. (4.18)
In order to estimate the different search equilibria, we derive the density functions associated
with the equilibrium price distributions given in equations (4.3) and (4.12) by taking the deriva-
tive with respect to p. The density function is then
f(p) =
1
N − 1
(
p¯− p
p− r
) 2−N
N−1
(
θ1(1− µ)
Nµ
) 1
N−1 p¯− r
(p− r)2 , (4.19)
where again setting θ1 = 1 gives the equilibrium with full consumer participation. Notice
that although the price densities are different for each of the two equilibrium it is empirically
impossible to distinguish between the two. This is easily seen by inspection of equation (4.19):
θ1 and µ can only be identified jointly as θ1(1 − µ)/µ. This also means that empirically one
cannot distinguish between the two equilibria without additional information on the share of
consumers not entering the market. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter we assume that
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θ1 = 1, allowing us to focus only on the full consumer participation equilibrium. As shown in
Section 4.3, in the full consumer participation equilibrium p¯ = ρ.
We set the number of firms N equal to the number of price observations found in the
data. The objective is to maximize the log-likelihood function, which is given by LL =∑N
i=1 log f(pi). Because the support of the log-likelihood function depends upon unknown
parameters, maximum likelihood estimation is not standard. Following Kiefer and Neumann
(1993) we take the sampling minimum and maximum to estimate p and ρ, respectively.5 These
super-consistent estimates allow us to proceed as if p and ρ were known. In addition, equation
(4.18) can be plugged in the density function to eliminate r so that the only parameter left for
estimation is µ.
We use the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS) quasi-Newton method with a
mixed quadratic and cubic line search procedure to find the µ that maximizes the log-likelihood
function given N , the consistent estimates of p and ρ and the vector of remaining prices, i.e, all
the prices apart from the maximum and the minimum price. The BFGS quasi-Newton method
uses the observed behavior of the log-likelihood function and its gradient to make an approx-
imation to the Hessian matrix using the BFGS iterative updating technique. This method is
implemented via a Matlab routine. We pick a random value for µ as a starting point and es-
timate the model several times to make sure that the outcome does not depend on the starting
values.6 Given these estimates of the parameters we can derive the level of search cost c that
is consistent with optimal consumer search using equation (4.8). The standard error for µ is
estimated by calculating the analytic Hessian matrix, given the estimate of µ. Standard errors
for r and c are calculated using the delta method.7
5More on using order statistics to estimate the lower and upper bound of distributions can be found in Donald
and Paarsch (1993).
6These random starting value for µ, together with N , p, ρ and a price pi are plugged into the equilibrium
condition (4.2) to find the value of F (pi) that solves this equation; this is done for all prices in the cross-section
pi. Subsequently, the calculated values of F (p), together with N , p, ρ, the vector of remaining prices and the
starting value of µ are plugged into equation (4.19) to calculate the vector f(p), from which we can calculate the
log-likelihood value LL. The BFGS quasi-Newton method then comes with a new µ, from which we calculate a
new value for LL. This process continues until the optimal µ is found, i.e., LL is maximized.
7If r is a function of the estimated µ, then the variance of r is given by ∂r∂µ · (−H)−1 · ∂r∂µ
′
, where H is the
Hessian matrix.
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4.6 Empirical application
A market most suitable in terms of the model of the previous section would consist of firms
offering a homogeneous product to consumers who demand at most a single unit of the product.
Keeping this in mind, we have chosen to focus on the online markets for memory chips. To make
the empirical application comparable to previous chapters, the estimation method is applied to
the same data set as in Chapter 2. Therefore, for an overview of the data the reader is referred
to the discussion in Section 2.5.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.2. As the table shows, estimates of the share
of consumers having zero cost µ range between 0.75 and 0.85 and are highly significant. These
consumers can be interpreted as shoppers, or as consumers using a price comparison site to find
the lowest price around. We note that these estimates seem quite high on the basis of findings by
other authors (although somewhat outdated, Whelan (2001) finds that around 36 percent of on-
line shoppers can be classified as bargain hunters). Using the estimates of µ, we can calculate
estimates of unit costs r and consumer search cost c. As Table 4.2 shows, in most cases unit cost
r is close to the lower bound of the price distribution p, which means that shops quoting low
prices have quite small margins. The search cost that is consistent with the sequential search
model, denoted c in the Table, varies between $11.16 and $13.89 and seems to be increasing in
the value of the product.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results show that for all four product the null hypothesis
that the observed prices are generated from the sequential search model can be rejected. This
is a striking result, especially given that the nonsequential search model presented in Chapter
2 is able to explain the data in a satisfactory manner. However, in this chapter we assume
that consumers either have positive search cost, or have zero search cost, which is a lot more
restrictive than the assumption made in Chapter 2 that consumers draw their search cost from
some distribution. As we will show in the next chapter, if the sequential search model presented
here is extended to a setting in which consumers draw their search cost from some distribution,
the model performs much better.
Figure 4.6 gives an illustration of how the estimated theoretical distribution functions match
observed price data. The dotted curves in the graphs represent the empirical distribution func-
tion of prices for the four different memory chips, while the solid curves give the estimated
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KTT3614 KTDINSP8200 KTD4400 KTD8300
p 115.00 109.20 96.00 102.00
ρ 208.90 200.50 170.50 182.50
N 25 24 24 23
M 179 174 174 162
µ 0.85 (0.05) 0.75 (0.07) 0.84 (0.05) 0.84 (0.05)
r 114.34 (0.26) 107.93 (0.50) 95.42 (0.23) 101.34 (0.27)
c 13.89 (1.61) 12.53 (1.81) 11.16 (1.34) 12.33 (1.54)
LL 993.53 1004.23 925.30 867.92
KS 9.77 10.29 9.76 9.20
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parenthesis. The 95%-critical value of
the KS-statistic is 1.36.
Table 4.2: Estimation results
theoretical distribution functions. In line with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results, the graphs
reveal that the model does not do very well in explaining observed pricing behavior.
(a) KTT3614 (b) KTDINSP8200
(c) KTD4400 (d) KTD8300
Figure 4.6: Estimated search cost cdf
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4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have taken the seminal model of Stahl (1989) on sequential consumer search
and oligopolistic pricing and studied the implications of relaxing the assumption that consumers
obtain the first price quotation for free. When also the first price quotation is costly, the Nash
equilibrium need not entail full consumer participation. Partial consumer participation arises
when search cost is above a certain threshold value which depends on the other parameters. This
threshold value becomes arbitrarily low as the number of firms becomes large enough and/or
the number of shoppers sufficiently small. Therefore, especially in markets with many firms
and/or with few shoppers, this situation of partial consumer participation should be seriously
considered.
This new type of equilibrium exhibits interesting comparative statics properties. In particu-
lar, expected price increases as search cost decreases, and is constant in the number of shoppers
and in the number of firms; welfare decreases as firms enter the market. This chapter also
showed that, starting from an equilibrium with full consumer participation, monopolistic pric-
ing never obtains when the number of shoppers goes to zero and/or the number of firms goes to
infinity because with truly costly search the economy eventually turns into an equilibrium with
partial consumer participation.
We have also shown how to estimate the model using maximum likelihood. Estimates indi-
cate that the model does not very well in explaining empirical observed prices of memory chips
sold online. A likely explanation for this result is that the assumption that there are only two
types of consumers is too restrictive. The next chapter generalizes the model presented here to
a setting in which there is a continuum of consumer types.

5Estimation of a sequential search model
NOTE: This chapter is based on Wildenbeest (2007b).
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5.1 Introduction
The search theoretic literature has studied a variety of models where consumers use different
search protocols. For example, in the model of Varian (1980) consumers use newspapers to
search for prices, in the model of Stahl (1989) consumers visit the shops sequentially and, fi-
nally, in the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) consumers search nonsequentially to find out the
prices the firms charge. The most commonly studied search protocols are the sequential search
protocol and the nonsequential search protocol. As demonstrated by Morgan and Manning
(1985) neither of these protocols is superior universally; as a matter of fact, sequential search is
optimal when price information can be gathered rather quickly because in that case the decision
whether to search further at a given point in time can be conditioned on the observed prices.
If offers are observed with some delay, as it would happen in the labor market for example,
nonsequential search is more advantageous to the decision-makers. The main results of the the-
ory, however, are robust: no matter whether consumers search sequentially or nonsequentially,
prices are typically dispersed in equilibrium and the prices different consumers pay may behave
in non-standard ways as a response to entry.
When it comes to empirical work, however, a sensible choice for an econometrician is to
employ a model whose assumptions are most in line with the real-world practice. As men-
tioned in previous chapters, the literature on estimation of full-fledged search models is scant.
The only papers we are aware of that estimate a sequential search model are Hortac¸su and
Syverson (2004) and Hong and Shum (2006). Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) model and esti-
mate a framework in which search frictions coexist with vertical product differentiation as an
explanation for price dispersion. Firms differ in marginal cost and quality level and play pure
strategies in prices. Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) show that search costs of consumers can be
identified from aggregate price and quantity data.1 In a related paper Hong and Shum (2006)
show how to estimate a sequential search model using only price data. Hong and Shum (2006)
present a method that relies on parametric assumptions on the shape of the search cost distri-
bution, but show in addition that if one has marginal cost data it is possible to estimate search
costs nonparametrically. A potential drawback of these two papers is that they assume that the
distribution of realized prices is known by the consumer before searching. This assumption has
1In the next chapter we show that in a slightly more restrictive setting it is possible to estimate search costs in
the presence of vertical product differentiation using only price data.
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been criticized (see e.g. Stahl, 1996) because it implies that consumers have a lot of information
prior to searching. In markets with many firms the assumption may be innocuous because the
theoretical and the empirical distribution of prices will be quite similar. However, in oligopolis-
tic markets the market distribution of realized prices may be quite different than the theoretical
distribution of prices.
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to this recent literature by presenting a consumer
sequential search model which can be estimated nonparametrically using a limited amount of
data and which does not need to assume that realized prices are known in advance of search.
Our paper is thus closely related to Hong and Shum (2006), but we study a more general model
for which it is not necessary to assume that firms operate in an environment with infinitely many
firms. The fact that we model an oligopoly game allows us to separate variation in prices due to
changes in the number of firms to variation due to changes in search costs. Moreover, contrarily
to what is assumed in both Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) and Hong and Shum (2006), we do
not assume consumers know realized prices before they start searching.
In our model a finite number of firms compete for consumers that have to pay a search cost
to obtain price information. We derive a condition that implicitly defines the equilibrium price
distribution and show how to use it to characterize the search cost distribution as a function of
the price distribution, marginal cost and the number of firms. Then using the empirical price
distribution search costs of consumers with reservation price equal to each observed price can
be estimated as well as the corresponding quantiles of the search cost distribution.
We apply the estimation method to the same price data for several memory chips sold on-
line as in Chapter 2. Our estimation results point towards relatively high search costs among
consumers. More specifically, median search costs are estimated to be between 7.78 and 19.72
US dollars.
A question that arises is what sort of mistake would the researcher commit if she used the
wrong type of model, i.e., if she used a sequential search model to estimate the relevant pa-
rameters when the data are actually generated from a nonsequential search strategy. To address
this question, we compare the estimates obtained with the sequential search assumption to the
estimates we obtained from the nonsequential search model of Chapter 2. For all memory chips,
we find that estimated search costs are much higher in the sequential search model than in the
nonsequential search model.
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The chapter also presents a comparison between our estimation method and the nonparamet-
ric estimation method of the competitive sequential search model of Hong and Shum (2006).
Also compared to that model, search costs are much higher using our method. A possible ex-
planation for this is that in a competitive model, firms put more mass on high prices since the
probability of serving the consumers with low reservation prices is low. Therefore, to rational-
ize the same set of prices, an oligopolistic model needs higher search costs than a competitive
model.
The structure of the rest of this chapter is as follows. In the next section, we present our
oligopolistic sequential search model. In Section 5.3 we study the characterization of a price
dispersed symmetric equilibrium. In Section 5.4 we show how to estimate search costs non-
parametrically using only price data. Moreover, we present some simulation results to illustrate
the identification and estimation issues. In Section 5.5 we apply the estimation method to the
market for online memory chips. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 The model
The model we study extends the standard sequential search model of Stahl (1989) by adding
search cost heterogeneity. The model is similar in nature to Stahl (1996). The features of the
model are as follows. On the supply side of the market, there are N firms each producing a
homogeneous good at constant returns to scale. Let r > 0 be the common marginal cost. On
the demand side of the market, there is a unit mass of buyers each demanding at most one unit of
the good. Let v be the common valuation for the good. Consumers differ in their search costs.
We assume that the search cost of a consumer is a random draw from a distribution G(c), with
density g(c) > 0, c ∈ R+. Consumers search sequentially. A consumer first decides whether
to sample a first firm or not and then, upon observation of the price of the first firm, decides
whether to search for a second price or not, and so on. For simplicity we assume that the first
price quotation is obtained for free so if a consumer with search cost c searches k times she
incurs a total costs (k − 1)c.
Firms and buyers play the following game. An individual firm chooses its price taking
price choices of the rivals as well as consumers’ search behavior as given. An individual buyer
forms conjectures about the distribution of prices in the market and decides on her optimal
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sequential search strategy. We confine ourselves to the analysis of symmetric Nash equilibria.
The distribution of prices charged by a firm is denoted by F (p), its density by f(p) and the
lower and the upper bound of its support by p and p, respectively.
5.3 Equilibrium
We start by discussing consumer search behavior. Consumers take the price distribution as
given and decide whether to continue searching or not using a reservation price strategy. Let
F (p) be a (correct) conjecture about the price distribution. If a consumer has observed a price
p̂, the gains from searching one more time are
H(p̂;F ) =
∫ pˆ
p
(pˆ− p)f(p)dp
Integrating by parts, we can rewrite these gains from search as
H(p̂;F ) =
∫ pˆ
p
F (p)dp. (5.1)
The reservation price of a consumer with search cost c, denoted ρ(c;F ), is the price at which
the gains from searching one more time are equal to the cost of search, that is, the solution to
H(ρ;F )− c = 0. (5.2)
As it is well-known (see e.g. Weitzman, 1979), a consumer with search cost c will continue
searching as long as p > ρ(c;F ), and will stop otherwise. Inspection of equation (5.1) reveals
that the reservation price ρ(c;F ) is increasing in c.
We now move to calculate the profits of a firm i charging a price pi. For this we follow Stahl
(1996). Take a consumer at random whose search cost is c. There are two kinds of situation
in which firm i sells to this consumer. The first situation is when the price of firm i induces
no further search by this consumer, i.e., pi < ρ(c;F ). In that case, the firm will sell to this
consumer at any moment she encounters firm i during the course of her search. This may be
in her first search, or in her second search, and so on till her last search. The other situation is
when the consumer prefers to continue searching after observing the price of firm i, i.e., when
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pi > ρ(c;F ), but firm i happens to have the lowest price in the market so the consumer comes
back to buy from firm i after visiting all the rival firms.
Let c˜ be the search cost of the consumer who is indifferent between accepting the price
of firm i and continue searching, i.e., pi = ρ(c˜;F ). From equation (5.2), it follows that c˜ =
H(pi;F ). Therefore, the profit to a firm i charging price pi is:
pii(pi;F ) = (pi − r)
[
G (H(pi;F )) (1− F (pi))N−1 + y(pi;F )
]
,
where the demand from the consumers with reservation values satisfying ρ(c;F ) < pi is given
by the first term between brackets and the demand from the consumers with ρ(c;F ) > pi is
given by
y(pi;F ) =
∫ ∞
H(pi;F )
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F (ρ(c;F ))]kg(c)dc. (5.3)
We shall study only symmetric equilibria. Let p denote the upper bound of the price dis-
tribution. Because it can never be optimal for a firm to set a price higher than the valuation
v of the good, the optimal upper bound is given by p¯ = min{v, pM}, where the monopoly
price pM = argmaxp(p − r)y(p;F ), if it exists.2 Furthermore, in equilibrium we require that
pii(pi;F ) = pii(p;F ) for all pi ∈ [p, p]. This is the usual constancy-of-profits condition stating
that a firm is indifferent between all the prices in the support of the price distribution. Because
a firm setting a price equal to the upper bound only serves consumers with a reservation value
higher than p¯, this means that
(p¯− r)1−G(H(p¯;F )
N
= (pi − r)
[
G (H(pi;F )) (1− F (pi))N−1 + y(pi;F )
]
. (5.4)
The equilibrium price distribution is implicitly defined by this condition. Although the price
distribution cannot be computed in closed-form, in the next section we show that if we evaluate
the equilibrium condition together with equation (5.2) only at observed prices, we can express
each search cost cdf value as a function of the observed prices, the number of firms and the
2The monopoly price pM exists if, for an infinitely high valuation, a firm changing the highest price in the
market does not gain by increasing its price. This is the case if we assume that limp→∞ p(1−G(H(p;F ))) = 0.
This is because (p− r) (1 − G(H(p;F ))) > (p− r) y(p;F ) so if profits go to zero as p → ∞, by continuity,
there must exist a finite p which maximizes the profits at p.
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marginal cost. As a result, an important advantage of our method is that even though we study
sequential search in oligopolistic setting, we do not need to evaluate any integral to estimate
search costs nonparametrically.
5.4 Identification and estimation
The idea of our estimation procedure is as follows. If one did know the price distribution
F (·), then one could use equation (5.2) to calculate all search cost values c that correspond to
reservation values ρ in the support of F (·). Then the latent search cost density g(c) in equation
(5.3) should be chosen in such a way that the equilibrium condition in equation (5.4) holds.
Unfortunately, F (·) is unknown, but we can proceed by estimating it from observed prices.
The estimation of the search cost distribution then consists of two steps. In the first step we
use the empirical price distribution in equation (5.2) to construct search cost values. In the
second step we use the empirical price cdf to estimate the height of the search cost distribution
corresponding to the search cost values obtained in the first step.
Assume we have a data set withM different prices. Let us collect them by ascending order,
i.e., p1 < p2 < . . . < pM . We can use the observed prices to estimate F (p) nonparametrically
by the empirical distribution, i.e., by
F˜ (p) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
1(pi < p),
whereM is the total number of prices.
As mentioned above, since F (ρ(c;F )) depends on c there is no closed-form solution for
equation (5.3). For the purpose of estimation it is therefore useful to rewrite y(p;F ) as
y(pi; F˜ ) =
1
N
M∑
j=i
∫ H(pj+1;F˜ )
H(pj ;F˜ )
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F˜ (ρ)]kg(c)dc, (5.5)
where H(pM+1; F˜ ) =∞ and H(p1; F˜ ) = 0.
From equation (5.2) it follows that there is a one-to-one mapping from prices to search
costs via the reservation values. As a matter of fact, if we define ci as the search cost of a
consumer with reservation value ρ(ci, F ) and this reservation value is equal to a price pi, we
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haveH(pi, F ) = ci. Therefore, we can calculate ci directly from the data by using the empirical
price cdf, i.e., ci = 1M
∑i
k=1(pi − pk). Moreover, it follows from the empirical distribution
that F˜ (p) = F˜ (pj) ∀ p ∈ (pj, pj+1), so for each c between H(pj) and H(pj+1) we have
F˜ (ρ) = F˜ (pj). This means that we can rewrite the integral in equation (5.5) as
∫ H(pj+1)
H(pj)
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F˜ (pj)]kg(c)dc =
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F˜ (pj)]kG(c)
∣∣∣∣∣
H(pj+1)
H(pj)
=
N−1∑
k=0
[1− F˜ (pj)]kγj,
where γj = G(H(pj+1)) − G(H(pj)) is the share of consumers with a reservation value ρi in
between pi and pi+1. Using this, equation (5.5) can be written as
y(pi; F˜ ) =
1
N
M∑
j=i
γj
N∑
k=1
[1− F˜ (pj)]k−1. (5.6)
so for estimation we do not need to evaluate any integral.
We can use the expression for y(pi; F˜ ) in equation (5.6) to write the equilibrium condition
as
(p¯−r)γM
N
= (pi−r)·
[(
1−
M∑
j=i
γj
)
(1− F˜ (pi))N−1 + 1
N
M∑
j=i
γj
N∑
k=1
(1− F˜ (pj))k−1
]
. (5.7)
For estimation we rewrite equation (5.7) as
γi =
p¯−r
pi−rγM −
∑M
j=i+1 γj
∑N
k=1(1− F˜ (pj))k−1 −N
(
1−∑Mj=i+1 γj) (1− F˜ (pi))N−1∑N
k=1(1− F˜ (pi))k−1 −N(1− F˜ (pi))N−1
.
(5.8)
Equation (5.8) expresses the differences between subsequent values of the search cost cdf, de-
noted by γi, as a function of the price pi, the distribution of prices F (·), the number of firms N ,
the maximum price p¯, and the marginal cost r. More specifically, equation (5.8) states that if
F (·) is the equilibrium distribution, then the share of consumers with a reservation value ρi in
between pi and pi+1 must satisfy equation (5.8).
Given estimates of F (p), N , r, p¯ and γM it is possible to calculate first γM−1, then γM−2,
and so on. The estimated γi’s in combination with the calculated ci’s then form a nonparametric
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(a) Search cost cdf (b) True and empirical price cdf
Figure 5.1: Example equilibrium search model (M = 5)
estimate of the search cost distribution G(c). Notice that p¯ is estimated by the highest observed
price. The estimate for unit cost r should be taken from another data source. The sum of all γi’s
should be one, so γM should be chosen in such a way that this indeed holds.
Example equilibrium
To simulate the equilibrium it is useful to write equation (5.7) as
pi =
(p¯− r)γM
N
(
1−∑Mj=i γj) (1− F˜ (pi))N−1 +∑Mj=i γj∑Nk=1(1− F˜ (pj))k−1 + r.
Now, given unit cost r, maximum price p¯, number of firms N , search cost distribution G(c),
andM initial search cost values ci, we can calculate prices pi.3 It turns out that the equilibrium
is a contraction. This means that with a set of computed prices we can calculate a new set of
ci’s, which will be used to generate a new set of prices. This process continues until the change
in ci’s compared to the previous round is approximately zero.
Figure 5.1 gives an example of an equilibrium. Here we take a lognormal search cost dis-
tribution with parameters 1 and 4, p¯ = 100, r = 50 and N = 5. Graph 5.1(a) gives the cdf
of the search cost distribution together with the γi’s and the ci’s that are identified in case of 5
price observations (M = 5). Graph 5.1(b) gives the constructed equilibrium price cdf and the
empirical price cdf when there are 5 price observations.
3Remember that p¯ is endogenous, so this should be kept in mind when generating data. Depending on the
chosen search cost cdf, a way would be to set p¯ = v and check afterwards whether v is indeed smaller than pM .
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(a) M = 10 (b) M = 25
(c) M = 100 (d) M = 1000
Figure 5.2: Identification
We note now that the identification of the search cost distribution works differently in the
sequential search model than in the nonsequential search model. In Chapter 3 we have shown
that in the nonsequential search model prices reflect only behavior of groups of consumers. For
a fixed number of firms, having more observations does not lead to more groups of consumers,
so this does not help to get more points on the search cost distribution. On the other hand,
increasing the number of firms does not give more information of the height of search costs at
high quantiles because the sequence of critical search costs ck is convergent to zero. However,
we show in Chapter 3 that a richer framework with price data from several markets overcomes
the problem.
In the sequential search model one does not need price data from several markets to identify
the search cost distribution in its full support, since increasing the number of observations is
already enough to get more points on the support. Intuitively, this is because each extra price pi
corresponds via the definition of the reservation price in equation (5.2) to an additional search
cost value ci. Figure 5.2 shows how the identification exactly works. The graph shows the points
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identified when we have 10, 25, 100 and 1000 price observations. Clearly, with 1000 price
observations the search cost distribution is fully identified. Notice that as in the nonsequential
search model, search costs are only identified up to some maximum search cost value. Using
data from markets with the same search cost distribution but a higher valuation v would help us
increase this maximum search cost value.
5.5 Empirical application
The purpose of this section is twofold. A first objective is to apply the estimation procedure
to real world data to investigate what level of search costs can rationalize empirically observed
prices. Secondly, a question that arises is what sort of mistake would the researcher commit
if she used a sequential search model to estimate the relevant parameters when the data are
actually generated from a nonsequential search strategy. The second question can easily be
addressed by using the same data set as the one we used to estimate the nonsequential search
model in Chapter 2. Once we get estimates of search costs for the sequential search model, we
can compare them to the estimates we obtained in the earlier chapter with nonsequential search.
As shown in the previous section, to estimate the model we need to observe prices, the
number of firms and the marginal cost. The prices used in this section come from the same
data set as in Chapter 2 (prices of four memory chips sold on the Internet from the beginning
of August 2004 till the end of September 2004).4 As in Chapter 2 we estimate the number of
firms by the maximum number of firms found selling the memory chips in the period of data
collection. Since we do not have data on the marginal cost of the memory chips, we propose to
take the estimated values from Chapter 2 and check afterwards how robust the estimates are to
changes in these values.
Figure 5.3 gives the estimated search cost distributions for all four memory chips. What
is striking is that for all memory chips estimated search costs are quite high. For example,
about 30% percent of the online consumers of the KTT3614 memory chip have search costs
higher than 30 dollars. To compare the estimates of search costs under the two different search
protocols, for each memory chip we plot in Figure 5.4 the search cost cdfs obtained from esti-
mating the two models. It can be seen that estimated search costs are much higher in the case
4The data is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.
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(a) KTT3614 (b) KTDINSP8200
(c) KTD4400 (d) KTD8300
Figure 5.3: Estimated search cost cdf
of sequential search (solid curve) than in the case of nonsequential search (dashed curve).
Although, as can be seen from the graphs, the share of consumers with search costs close
to zero is in both models roughly the same, in general estimated search costs according to the
nonsequential search model are much lower. For example, median search costs of consumers
buying the KTDINSP8200 memory chip are 19.72 US dollars according to the sequential search
model, while only 9.41 US dollars according to the nonsequential search model. As can be seen
from Table 5.1 a similar pattern arises for the other memory chips.
KTT3614 KTDINSP8200 KTD4400 KTD8300
Median search costs
Sequential 7.78 19.72 8.84 19.05
Nonsequential (Chapter 2) 5.39 9.41 7.01 8.63
Sequential (Hong and Shum, 2006) 0.28 0.25 0.50 1.50
Notes: Marginal cost r is fixed at the marginal cost estimated by the nonsequential search model.
Table 5.1: Median search costs sequential and nonsequential search
The shapes of the estimated search cost distributions seems to be to in line with the shapes
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(a) KTT3614 (b) KTDINSP8200
(c) KTD4400 (d) KTD8300
Figure 5.4: Comparison estimated search cost cdf with nonsequential search model
of the estimated search cost cdfs in the market for mutual funds as studied by Hortac¸su and
Syverson (2004). In a related paper Hong and Shum (2006) estimate a sequential search model
in a setting with infinitely many firms. Although their main focus is to estimate the model para-
metrically, as a specification check they also estimate a nonparametric version of their model.
As in this chapter, they need marginal cost data to be able to do that. Hong and Shum (2006)
show that in their model the relation to be estimated is simply
G(H(p)) =
p− p
p− r ,
so if one evaluates this relation only at the search cost values corresponding to reservation
prices that equal observed prices, the search cost distribution can be estimated nonparametri-
cally. Figure 5.5 presents a comparison of the results obtained from the two different estimation
methods. Estimated search costs using the method of Hong and Shum (2006) are shown by the
dashed curves, while the estimated search cost distribution using our method is given by the
solid curves. As also indicated by the low median search cost values in Table 5.1 search costs
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Figure 5.5: Comparison estimated search cost cdf with Hong and Shum (2006)
are much lower in the competitive model of Hong and Shum (2006) than in the N firm model
presented here. The intuition behind this result is as follows. To rationalize the empirically ob-
served pricing patterns, the competitive model needs lower overall search costs than the N firm
model. This seems counterintuitive since this would imply that the same search cost distribution
would lead to more competitive pricing in the N firm model than in the competitive model. A
mechanism that could potentially explain this surprising result is that the probability that one
has the lowest price decreases in the number of firms. In a setting with infinitely many firms this
probability goes to zero, so if the number of competitors increases firms will put more weight on
the consumers with high search costs and will allocate more probability mass to higher prices.
As illustrated by Figure 5.5 the difference in estimated search costs is substantial, so this makes
the choice which model to use an important one.
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5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have shown how to estimate a sequential search model nonparametrically.
The model has N firms competing for consumers searching for price information. Using a
condition that implicitly defines the equilibrium price distribution, we have shown that each
search cost cdf value can be expressed as a function of the price distribution, the marginal cost
and the number of firms. As a result, using the empirical price distribution search costs of
consumers having reservation prices equal to observed prices can be computed, as well as the
corresponding quantiles of the search cost distribution.
The model has been estimated using prices of memory chips sold online. Estimates indicate
that search costs are quite high; in fact, mean search costs are up to almost 20 US dollars.
Compared to the estimates obtained in Chapter 2 where we estimated a nonsequential search
model, search costs appear to be much higher under sequential search than under nonsequential
search.
We have also compared our estimation method to the nonparametric estimation method of
the sequential search model presented in Hong and Shum (2006). We have found that our
estimates of search costs are much higher. A possible explanation for this striking result is that
Hong and Shum (2006) model competition in a fully competitive setting, while we have onlyN
firms competing. Everything else equal, firms put more mass at higher prices in a competitive
setting, which implies that in order to rationalize the same set of prices, in the oligopolistic
model one needs higher search costs.

6Vertical product differentiation and
search
NOTE: This chapter is based on Wildenbeest (2007a).
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6.1 Introduction
Almost all theoretical search models discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis deal with homoge-
neous goods, despite the fact that even goods that are seemingly homogeneous differ in as-
pects indirectly related to the good. For example, books are typically homogeneous; books are
uniquely identified by an ISBN number and if there are two books with the same ISBN number
there are no clear reasons to prefer one over the other. However, when the same book is sold
by different retailers, it is a different story. Then the characteristics of the stores play a role as
well. Although the book is the same, the retailers might differ in things like offered service or
location, which will have an impact on pricing strategies.
This chapter studies a search model which allows for (vertical) product differentiation. This
product differentiation can either be because the goods themselves are differentiated, or, as
in the example above, because there are differences between the stores selling the goods. By
letting both valuation and unit cost vary across firms, it is shown that a symmetric equilibrium
exists in which firms offer deals to consumers that are randomly drawn from a common utility
distribution. Because of the firm differences in quality and unit cost, the equilibrium entails
different price distributions across firms. Consumers, on the other hand, know the valuation of
the goods, but have to pay a search cost in order to observe prices. Given the utility distribution,
consumers decide how much to search to maximize expected utility.
The search model in this essay can explain random pricing patterns, and unlike other existing
models it also offers an explanation why some firms have persistently higher or lower prices
than other firms. In consumer search models, the latter is typically explained by pure pricing
strategies, while the former is usually explained by mixed pricing strategies. The search model
in this paper has firms mixing in utilities. As a result, firms randomly draw prices from price
distributions with supports that depend on the quality level of the product. To the best of my
knowledge this feature is novel in the literature.
By using the structure of the equilibrium of the model, I show that it is possible to estimate
both search costs and the impact of firm characteristics on prices using price data alone. Utilities
can be estimated from prices by taking the negative of the residuals of a regression of prices
on a firm dummy. The utilities are then used to estimate the model by maximum likelihood.
The estimation method is similar to the method described in Chapter 3, although the likelihood
VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND SEARCH 123
function is now written in terms of utility instead of prices.
I apply the estimation method to price data from supermarkets in the Netherlands. The data
covers the period between January 2004 and June 2006. This period is interesting because it was
characterized by a declining trend in prices.1 The estimation results show that the model does
quite well in explaining the observed prices. Besides that, I find that the share of consumers
who search thoroughly has decreased over time. Since real monthly wages went down during
the sampling period, this shift in the search cost distribution cannot be explained by changes in
real income. Alternative explanations are changes in the utility of shopping itself or changes in
consumer confidence.
In a related empirical paper, Lach (2002) studies existence and persistence of price dis-
persion using price data of four different products in Israel. Several predictions from search
models are tested and he finds the patterns in the price data to be in line with these predic-
tions. Lach (2002) controls for differences between firms in a similar way as I do here. In that
sense, the analysis presented here shows that vertical product differentiation can be captured in
a theoretical model in such a way that Lach’s approach is theoretically justified. Moreover, this
paper goes one step further by using the structure of the theoretical search model to estimate
the underlying search cost distribution. In a recent paper Hong and Shum (2006) show how to
estimate search cost distributions using the restrictions of an equilibrium search model. Using
a maximum empirical likelihood approach they show that in their homogeneous good model
only price data is needed to estimate search costs. In Chapter 2 this approach is extended to
an oligopoly search model and it is shown how to estimate search costs using a maximum like-
lihood approach instead. Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) show how to estimate search costs in
a model of vertical product differentiation. The model presented here is similar in nature to
Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) since both allow for vertical product differentiation. Neverthe-
less, there are some important differences. First of all, Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) assume
consumers observe all prices, but do not know which firm charges which price, while here I
assume consumers only know the distributions from which prices are drawn. When the market
is populated by just a few firms, the assumption that consumers already know all prices around
1In the Dutch press this process was called a ‘price war’. The meaning of ‘price war’ in the economics literature
is somewhat different because it refers to a deviation from a collusive equilibrium (see, e.g., Rotemberg and
Saloner, 1986). It is not likely that supermarkets in the Netherlands were colluding at the beginning of the sampling
period, so in this context using the term price war would be misleading.
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is a particularly strong one because the realized prices might differ a lot from the distribution
from which they are drawn. A second difference is that Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) study
a sequential search model, while I assume consumers search nonsequentially. Nonsequential
search is optimal in some circumstances, for example when several price quotations arrive at a
time.2 Finally, and most importantly, another difference is that price dispersion in Hortac¸su and
Syverson (2004) is a result of firms playing pure strategies, while in the model presented here
it is a result of mixed strategies. In a mixed strategy equilibrium profits need to be the same
across firms, which gives an extra condition that can be used for the estimation of the model.
This extra condition makes that here only price data is needed to estimate the model, while
Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) need both price and quantity data.
The empirical section is connected to the literature on retail pricing dynamics in supermar-
kets. In recent work it has been observed that a typical grocery product is sold at a regular price
for a number of time periods, whereas only once in a while the product is sold at a discount price
(see e.g. Hosken and Reiffen, 2004; Pesendorfer, 2004). An implication of this is that current
prices depend on past prices. This seems to be at odds with the implication of the search model
in this paper that prices are random draws from some distribution, since this means that prices
are not predictable and that there is no correlation over time. However, an important difference
between the papers mentioned above and this paper is that while they focus on single products,
the focus here is on baskets of goods. Consumers typically buy more than one grocery product
at a time when visiting a supermarket, so the sum of prices of all products being bought together
is of greater importance to the consumer than the price of individual products. It turns out that
considering a basket of goods one cannot reject the null hypothesis that prices are random draws
from some distribution.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section I discuss the theoretical model.
Section 6.3 continues with a method to estimate search costs using maximum likelihood. In
Section 6.4 I apply the estimation method to price data from supermarkets. Finally, the last
section concludes.
2See Morgan and Manning (1985) for the optimality of sequential versus nonsequential search.
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6.2 The model
I study a model of firms offering a differentiated good competing for incompletely informed
consumers. On the supply side there are N firms producing goods at a unit cost r. The goods
are vertically differentiated, i.e., the goods can be ranked according to their characteristics and
consumers all agree in the ranking. The model can be used to address two sources of product
differentiation. The goods can be differentiated either because the goods themselves are het-
erogeneous, for example because the products have different features. It could also be that the
good is homogeneous, but that the firms selling the product are differentiated. An example of
this would be stores selling the same products but offering different service levels.
On the demand side there is a continuum of consumers demanding at most one good, all
deriving the same utility from consumption of good j:
uj(Xj, pj; β) = βXj − pj + ξj, (6.1)
where Xj are the observable characteristics of the good, pj is the price of firm j’s good, ξj
are (by the econometrician) unobservable characteristics of good j and where the parameter β
describes the relation between Xj and uj . Since the coefficient of price is normalized to −1,
utilities are measured in the same unit as prices. In what follows, let the valuation vj for the
good produced by firm j be the sum of the contribution of the observable and unobservable
characteristics to utility, so that equation (6.1) can be rewritten as
uj = vj − pj. (6.2)
Consumers know their valuation for the good produced at the different firms. However,
consumers have no information about which firm provides the good at what utility level, since
prices are only observed after searching. By engaging in costly search the consumers can gain
information about the prices of the good at a subset of the firms. Consumers are characterized
by their search cost c, which is a random draw from the distribution function G(c), with density
function g(c). I assume consumers search nonsequentially, i.e., consumers determine before
entering the market how many times to search.3 Consumers then buy the product from the firm
3The way consumers search is similar to the nonsequential search model of Burdett and Judd (1983).
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in their sample providing the highest utility level.
Firms and consumers play a simultaneous move game. The store characteristics are assumed
to be drawn from some distribution and are fixed in the short run. I assume the difference
between valuation and unit cost vj − rj to be the same across firms, i.e., x = vj − rj , where x is
the maximum possible margin that can be attained by the firms. This means that more favorable
characteristics come at a higher cost. Moreover, by restricting vj and rj to be related in this
way, as I will show below, firms are symmetric in the margin received at each offered utility
level. In this way incentives for the firms are identical, which gives rise to the existence of a
symmetric equilibrium.
Valuations and unit costs are common knowledge. Therefore, an individual firm takes the
expected utilities of the other firms and the search behavior of consumers as given while setting
its own price. An individual consumer takes the firm pricing strategies as given and decides on
a number k of firms to visit in order to maximize utility. The fraction of consumers sampling k
firms is denoted by µk.
I only focus on symmetric equilibria. A condition for a symmetric equilibrium to exist is that
some consumers should search once, while others should search more than once. The intuition
for this is that if all consumers did compare prices, all firms would set a price equal to their unit
cost, which implies that all firms would be offering the same utility level x. As a result, there is
no reason to search. On the other hand, if no consumers were willing to compare prices, firms
would set their price equal to their valuation, which means that all firms would offer a utility
level of zero. Consumers would not participate, because they have to pay a search cost c to enter
the market.4
A second condition for a symmetric equilibrium to exist is that the firms must play mixed
strategies in setting their utility level. The proof for this is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2
of Chapter 3 and can be explained by the idea that offering slightly more utility gives a discrete
jump in profits when dealing with consumers that compare utilities. Hence there are no atoms
in the utility distribution. On the other hand, at utility levels close to zero only consumers
searching once will buy, so in that case offering a lower utility increases profits. As a result,
firms draw utilities from a common atomless utility distribution, which I denote L(u), with a
lower bound equal to zero.
4See also Lemma 3.1 of Chapter 3.
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Consumer search behavior should be optimal. This means that for a consumer searching k
times, the expected utility should be higher than the expected cost of searching kc. Moreover,
the net benefit of searching k times should be higher than the net benefit of searching k − 1 or
k + 1 times. Now define ck as the search cost of the consumer indifferent between searching k
and k+1 times. For this consumerE[max{u1, u2, . . . , uk}]−kc = E[max{u1, u2, . . . , uk+1}]−
(k + 1)c, or
ck = E[max{u1, u2, . . . , uk+1}]− E[max{u1, u2, . . . , uk}]. (6.3)
The share of consumers who search k times is then given by
µk =
∫ ck−1
ck
g(c)dc = G(ck−1)−G(ck). (6.4)
Now consider optimal firm behavior. Given expected consumer behavior µk and expecta-
tions on L(u), the profit of firm j offering utility uj is given by
pij(uj;L(u)) = (x− uj)
N∑
k=1
kµk
N
L(uj)
k−1.
Since x−uj = pj−rj , the first part of this equation is the margin the store makes on its product.
The second part represents the expected quantities sold, and is explained as the summation over
allN consumer groups of the share of consumers searching k times multiplied by the probability
that these µk consumers visit the firm (which is k/N ) and by the probability that a firm selling
the product at a utility level of uj offers the highest utility out of k firms, which is L(uj)k−1.
Given the mixed strategies, in equilibrium a store should be indifferent between setting any
utility in the support of L(u). In addition, the lower bound of L(u) should be equal to zero.
This is because a firm offering a utility of zero will only sell to the consumers searching once,
and surplus extracted from these consumers is maximized by setting p¯j = vj so that u = 0. In
this case the profit equation simplifies to pi(u) = xµ1/N . Setting this equal to the equilibrium
profits in general gives the equilibrium condition for this model:
(x− u)
N∑
k=1
kµk
N
L(u)k−1 = x · µ1
N
. (6.5)
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Unfortunately, this equation cannot be solved for L(u), so the equilibrium distribution of utili-
ties is only implicitly defined. Solving equation (6.5) for u gives
u = x ·
∑N
k=2 kµkL(u)
k−1∑N
k=1 kµkL(u)
k−1 . (6.6)
Although the utility distribution is the same for each firm, since u = vj − pj , the price distribu-
tion is different across firms:
Fj(p) = Pr[pj ≤ p] = Pr[p ≥ vj − uj] = Pr[uj ≥ vj − p] = 1− L(vj − p).
The maximum utility in the market can be found by setting L(u) = 1, which gives
u¯ = x ·
∑N
k=2 kµk∑N
k=1 kµk
. (6.7)
Individual firms choose a utility level to maximize expected profits given expected search be-
havior of the consumers and given the expected utility distribution function, so in equilibrium
the first order condition with respect to u should be zero, i.e.,
∂pi
∂u
=
N∑
k=1
kµk
N
L(u)k−1 − (x− u)
N∑
k=1
k(k − 1)µk
N
L(u)k−2l(u) = 0.
Solving this expression for l(u) gives the density function of utility
l(u) =
∑N
k=1 kµkL(u)
k−1
(x− u)∑Nk=1 k(k − 1)µkL(u)k−2 . (6.8)
Using the characterization of the utility distribution equation (6.3) can be rewritten as a
function of the utility distribution:
ck =
∫ u¯
u
(k + 1)uL(u)kl(u)du−
∫ u¯
u
kuL(u)k−1l(u)du.
By using the change of variable y = L(u), we obtain dy = l(u)du. Plugging this into the
equation above, transforming the lower limit into y = L(u) = 0 and the upper limit into
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(a) Utility pdf (b) Price cdfs
Figure 6.1: Example equilibrium search model
y = L(u¯) = 1 and solving gives
ck =
∫ 1
0
u(y)[(k + 1)y − k]yk−1dy. (6.9)
Then using the same change of variable in equation (6.6) we can get rid of u(y) in equation
(6.9).
As an example, I calculate equilibrium when consumers search costs are drawn from a log-
normal distribution with parameters 0.5 and 5. Figure 6.1 gives plots of the equilibrium for 5
firms with valuations ranging from 100 to 140 and x = 50 so that marginal cost range from 50
to 90. In Figure 6.1(a) the equilibrium utility density is plotted. Most mass is at the extremes
of the distribution, with slightly more mass at lower utilities than at higher utilities. This shows
the tradeoff firms face: set a high utility to attract consumers who compare several offerings or
set a low utility in order to maximize surplus extracted from consumers who do not search. In
Figure 6.1(b) the equilibrium price cdfs are drawn; the dashed lines are the firms’ individual
price cdfs and the solid line is the price cdf for all the firms together. What is interesting to
note is that the shape of the individual price cdfs is quite different from the shape of the price
cdf of all firms together. This means that assuming all firms are selling the same homogeneous
product when in fact they are not might likely lead to wrong estimates of the underlying search
cost distribution. I will come back to this issue in the empirical section.
Note that price dispersion in Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) is a result of firms playing pure
strategies, while in the model presented here it is a result of mixed strategies. In a mixed strategy
equilibrium profits need to be the same across firms, which gives an extra condition that can be
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used for the estimation of the model. As we will see in the next section, this extra condition
makes that here only price data is needed to estimate the model, while Hortac¸su and Syverson
(2004) need both price and quantity data.
6.3 Estimation
The goal of this section is to present a method to estimate the model presented in the previous
section using only price data. Assume the pricesN firms charge for the same good are observed
for a certain period of time, the latter being indicated by the subscript t. There are two methods
to calculate utilities from observed prices. In the first method vj is (superconsistently) estimated
by taking the maximum observed price p¯j for each firm j during the sampling period. Then
using equation (6.2) we get ujt = vj−pjt = p¯j−pjt, so corresponding utilities for all observed
prices can be calculated. The second method follows from rewriting equation (6.2) to pjt =
vj − ujt. This equation can be estimated by carrying out a fixed effects regression of prices on
a constant, i.e.,
pjt = α+ δj + jt,
where α is a constant, δj are the firm fixed effects and jt are the residuals. Note that with
this specification, valuations vj are estimated by α + δj and utilities are calculated by taking
the negative of the residuals jt. Moreover, jt is simply the price at time t for firm j minus
the average price of firm j within the period, which means that ujt = −jt = pj − pjt, where
pj is the average price for store j.5 In both methods utilities are calculated by restricting the
shape of the price distribution to be the same across firms (although they might have different
means), but instead of using the maximum observed prices across firms the second method uses
the average observed prices across firms to serve as a proxy for differences in valuations. If the
underlying utility distribution is the same, asymptotically both methods give the same results.
However, in small samples estimates using the maximum price to estimate valuation leads to
an overestimation of the density at zero utility. For each firm by definition the highest observed
5For the analysis the height of the utilities is not important, all what matters are the differences between the
utilities. This means that our estimate of the search cost distribution does not change when the same constant is
added to all valuations vj .
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price during the sampling period leads to a zero utility observation, so if the sample consists of
10 firms competing over 10 periods, 10 percent of the observations lead to zero utility, while if
the firms compete over 100 periods, only 1 percent of the observations lead to zero utility. Such
an overestimation of zero utility in the utility distribution seriously affects the estimates of the
underlying search cost distribution, so in small samples it is better to estimate the valuations
using the mean of the prices.
The density function in equation (6.8) can be used to estimate the search cost distribution by
maximum likelihood. Since all firms are assumed to draw utilities from the same distribution,
all the calculated utilities can simply be pooled. The log-likelihood function is then LL =∑M
i=1 log l(ui), where M is the total number of observations. The likelihood function can be
concentrated by solving the calculated upper bound of the utility distribution in equation (6.7)
for x as a function of the rest of the parameters, i.e.,
x = u¯ ·
∑N
k=1 kµk∑N
k=2 kµk
,
and by plugging this into equation (6.8). I then proceed as in Chapter 3 to estimate the param-
eters of the model using the semi-nonparametric (SNP) density estimator. The idea is to mimic
the underlying search cost distribution by the flexible, Hermite polynomial based form of the
SNP estimator. As in Chapter 3 I take the parametric form of the univariate SNP estimator of
Fenton and Gallant (1996) but I use the log-normal instead of the normal distribution as the
base case. The search cost density is then specified as
g(c; γ, σ, θ) =
[
pn∑
i=0
θiwi(c)
]2
pn∑
i=0
θ2i
, θ ∈ Θp,Θp = {θ : θ = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θp), θ0 = 1}, (6.10)
where pn is the number of polynomial terms,
w0(c) = (cσ
√
2pi)−1/2 exp(−((log c− γ)/σ)2/4),
w1(c) = (cσ
√
2pi)−1/2((log c− γ)/σ) exp(−((log c− γ)/σ)2/4),
wi(c) =
[
((log c− γ)/σ)wi−1(c)−
√
i− 1wi−2(c)
]
/
√
i for i ≥ 2.
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The search cost density is then, together with the specification of ck as in equation (6.9), plugged
into the specification of µk as in equation (6.4), which is subsequently plugged into the log-
likelihood function to get rid of the µk’s and the ck’s. The parameters left for estimation by max-
imum likelihood are the parameters of the SNP density function, i.e., {γ, σ, θ0, θ1, . . . , θpn}.6
6.4 Empirical analysis
In this section I apply the estimation method to prices collected from Dutch supermarkets be-
tween January 2004 and June 2006. The application of the search model described in Section
6.3 to grocery products might need some justification. The supermarket sector is typically a
sector in which vertical product differentiation plays an important role. Everyone who visits
a supermarket once in a while knows that things like shopping location, parking possibilities,
product variety, queue length, etc. do matter a lot. However, although favorable characteris-
tics increase the utility level of the typical visitor of a supermarket, they usually come at a cost.
Full-service supermarkets, focussing on quality, are in general more expensive than for example
discounters, whose primarily focus is on low prices and not on service.
Compared to shops selling memory chips online as studied in previous chapters, in the of-
fline world physical locations become important as well. Although this implies that horizontal
product differentiation issues might be relevant, allowing for horizontal product differentiation
in addition to vertical product differentiation would complicate the analysis too much. We
therefore ignore horizontal characteristics, so location should be interpreted as a vertical char-
acteristic, which can be justified by the idea that some supermarkets in general have better
locations than others.
Another assumption made is that consumers search nonsequentially for the highest utility
around. Nonsequential search implies that consumers determine before they start searching how
many times to search. To justify this assumption one could think of consumers using advertise-
ments in for example newspapers to collect information about prices at different supermarkets,
the use of price comparison sites on the Internet, or a situation where there are a lot of shops at
the same distant place in town.7
6Note that the identification results of Chapter 3 carry over to this model as well.
7At this point I would like to notice that the sequential search model of Chapter 5 could also be extended in the
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In the analysis we do not explicitly take advertising into account, although it is clear that
advertising is more of an issue for grocery products than for online memory chips. Through
advertising consumers essentially get some price information for free, so ignoring advertising
puts a lower bound on the estimated search costs. On the other hand, as I will explain in more
detail below, my focus will be on a basket of goods, so ignoring advertising could be justified
on the basis of the argument that consumers are not so much interested in the prices of only a
few advertised products, but only in the price of a basket of grocery products. Our focus on a
basket of goods also helps to justify the inelastic demand assumption, since the usual buyer is
expected to buy a single basket at a time.
The model is applied to a data set of prices that are collected over time, so the implicit
assumption is that supermarkets play a stationary repeated game of finite horizon. This means
that we are ignoring dynamic effects caused by for example loyalty cards, advertising, and
switching costs. However, since part of the share of consumers searching only one time can
also be interpreted as consumers being loyal to some supermarket, to some extent loyalty can
also be accommodated in the current setting.
The focus of this study will be on homogeneous goods, but I allow for the possibility that
supermarkets are differentiated in terms of the service they offer. Most theory models explain
price dispersion by either random pricing strategies of homogeneous firms or by pure strategies
of heterogeneous firms. The model described in Section 6.2 combines the two: heterogeneous
firms mix over price distributions with different support. As is shown below in some detail,
in the data set average prices across stores are persistently different over time, but at the same
time, stores randomize their prices. These observations make the model presented here a suit-
able theoretical framework to study price setting behavior of supermarkets in relation to search
behavior of consumers, as traditional search models cannot explain both things at the same time.
Besides estimating search cost parameters and investigating whether the model does well
in explaining observed pricing behavior in the supermarket sector, an additional purpose of
this empirical section is to investigate how search costs have evolved over the sampling period.
This is an especially interesting exercise because during the period of data gathering the Dutch
supermarkets were engaged in a process of lowering their prices. This process was initiated on
same way as I did in this chapter for the nonsequential search model of Chapter 2. As discussed in Chapter 5, one
could then evaluate the extent of the bias introduced by estimating a model with the “wrong” search protocol.
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October 20th 2003 by market leader Albert Heijn by cutting prices of around 1000 products.
All other competitors reacted swiftly on this move and from that moment on Albert Heijn cut
prices several times.
Albert Heijn is a typical full-service supermarket, offering high service at high prices, and,
according to the management of Albert Heijn, the reason to lower their prices was to improve its
price-quality ratio by offering high service at more competitive prices.8 In terms of the model
described in Section 6.2, improving the price-quality ratio while at the same time cutting prices
means that a firm with unit cost ri has to decrease more than the maximum price consumers
are willing to pay for its basket vi (i.e., supermarkets need to become more efficient) and this is
exactly what happened: supermarket chains tried to renegotiate contracts with their suppliers in
order to lower their unit costs.9
I divide the entire sampling period into three periods and I estimate the model for each
period separately. This not only allows me to estimate the search cost distribution for each
period separately, but is also necessary to capture the effects of the price cutting process on the
firm side of the model. I assume that within a period supermarket chains are in equilibrium,
with exogenous parameters fixed, but that between periods the exogenous parameters of the
firm side of the model are allowed to change. This means that the stores’ margins in periods
2 and 3 are not necessarily the same as in period 1, which is necessary to explain why Albert
Heijn initiated the price cutting process in the first place.
The setup of the empirical analysis is as follows. In the next subsection, I start by giving
a description of the entire data set. Here I check some of the implications of the model, like
random pricing. I then divide the data set in three periods of equal length. Next, because
the analysis of the first two periods is complicated by a declining monthly average price, for
expositional reasons I first estimate the model for the last period, without correcting for any
trend. Thereafter, I estimate the model for all periods, but this time I do take changes in the
average monthly price into account. I end the study with a comparison of the estimates.
8See http://www.ah.nl/albertheijn/persberichten/article.jsp?id=219162 for the press release of Albert Heijn an-
nouncing price cuts on more than 1000 of its products on October 20, 2003.
9In a document of the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) on supermarkets and their relationship with suppli-
ers, the NMa concludes that the supermarkets passed on the benefits of lower supply prices to the consumers (see
point 6 of http://www.nmanet.nl/images/veelgestelde%20vragen%20inkoopmacht tcm16-55025.pdf).
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6.4.1 Description of the data
The data was collected using the web site Supers.nl, an independent price monitor of super-
market prices in the Netherlands.10 Each month, Supers.nl compares prices for around 25-30
products sold at several Dutch supermarkets chains. In the Netherlands, all supermarkets price
uniformly across locations. This means that even though supermarkets serve local customers,
prices are set nationally, so pricing strategies of the stores can be investigated at an aggregate
level.11 As already said, besides seeing whether the model could actually explain observed
behavior in this sector, an additional purpose of this empirical analysis is to investigate how
search costs evolve over time. Given that supermarkets initiated a process of lowering prices
in October 2003, ideally I would have liked to have data from before and after the start of this
process. However, since price comparison on Supers.nl started on January 2004 only data from
during the process is available.
The data set consists each month of around 25-30 products, but the set of products is not
necessarily the same each month. In this analysis I focus on a basket of goods. In supermarkets,
consumers usually buy many products at a time, so most consumers are interested in the price
of a basket of goods and not so much in the price of individual products.12
In total there are 40 different products in the data set. Figure 6.2 gives a kernel estimate
of the price density of the entire basket, that is, the price density of all the 40 products which
appear at least once during the period of data collection together, where prices are in logarith-
mic form and as deviations from the monthly average to control for differences in products
within the sample each month. Moreover, to correct for changes in the CPI I divide each price
observation by the monthly CPI with January 2004 as the base case, so that all prices are in
terms of January 2004 prices. As a result, all the variation depicted in Figure 6.2 is solely due
to differences between stores. As the graph shows, there is substantial price dispersion for the
10See http://www.supers.nl.
11In a press release of the Dutch Competition Authority (NMa) on the acquisition of Groenwoudt by Laurus,
the NMa speaks about a so-called chain effect in the way supermarket compete in the Netherlands; because areas
from where supermarkets attract their customers overlap, in the end supermarkets compete at a national level (see
http://www.nmanet.nl/nederlands/home/Actueel/Nieuws Persberichten/NMa Persberichten/2000/00 14.asp).
12In addition, a supermarket is a multi-product firm so a single-product model as described in Section 6.2 is
probably not the right model when investigating individual products. A drawback of looking at baskets of products
instead of individual products is that behavior of consumers who go to different supermarkets for each different
product is not captured.
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Figure 6.2: Price density (logarithm of real price in deviation from monthly average)
basket.13 Whether this is due to quality differences or due to strategic price differences will be
the focus of the remainder of this section.
Supers.nl compares prices of products at all the big supermarket chains in the Netherlands
selling branded products. In total there are 18 different supermarket chains in the data set.14
Not all chains are in each others proximity at the local level, but since prices are set nationally, I
assume all stores are competing with each other and set the number of storesN equal to 18. The
goods within a basket are all homogeneous brands, but because they are sold by different sellers,
the heterogeneity of the supermarkets is transferred to the products. In terms of the theoretical
model presented in Section 6.2, consumers valuation v is different across supermarket chains,
even though the good is the same. Therefore, supermarkets with better valued characteristics
can ask higher prices on average.
To investigate whether the right model is used to study search behavior of consumers in
this setting, I will first check if some of the implications of the model, like random pricing
and persistent differences in average price across stores, are observed in the data. As in Lach
(2002), I concentrate on the relative position of the stores in terms of price rankings, and how
these positions evolve over time, but in contrast to his approach, because my model allows
13Table A6.6 in the Appendix gives the names and some simple statistics for the 40 products which appear at
least once during the period of data collection. The coefficient of variation fluctuates across products, but as the
table shows, also for most products there seems to be substantial price dispersion as well.
14I left two supermarkets out of the analysis because there were only price observations for 8 months or less.
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Figure 6.3: Price rankings (real price)
for vertical product differentiation the prices I use to calculate rankings are not corrected for
differences between stores.
According to the model, prices are randomly drawn from a distribution, so as a result of
this, price rankings should change over time, but, as different stores have different supports of
the price distribution, it is unlikely that a store’s variation in ranking is very large. Figure 6.3
shows how the price rankings of the stores evolve over time for the basket of goods. Clearly,
rankings do change over time, but it does not happen that a store with an initial low price for
the basket, and thus a low ranking, moves up all the way in the ranking distribution. The same
holds for stores with an initial high ranking.
To study this issue in more detail, Table 6.1(a) gives information about the time a firm
spends in each quartile of every month’s empirical price distribution. Stores change their relative
position in the price rankings, but usually not every month. For example, 6.19% of the price
observations in the first quartile were for stores that had a price in this quartile for one successive
month. Likewise, 3.54% of prices in the first quartile belong to stores that were in this quartile
for two successive months. Especially the stores that have a price within the first or fourth
quartile stay there for many months: at least 65% of stores for more than 6 months. Among
supermarkets pricing in the second and third quartile there is more fluctuation; prices are on
average between 4 and 5 successive months in one of these quartiles and 50% of stores keep
their prices in these quartiles for at most 5 months.
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Duration q1 q2 q3 q4
1 month 6.19 14.29 24.79 12.77
2 months 3.54 12.03 11.57 4.26
3 months 7.96 11.28 17.36 6.38
4 months 3.54 12.03 16.53 11.35
5 months 8.85 11.28 12.40 0.00
6+ months 69.91 39.10 17.36 65.25
mean 11.19 4.76 4.14 12.01
median 13 5 4 6
max 20 9 12 27
Notes: In percentages.
(a) Durations by quartile
Quartile spend most time in
Quartile q1 q2 q3 q4
q1 71.67 19.01 0.00 0.00
q2 25.83 59.15 10.83 3.97
q3 2.50 20.42 61.67 11.90
q4 0.00 1.41 27.50 84.13
N 4 7 4 5
M 120 142 120 126
Notes: In percentages.
(b) Quartiles by quartile spend most time
in
Table 6.1: Stores’ positioning
Table 6.1(b) groups supermarkets by the quartile they spent the most time in and gives the
percentage of prices in each quartile. In line with Table 6.1(a), supermarkets that have most
observations in either quartile 1 or 4 are the least found in other quartiles. On average 69% of
prices of a supermarket are observed in one quartile only. Moreover, on average 95% of prices
within a supermarket are in two successive quartiles only. The are no supermarkets which have
prices in all four quartiles. We can conclude from all this evidence that supermarkets change
their relative positions, but stick to two successive quartiles of the empirical price distribution
only. Together with Figure 6.3 and the duration results this shows that supermarkets randomize
their prices, but over different supports. This is consistent with the theoretical model of Section
6.2.
To investigate if search costs have changed over time, and to capture the dynamics of the firm
side of the model, I divide the sampling period into three distinct subperiods. More specifically,
I divide the 30 months into three periods of 10 months, so that all periods are of equal length.
This means that within a period it is assumed that the maximum possible margin x and the
search cost distribution G(c) do not change, but that between periods both x and G(c) are
free to fluctuate. In this way I am able to estimate the search cost distribution for each period
separately, while controlling for possible changes in x as a result of the supermarkets attempts
to improve their price-quality ratio or to become more efficient.
To be able to estimate valuations within a period, the products in the basket should not
change. However, between periods it does not matter if the composition of the basket changes,
as the underlying search cost distribution to be estimated does not depend in any way on the
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Figure 6.4: Monthly average price of the basket per period
basket or the products in the basket. Selecting only the products for which I had price obser-
vations for a complete period, I end up with a basket containing 20 products in period 1, 25
products in period 2 and 22 products in period 3.15
Figure 6.4 gives the average monthly price for the basket for each month in the sample.
Note that each period has different products in the basket so the average monthly price cannot
be compared between periods. Especially in the first period there seems to be a downward trend
in the average monthly price. Even though in terms of the search model each average price is the
result of the mean of only around 18 random draws from a particular distribution it is unlikely
that declining price pattern is due to randomness. Instead it is more likely that the declining
pattern is caused by the ongoing price cutting process. In the third period prices are more or
less stabilized, which suggests that the price cutting process has probably ended.16
The downward trend in average monthly price in period 1 and 2 complicates the estimation
of the model. For expositional reasons I will therefore estimate the model first for the third
period without correcting for differences in average price across time; in subsection 6.4.3 the
search cost distributions will be estimated for all periods, but this time by allowing for time
15In period 2 there is one product for which there are 9 out of 10 prices in the sample. To increase the size of
this periods basket I use the price of the week before to replace the missing price.
16Although there is a downward trend in the average monthly price in the first months, this is not necessarily at
odds with the assumption that x is constant within a period. To see this, note that in terms of the model of Section
6.2, when both v and r decline by the same amount, x remains constant while the average price goes down.
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(a) Price density (b) Utility density
Figure 6.5: Price and utility density period 3
fixed effects as well. In subsection 6.4.4 the results will be compared and discussed.
6.4.2 Estimation of search costs without time fixed effects
Figure 6.5(a) shows a kernel estimate of the price density for the basket in the third period, were
prices are the logarithm of real prices in deviation from the period average. According to the
search model presented in Section 6.2, the substantial price dispersion shown in this graph is
explained as a combination of quality differences between stores and random pricing strategies.
Because of the way utilities are defined in the model, utilities are essentially prices controlled
for quality differences between stores. As described in the previous section, utilities can be
calculated by taking the difference between the maximum price for store j over time and the
price at time t, i.e., ujt = p¯j − pjt, or by a fixed effects regression, where the utilities are given
by ujt = −jt = pj − pjt. Given that there are only 10 monthly observations per store, the
second approach will be used here. Utility uj at time t is then calculated as the average price
for store j over the 10 months minus the price at time t for store j.
Table 6.2 gives the results of the fixed effects regression. Since the R2 is quite high, shop
characteristics explain a large part of the variation in the data. To see whether the store fixed
effects are jointly significant, an F -test is performed. As can be seen in Table 6.2, the p-value
for the F -test is equal to zero, which suggests that store fixed effects indeed matter.
Figure 6.5(b) graphs a kernel estimate of the utility density function for period 3, where the
utilities are the negatives of the residuals of the fixed effects regression. Figure 6.5(b) shows
that there is substantial utility dispersion. The utility density is right-skewed, which tells us that
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Variables price p
Constant 32.74 (0.05)
Albert Heijn 1.64
Bas Dirk Digros -1.62
Bonimarkt -1.88
C1000 1.21
Coop 2.07
Deen -0.50
Dekamarkt -0.50
Edah -
Foodfactory -1.62
Golff 1.62
Hoogvliet -1.62
Jan Linders -0.23
Jumbo -1.37
Konmar 0.86
Nettorama -1.91
Plus 1.38
Super de Boer 2.19
Vomar 0.29
N 170
R2 0.85
R¯2 0.83
p-value F -test 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 6.2: Fixed Effects regression results period 3
although it is possible to encounter utilities of more than 2.5, it happens with small probability.
This already gives some indication that the share of consumers searching intensively will not be
very large in this market.
The calculated utilities are used in the maximum likelihood procedure described in Section
6.3. The estimation results are presented in Table 6.3(a). The estimates of the parameters of
the log-normal part of the SNP function, γ and σ, are highly significant, while only some of
the parameters of the polynomial part of the SNP function, the θ’s, are significant at a 5%-
level. Table 6.3(b) gives the search intensities derived from the estimated parameters of the
SNP distribution. What strikes is that consumers either search for prices at one or two, or at
all chains. The estimated share of consumers searching once or twice is around 97%, while
only 3% of consumers compare all prices. A similar picture arises when the estimated search
cost cdf and pdf are graphed, as in Figure 6.6. The flat part in the lower part of the search cost
distribution indicates that consumers either have search cost of more than 0.22 euro, or they
have search cost almost equal to zero. Finally, Table 6.3(a) shows that the estimated maximum
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Period 3
pn 5
# obs 170
γ 2.882 (0.32)
σ 0.620 (0.18)
θ0 1.000
θ1 1.317 (0.81)
θ2 0.845 (1.62)
θ3 -0.484 (1.87)
θ4 -0.710 (1.39)
θ5 -0.931 (0.83)
x 6.13
LL 914.200
KS F (p) 1.00
KS L(u) 0.86
Notes: Standard errors in
parenthesis.
(a) Parameter estimates
SNP function
Period 3
µ1 0.81
µ2 0.16
µ3 0.00
µ4 0.00
µ5 0.00
µ6 0.00
µ7 0.00
µ8 0.00
µ9 0.00
µ10 0.00
µ11 0.00
µ12 0.00
µ13 0.00
µ14 0.00
µ15 0.00
µ16 0.00
µ17 0.00
µ18 0.03
Notes: The µk’s are calcu-
lated using equation (6.4)
(b) Implied µk’s
Table 6.3: Estimation results period 3
(a) Search cost cdf (b) Search cost pdf
Figure 6.6: Estimated search cost distribution period 3
price-cost margin x = vj − rj is 6.13 euro.
As can be seen in Figure 6.7(a) the model does quite well in explaining the data since the
estimated price cumulative distribution function, as indicated by the solid line, is quite close
to the empirical one. The results of a more formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are put in Table
6.3(a).17 Since allKS F (p) values are below the 95%-critical value of theKS-statistic, which is
17In this tableKS F (p) is calculated as
√
m·τm, wherem is the number of observations and τm is the maximum
absolute difference over all prices between the estimated price cdf and the empirical price cdf.
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(a) Fit price distribution (b) Fit utility distribution
Figure 6.7: Fit price and utility distributions period 3
1.36, we cannot reject that the prices are drawn from the estimated price distribution. Of course,
given that around 85% of the variation can be explained by store fixed effects, a substantial part
of the fit in Figure 6.7(a) is due to non-search related causes. Since the utility distribution is
derived by controlling for store fixed effects, in principle the fit of the utility distribution is a
better indicator for determining to what extent search matters. Figure 6.7(b) shows the estimated
utility cdf compared to the calculated utility cdf. As can be seen in this graph, the estimated
utility distribution is close to the calculated utility distribution. That the model does quite well
in explaining utilities can also be concluded from the corresponding KS L(u) value in Table
6.3(a), which is well below the critical value of 1.36.
6.4.3 Estimation of search costs with time fixed effects
In this subsection search cost distributions for all three periods will be estimated. Because of
the declining trend in average price in period 1 and to a lesser extent in period 2, I will allow
for time fixed effects in the calculation of utilities. To be able to compare the estimates across
periods, the data in period 3 will be corrected for differences in average price across time as
well.
Figure 6.8(a) shows kernel estimates of the price density for each period. Because of the
declining trend in the first months I take the logarithm of real prices in deviation from the
monthly average. It cannot be concluded from this graph whether pricing was more competitive
in one period versus another one, but the graph does show that the shape of the price distribution,
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(a) Price densities (b) Utility densities
Figure 6.8: Price and utility densities all periods
corrected for the differences in the basket and the declining trend, is different between periods.
What causes this remains to be seen.
To correct for the declining average price in the first periods in the calculation of the utilities,
in this section I allow for time fixed effects as well. Utility uj at time t is then calculated as the
price at time t for store j minus the average price of the basket at time tminus the average of the
time corrected price for store j in the specific period, i.e., ujt = pt + pj − pjt, where pj is now
the average of pt − pjt across stores. Notice that adding time fixed effects effectively corrects
for the declining average price, but it also eliminates part of the variation in prices caused by
the search process, so this should be taken into account when evaluating the results.
Table 6.4 gives the results of the fixed effects regression, including the store fixed effects.
Since for all periods the R2 is quite high, shop characteristics and time effects explain a large
part of the variation in the data. Moreover, for each period the results of an F -test to test whether
time and store fixed effects are jointly significant suggest that both store and period fixed effects
indeed matter.
Figure 6.8(b) graphs a kernel estimate of the utility density function for each period, where
the utilities are the negatives of the residuals of the fixed effects regression. Figure 6.8(b) shows
that there is substantial utility dispersion. On average, supermarkets have offered the highest
utility in period 1 and the lowest in period 3. A likely reason for the difference in average utility
between period 1 and period 2 is that the basket of period 1 is bigger in size. However, the
basket of period 2 is smaller in size than the basket of period 3 and still average utility is lower
in the last period. As will be shown later, this might have to do with changes in the underlying
search cost distribution.
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Variables Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Constant 36.27 (0.06) 31.62 (0.04) 32.74 (0.04)
Albert Heijn 1.52 1.71 1.64
Bas Dirk Digros -2.48 -2.29 -1.62
Bonimarkt -0.33 -1.30 -1.88
C1000 0.82 1.29 1.21
Coop 2.33 3.12 2.07
Deen -1.19 -0.57 -0.50
Dekamarkt -0.34 -0.20 -0.50
Edah 1.02 1.71 -
Foodfactory - -1.93 -1.62
Golff - - 1.62
Hoogvliet -1.04 -1.71 -1.62
Jan Linders - 0.08 -0.23
Jumbo -1.80 -1.42 -1.37
Konmar 0.47 -0.15 0.86
Nettorama -2.81 -2.08 -1.91
Plus 1.24 1.30 1.38
Super de Boer 2.39 1.92 2.19
Vomar 0.22 0.53 0.29
N 150 170 170
R2 0.89 0.92 0.92
R¯2 0.87 0.91 0.90
p-value F -test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 6.4: Fixed Effects Regression Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 6.5. The parameter estimates of γ and σ
in Table 6.5(a) are all highly significant, while only some of the θ’s are significant at a 5%-
level. Table 6.5(b) gives the search intensities derived from the estimated parameters of the
SNP distribution. In line with the results from the previous section, consumers either search
for prices at one or two, or at all chains. Moreover, the estimates indicate that the share of
consumers searching once or twice increases over time, from 86% in period 1 to 89% in period
2 and even 94% in period 3. In contrast, the share of consumers comparing prices from all
supermarkets decreases from 12% in period 1 to 8% in period 2 and 6% in period 3. A similar
picture arises when the estimated search cost cdf and pdf are graphed, as in Figure 6.9. For all
three periods there is a flat part in the lower part of the search cost distribution, indicating that
consumers either have search cost of more than 0.20 euro, or they have search cost almost equal
to zero.
According to the estimates the share of consumers searching for all prices declines over
time, which is also shown in Figure 6.9. However, although the shares of consumers searching
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period 1 period 2 period 3
pn 5 5 5
# obs 150 170 170
γ 2.642 (0.28) 3.334 (0.31) 2.572 (0.21)
σ 0.652 (0.11) 0.782 (0.09) 0.608 (0.10)
θ0 1.000 1.000 1.000
θ1 1.510 (0.75) 0.525 (0.68) 1.311 (0.68)
θ2 1.662 (1.61) -0.568 (0.85) 0.951 (1.58)
θ3 -0.094 (1.71) -0.356 (0.63) -0.559 (2.04)
θ4 -0.082 (1.67) -0.119 (0.95) -0.678 (1.61)
θ5 -1.378 (0.78) 0.716 (0.64) -1.103 (0.89)
x 4.21 3.91 3.83
x/p¯ 10.38% 11.05% 10.73%
LL 831.438 906.433 857.248
KS F (p) 0.94 0.57 0.98
KS L(u) 1.80 1.68 1.39
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parenthesis.
(a) Parameter estimates SNP function
period 1 period 2 period 3
µ1 0.50 0.61 0.76
µ2 0.36 0.28 0.18
µ3 0.00 0.01 0.00
µ4 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ5 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ6 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ7 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ8 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ9 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ10 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ11 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ12 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ13 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ14 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ15 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ16 0.00 0.00 0.00
µ17 0.01 0.01 0.00
µ18 0.12 0.08 0.06
Notes: The µk’s are calculated using
equation (6.4).
(b) Implied µk’s
Table 6.5: Estimation results
(a) Search cost cdf (b) Search cost pdf
Figure 6.9: Estimated Search Cost Distribution
once and twice increases when moving from period 1 to period 2 and 3, the estimated search cost
distributions for higher search costs show a less straightforward pattern: according to Figure 6.9
the search costs for people with search costs above 0.25 actually went down over time.
Table 6.5(a) also gives the estimated maximum price-cost margin x = vj − rj . Because the
baskets are different over time these estimates cannot be directly compared between periods.
Therefore, in the table I also give x as a percentage of the maximum price found in each period,
so that it can be compared across periods. Clearly, compared to period 1, the maximum price-
cost margin went up in period 2 and 3, which gives some indication that supermarkets have
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(a) Period 1 (b) Period 2
(c) Period 3
Figure 6.10: Fit price distributions
become more efficient.
As can be seen in Figure 6.10 the model does quite well in explaining the data since all
three estimated price cumulative distribution functions, as indicated by the solid lines, are quite
close to the empirical ones. The results of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test in Table 6.5(a) are in
line with these observations, since all KS F (p) values are below the 95%-critical value of
1.36. In contrast, the fit of the estimated utility distribution to the calculated utility distribution
is less good. Figure 6.11 shows the estimated utility cdfs compared to the calculated utility
cdfs. Especially in period 1 and 2 the fit is not so good, which can also be concluded from
the corresponding KS L(u) values in Table 6.5(a). The fit in period 3 is already much better.
Prices stabilized in this period, so the relatively poor fit of the utility distribution in the first
two periods could be due to a non-equilibrium situation caused by the price cutting process.
Another reason for the relatively poor fit is that part of the variation in prices is eliminated by
controlling for time fixed effects. From Subsection 6.4.2 it is already known that estimating the
model for period 3 without controlling for time fixed effects gives a much better fit.
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(a) Period 1 (b) Period 2
(c) Period 3
Figure 6.11: Fit utility distributions
6.4.4 Comparison across periods and discussion of results
The estimated search cost distributions in Subsection 6.4.3 point out that the amount of search
has decreased over time. In addition, according to Table 6.5(b) the share of consumers with
higher search cost went up, although Figure 6.9 points out that this did not lead to a general
shift to the right of the search cost cdf. The most intuitive way to interpret search cost is as an
opportunity cost of time. A change in search costs over time is then naturally related to a change
in income, as time becomes more valuable as people earn more. During the sampling period,
changes in income were modest in the sampling period and changes in union monthly wages
were even negative in real terms, so although this might explain the decrease in search cost of
part of the population, it is not very likely that a shift in real income is driving the changes in
search intensity.18
The changes in search intensity could instead be explained by changes in utility of the
18According to the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, union monthly wages increased 2.5% between January
2004 and June 2006. In real terms there was a decline of 1.5%.
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(a) Search cost cdf (b) Search cost pdf
Figure 6.12: Estimated search cost distribution without product differentiation
shopping itself. As the so-called ‘shoppers’ in the search model of Stahl (1989), people may
like shopping, even though they have a high opportunity cost of time. These shoppers have
essentially search costs equal to zero. Apart from the products being bought, the shopping
itself provides utility to these consumers as well, for example, because finding the lowest price
gives satisfaction. If people dislike shopping more and more over time, this would decrease the
share of shoppers. As a result people become less sensitive to price changes. Such a change in
utility of shopping might even be caused by the process of price cutting itself, as a psychological
reaction. Even though there are reasons to search, consumers are simply tired of looking for low
prices. Indeed, in a report published in June 2004 about the Dutch supermarket price cutting
process, consultancy firm Deloitte concludes that since its start in October 2003, less and less
consumers change supermarkets because of low prices.19
An alternative, but related explanation for the changes in search intensity over time would
be related to changes in the level of consumer confidence. People care less about finding the
lowest price when they believe the economy is doing well. Instead of linking search cost to
actual income, in this interpretation it is linked to expected income. Indeed, the consumer
confidence level in the Netherlands has increased sharply in the last period compared to the
other periods (from on average around −24 in period 1 and 2 to −13 in period 3), so this could
explain that over time, less people compare all prices.
An interesting question would be how the estimates of the search cost model with vertical
product differentiation compare to estimates from a model without vertical product differenti-
19See http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press release/0,1014,sid%253D13354%2526cid%253D52455,00.html for a
press release of Deloitte published on June 23, 2004.
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ation. Figure 6.12 gives the estimated search cost cdf and pdf if it is assumed the stores are
homogeneous instead of vertically differentiated. What strikes is that estimated search costs are
now much higher. Given that around 90% of the variation in prices can be attributed to differ-
ences between stores and that this is no longer captured in different valuations across stores but
in the prices itself, the gains from searching are much higher in the homogeneous search model.
To be able to explain observed prices, the population of consumers should have higher search
cost on average and should search less than in the search model with vertical product differen-
tiation. As Figure 6.12(a) shows, the share of consumers comparing prices from all stores is in
general much lower now, although in period 1 it is still the highest and in period 3 the lowest.
The homogenous search model does only slightly worse in explaining the observed prices, but
as reported earlier, it fails to explain patterns at a more detailed level, so on those grounds the
homogeneous products model can be rejected for this data set.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter presented a nonsequential search model that allows for vertical product differenti-
ation. Firms offering distinct products at different prices can be seen as competing in terms of
utilities. It is shown that a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in utility exists. Firms draw
utilities from a common utility distribution, but because valuations and unit costs are different
across firms, firms have different price distributions. A result of this is that firms randomize
their prices, but over different supports, so that prices are persistently different across firms
over time, something which so far could not be explained by existing search models.
It is shown how to estimate the model using price data only. Utilities are calculated by taking
the negative of the residuals of a fixed effects regression of prices on store and time dummies.
The calculated utilities then serve as an input to a maximum likelihood estimation procedure
in order to estimate the underlying search cost distribution. For this a semi-nonparametric
estimator is used.
The method is applied to data from Dutch supermarkets in the period January 2004 till
June 2006, a period which was characterized by a process of price cutting. The model does
reasonably well in explaining observed prices. Moreover, estimates indicate that the amount of
search has decreased over time. Since real monthly wages have decreased over time this shift
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cannot be explained by a change in real income. Alternatively, the changes can be attributed to
a change in the utility shopping gives to consumers, possibly as a result of events related to the
price cutting process. An increase in the level of consumer confidence in the final period might
explain the decreasing share of consumers comparing all prices as well.
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APPENDIX
Mean Price Minimum Maximum Coefficient of Number of
Product (Std) Price Price Variation (×100) Observations
Andrelon Iedere dag shampoo 2.02 (0.18) 1.16 2.45 8.88 508
Ariel Color 1.35 kg 4.76 (0.38) 3.24 5.83 8.07 471
Axe deodorant 3.01 (0.43) 1.97 3.99 14.14 272
Bolletje beschuit blauw 135 g 0.52 (0.05) 0.41 0.87 8.83 508
Calve whisky cocktail saus 250 ml 0.87 (0.06) 0.57 1.19 6.99 490
Chicken Tonight Hawaii 1 pot 1.36 (0.14) 0.86 1.65 10.21 508
Coca Cola 1,5 l 0.94 (0.13) 0.64 1.25 13.75 508
Conimex mix voor bahmi speciaal 0.90 (0.07) 0.57 1.09 8.18 508
Douwe Egberts Roodmerk Snelfiltermaling 500 g 2.52 (0.26) 0.96 2.91 10.14 508
Dubbelfrisss sinaasappel mandarijn 1 liter 0.58 (0.04) 0.38 0.64 6.07 444
Dubbelfrisss sinaasappel mandarijn 1,5 liter 0.93 (0.03) 0.83 0.97 3.53 19
Fristi roze normaal 1 liter 0.92 (0.07) 0.39 1.04 7.95 317
Goudkuipje klein 100g 0.55 (0.06) 0.46 0.75 10.26 508
Hak Bruine Bonen klein 210 g 0.47 (0.05) 0.24 0.64 10.98 384
Heineken Bier 24 x 0,3 l krat 9.00 (0.47) 6.78 9.72 5.26 253
Hero aardbeienjam 340 g 1.43 (0.12) 0.96 1.67 8.52 355
Hertog Slagroomijs 1 liter 2.43 (0.18) 1.54 2.90 7.58 463
Honig chinese kippensoep pakje 0.85 (0.07) 0.57 1.16 8.07 355
Honig Macaroni vlugkokend (groen) 500 g 0.55 (0.16) 0.38 0.95 29.21 107
Honig macaroni vlugkokend kiloprijs 0.94 (0.04) 0.78 1.23 4.55 148
Honig mix voor macaroni en spaghetti 62 g 0.72 (0.07) 0.28 0.95 10.03 508
Honig Spaghetti vlugkokend (groen) 0.68 (0.06) 0.37 0.78 8.63 253
Kellog’s Smacks 375 g 2.09 (0.29) 1.68 2.68 13.69 508
Knorr Wereldgerechten 1.74 (0.19) 1.06 1.93 10.99 17
Krat Amstel bier 24 x 0,3 l 8.31 (0.51) 5.93 9.19 6.14 346
Lassie toverrijst 400 g 0.74 (0.04) 0.67 0.84 5.07 102
Lays chips naturel 0.70 (0.05) 0.57 0.93 7.57 238
Lays chips naturel kiloprijs 3.30 (0.19) 2.88 3.64 5.81 17
Optimel drink framboos 1 l 1.13 (0.10) 0.66 1.34 8.55 355
Peijnenburg ontbijtkoek 500 g 0.82 (0.04) 0.79 0.89 5.06 15
Peijnenburg ontbijtkoek 600 g 0.95 (0.02) 0.87 0.98 1.98 76
Pickwick thee Engelse Melange (groen) 20 x 4 g 0.75 (0.04) 0.64 1.04 5.96 508
Pringles Naturel 200 gram 1.44 (0.14) 0.72 1.67 9.51 403
Rexona deodorant crystal 2.37 (0.40) 1.55 2.99 17.09 344
Riedel Appelsientje Sinaasappelsap 1 liter 0.78 (0.07) 0.36 0.99 8.58 508
Robijn Black Velvet 750 ml 3.79 (0.17) 3.34 4.12 4.52 55
Spa Blauw 1,5 l 0.42 (0.04) 0.34 0.56 10.33 508
Sportlife Peppermint 4 stuk 1.49 (0.09) 1.33 1.79 6.18 90
Unox Cup-a-soup kip 3 zakjes 0.66 (0.04) 0.48 0.82 6.53 508
Verkade knappertjes 220 g 0.90 (0.06) 0.64 0.99 6.73 508
Notes: Prices are deflated to January 2004.
Table A6.6: Simple statistics for products in the sample
7Summary, achievements and directions
for further research
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7.1 Summary
This thesis focused on the structural estimation of consumer search models. As argued in Chap-
ter 1, because the way search frictions influence markets may depend on how search costs are
distributed among consumers, meaningful competition policy requires knowledge of these dis-
tributions. Using the structure of several existing and newly developed consumer search models,
the various essays of this thesis gave methods to identify and estimate search costs of consumers.
An important finding is that in most settings price data is enough to identify how search costs
are distributed among consumers, even in a setting where search frictions coexist with quality
differences among firms.
The common approach in the different essays of this thesis is to take a particular consumer
search model as the starting point for identification of the search cost distribution of consumers.
Then using the structure of this consumer search model an equilibrium price distribution can
be derived. This equilibrium price distribution characterizes how search costs are related to the
pricing strategies of the firms. By taking the inverse of this relation, the quantiles of the search
cost distribution can be expressed as a function of the structural parameters of the consumer
search model. This inverse relation serves as the starting point for the estimation of search costs.
How exactly the estimation works depends on the type of model. For example, we have shown
that for the nonsequential search models of Chapters 2, 3 and 6, as well the sequential search
model of Chapter 4 maximum likelihood can be used, while the estimation of the sequential
search model of Chapter 5 relies on the empirical price distribution.
We showed how to estimate search costs within several theoretical settings. Chapter 2 and 3
focused on nonsequential consumer search models. Chapter 2 discussed how to estimate a non-
sequential search model with symmetric firms and heterogeneous consumers in terms of search
costs. The starting point of the analysis was an oligopolistic version of Hong and Shum (2006).
We explained how to estimate the model using a maximum likelihood procedure. Furthermore,
we applied the estimation method to data collected from an online price comparison site on
memory chips. According to the estimates, consumers either search for at most three prices
or they compare prices of all stores around. Goodness-of-fit statistics indicated that the model
does quite well in explaining empirical pricing patterns.
Chapter 3 extended the framework of Chapter 2 to allow for valuation heterogeneity on the
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consumer side of the model. In addition, this essay went more into the details of how exactly
the identification of nonsequential search models works. We showed that in order to identify the
model, one needs data from several markets with the same underlying search cost distribution.
In order to connect the different markets, a spline approximation cannot be used. Instead, to
exploit the linkage between the different markets via the search cost distribution, we proposed
a semi-nonparametric (SNP) density estimator. The parameters of this SNP density function
maximize the log-likelihood function corresponding to all the markets together.
The focus of Chapter 4 and 5 was on sequential search. In Chapter 4 we modified the se-
quential search model of Stahl (1989) by relaxing the assumption that the first price observation
is for free. In the first part of this essay we showed that the so-called Diamond result never ob-
tains when search is truly costly, that is, when the first price observation is also costly, not even
as a limiting result. In the second part of this essay, the estimation of this model was studied.
The estimation results indicated that the model does not do well in explaining empirically ob-
served pricing patterns for memory chips sold online. This result seems to be intimately linked
to the assumption that all searchers have the same search cost.
The framework of Chapter 4 was extended in Chapter 5 by allowing consumers to draw
their search cost from an atomless search cost distribution. We showed how to identify and esti-
mate the search cost distribution using price data. Interestingly, compared to the nonsequential
search model, in this sequential search setting data from one market is enough to identify the
search cost distribution. As in Chapter 2, we estimated the model using price data for memory
chips obtained from a price comparison site. The estimates indicated that search costs are much
higher when it is assumed that consumers search sequentially than when consumers search non-
sequentially. Also compared to the nonparametric estimation method of the sequential search
model of Hong and Shum (2006) estimated search costs are relatively high.
Finally, Chapter 6 extended the basic framework with homogeneous goods by allowing for
vertical product differentiation. We showed that a unique mixed strategy equilibrium exists
in terms of utility levels offered to consumers. Because firms differ in their characteristics,
the price equilibrium is asymmetric. This model therefore provided a theoretical rationale for
explaining price dispersion as a result of both quality differences between firms and search
frictions. Using the equilibrium conditions derived from the model, we showed how to estimate
the model using only price data. We estimated the model using a data set of products sold at
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several grocery stores in the Netherlands. The estimates indicated that most consumers search
at most twice, and that only a small fraction of consumers sampled all stores.
7.2 Achievements
The main contribution of this thesis is methodological: the several chapters of this thesis pro-
vide methods to retrieve the costs consumers make to obtain price observations using a limited
amount of data. Even when part of the price differences seen between firms are due to quality
differences, in most cases the only information needed to identify search costs is a data set of
prices. As explained in this thesis, this is true for a wide range of models, even without making
a priori assumptions about the way search costs are distributed.1 As shown in Chapter 3, a
previously overlooked condition for identification is that in a nonsequential search setting one
needs to have price data from several markets, all with the same underlying search cost distribu-
tion. In addition, relative to the existing literature on the estimation of consumer search models,
our estimation methods do not rely on the assumption that there are infinitely many firms in
the market. Instead, we start from an oligopolistic setting, which allows us to study the impact
of the number of firms on prices. Moreover, we assume consumers only know the distribution
from which prices are drawn and not realized prices. As pointed out by Stahl (1996), since
the purpose of our models is to investigate the information acquisition process of consumers,
consumers should have no information regarding actual prices.
Although the main focus of this thesis is on the identification and estimation of consumer
search costs, the thesis delivers a number of useful byproducts. The starting point for all de-
scribed estimation procedures is consumer search theory. Several existing theoretical models
have been adapted to make them empirically more useful. For example, the nonsequential
search model of Burdett and Judd (1983) is extended in Chapter 3 to an oligopolistic setting with
consumers that are heterogeneous in their search costs as well as in their valuations. Compared
to a model where consumers have one common valuation for the good, after having observed
a sample of prices, consumers who observe that their valuation is lower than the prices in their
sample now leave the market. This puts some extra competitive pressure on the pricing of the
1This is true for nonsequential search models. To identify search costs in a sequential search setting in addition
one needs to have an estimate of the (common) marginal cost of the firms. Otherwise, only parametric identification
is possible.
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firms. Another lesson that can be learned from the several search models described in this thesis
is that the exact shape of the search cost distribution matters a lot for comparative static results.
This can be quite important when doing policy experiments. In Chapter 2 we have shown how
to use the estimated search cost distribution to see what happens when there is a change in the
tax regime of a particular market. Interestingly, a substantial increase in taxes might be passed
on to consumers more than fully, resulting in greater profits for the firms.
When it comes to the actual pricing of firms, another thing that can be learned from this
thesis is that most models discussed in this thesis do quite well in explaining observed pric-
ing patterns. Estimated price distributions match very well empirical price distributions, which
means that the empirically observed prices could very well be drawn from the estimated theoret-
ical models. Also in other dimensions the models described in this thesis seem to be supported
by the data. For example, like Lach (2002) we find that our price data on memory chips and
grocery products largely follow a random pattern, which is in line with the mixed strategies we
derived as equilibria in all of our search models.
Finally, we can learn from Chapter 5 that the choice between a sequential or a nonsequential
search model can have a large impact on the estimates of the search cost distribution. When con-
sumers search sequentially they always have the option to continue searching if an encountered
price is higher than their reservation price. This puts much more competitive pressure on prices
than in the nonsequential search model, since in the nonsequential search setting consumers will
never continue searching after they have gathered the number of prices they committed to before
the start of the search process. As a result, to explain the same price distribution estimated con-
sumer search costs are lower in case of sequential search than in case of nonsequential search.
Although one could estimate both models to get an idea of the upper and lower bounds of the
search cost distribution, to get more specific estimates this means that the researcher should be
very careful in deciding which of the two search protocols to start the analysis with. Knowledge
of the market being studied will provide natural guidelines, i.e., for markets where the search
outcome is observed with some delay, like in markets for labor, mortgages, refurbishing ser-
vices, etc., nonsequential search is a natural choice, while for other markets sequential search
is more appropriate.
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7.3 Directions for further research
This thesis showed how to estimate search cost distributions within several theoretical frame-
works. The focus was mostly on search frictions, even though price dispersion might also
be related to capacity constraints, uncertainty in demand, quality differences between firms,
marginal cost differences between firms, or differences in tastes among consumers. Chapter 6
is an attempt to combine search frictions as a source of price dispersion with product differen-
tiation. Consumers are assumed to rank firms in terms of quality and all consumers agree in
this ranking. A first direction for future research would be to introduce some heterogeneity in
how consumers value quality, since it is likely that different groups of consumers have different
tastes for quality. Also, an interesting extension would be to model horizontal product differ-
entiation. In both cases, it is very likely that in addition to price data, sales data are needed to
be able to identify the models. A useful starting point for a horizontal product differentiation
model with consumer search would be a model along the lines of Sovinsky Goeree (2005), a
paper that presents a discrete choice model of product differentiation that allows for heterogene-
ity in the information different consumers have due to their relative exposure to advertising. A
nontrivial difference would be that in a consumer search setting the choice of information set is
determined by the consumer, while in an advertising setting the firms decide how much infor-
mation the consumer will get. Another way to capture firm heterogeneities would be to allow
for unequal sampling probabilities. As a result of for example advertising, some firms have
more visibility than others, so that they are more likely to be visited by consumers. Hortac¸su
and Syverson (2004) allow for unequal sampling probabilities in their model, and show how
to estimate these probabilities. However, to be able to identify sampling probabilities, quantity
data is needed as well.
Another avenue for future research could evolve around the optimality of the different search
protocols. As shown in Chapter 5 estimated search costs according to the sequential search
model are in general higher than those according to the nonsequential search model. Without
a priori knowledge of the way consumers search it is impossible to distinguish empirically
between the two frameworks within the current set of models. To deal with this issue one
could think of a model that makes the choice between sequential and nonsequential search
endogenous. Another possibility would be a model that combines the two protocols. As shown
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by Morgan and Manning (1985) the optimal search strategy is a combination of sequential and
nonsequential search. It would be interesting to see the extent to which such a hybrid model
outperforms the sequential and nonsequential search models.
A third direction for further research would be to abandon the static framework and focus
on the dynamics of the search process. As shown by Fershtman and Fishman (1992), a dynamic
environment might lead to results very different than those from the static environment. Also,
when consumers face switching costs in addition to search costs, because of for example loyalty
cards, advertisement, etc., dynamic effects should be taken into account. Combining switching
costs and search costs in a model is nontrivial. Although it is often assumed that switching costs
are similar to search costs, Wilson (2006) shows that the anticompetitive effects of search costs
are larger than those stemming from switching costs.
Finally, an interesting extension would be to investigate the estimation of a model that allows
for marginal cost heterogeneity. Emre, Hortac¸su, and Syverson (2005) show that a model with
marginal cost heterogeneity results in firms playing pure strategies in prices. As argued in this
thesis, in general models with pure strategy equilibria put less structure on the data than models
with mixed strategy equilibria, so to estimate such a model quantity data is needed as well.

Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Volgens het beroemde artikel van Bertrand (1883) zal zelfs wanneer we te maken hebben met
een beperkt aantal bedrijven, de prijs van een homogeen product naar deWalrasiaanse prijs con-
vergeren, mits we in een wereld leven waarin informatie volledig is, waarin bedrijven dezelfde
kostenstructuur hebben en waarin transactiekosten geen rol spelen. Zoals wordt uitgelegd in
Bertrand (1883), wanneer bedrijven hun prijs bepalen kan ieder bedrijf de hele markt verove-
ren door simpelweg het product voor een iets lagere prijs te verkopen dan de concurrent. Een
uitvloeisel van dit mechanisme is dat alle bedrijven door middel van prijsverlagingen de laag-
ste prijs proberen te krijgen. Dit proces gaat net zolang door totdat de prijs gelijk is aan de
marginale kosten.
Het gemak waarmee we twee winkels kunnen vinden die verschillende prijzen voor verge-
lijkbare producten vragen, laat zien dat de “wet van e´e´n prijs” niet altijd opgaat. In plaats daar-
van lijkt het alsof prijsspreiding de regel is. Economen zijn door de jaren heen met verschillende
verklaringen gekomen voor dit fenomeen. Een eerste verklaring is dat in tegenstelling tot wat
wordt verondersteld door Bertrand (1883), in werkelijkheid het vaak het geval is dat producten
verschillen in hun kenmerken. Wanneer consumenten een verschillende smaak hebben voor
deze kenmerken zijn producten niet langer substituten, wat leidt tot marktmacht aan de kant
van de bedrijven. Hierdoor zullen er minder prikkels zijn voor bedrijven om net onder de prijs
van de anderen te gaan zitten, waardoor de producten voor verschillende prijzen aangeboden
kunnen worden.
Het intrigerende is dat prijsspreiding ook wordt geobserveerd in markten waarin de goe-
deren en de bedrijven vrijwel identiek zijn. Wanneer we ons puur op de kant van de bedrij-
ven richten zijn er in zo’n situatie duidelijk prikkels voor bedrijven om net onder de prijs van
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de concurrenten te gaan zitten. Echter, wanneer in tegenstelling tot Bertrand (1883) wordt
verondersteld dat consumenten geen volledige informatie hebben over bijvoorbeeld de prijs van
het goed bij de verschillende winkels, zal de prikkel om net een lagere prijs te vragen dan
de concurrent minder worden. In recent empirisch werk wordt deze gedachte uitgewerkt om
te verklaren waarom op het oog identieke goederen verschillende prijzen hebben. Het idee is
dat vanwege zoekfricties sommige consumenten geen prijzen vergelijken, waardoor bedrijven
een hogere prijs kunnen vragen voor hun product. Immers, deze consumenten zullen iedere
prijs accepteren, mits lager dan hun waardering voor het goed. Aan de andere kant zijn er
consumenten die wel prijzen vergelijken, wat weer een drukkend effect heeft op de ideale prijs.
Om de juiste balans te vinden tussen deze twee prikkels, kan het zo zijn dat bedrijven prijzen
aselect bepalen en veranderen. Dit om aan de ene kant de winst te maximaliseren behaald op
consumenten die geen prijzen vergelijken, door een hoge prijs te vragen. En aan de andere kant
om de winst te maximaliseren behaald op consumenten die wel degelijk prijzen vergelijken,
door een lage prijs te vragen. Dit proces leidt tot prijsspreiding.
Ook als de producten identiek zijn, maar bedrijven een verschillende kostenstructuur hebben,
kan er prijsspreiding ontstaan. Echter, dit kan alleen in combinatie met zoekfricties. Het idee
hierachter is dat in het geval van volledige informatie, bedrijven met hogere marginale kosten
dan hun concurrenten niet kunnen overleven om de reden dat deze bedrijven niet mee kunnen
gaan met de lage prijzen van bedrijven met lage marginale kosten zonder verlies te maken.
Consumenten kopen immers bij het bedrijf of de winkel met de laagste prijzen. Wanneer
deze verschillen in marginale kosten evenwel samengaan met zoekfricties, kunnen de bedrij-
ven met hoge marginale kosten overleven door vooral te verkopen aan consumenten met hoge
zoekkosten.
Alhoewel productdifferentiatie, onzekerheid wat betreft de vraag en capaciteitsrestricties
eveneens een bron van prijsspreiding kunnen zijn, zal dit proefschrift zich vooral richten op
zoekfricties als verklaring voor prijsspreiding. Desondanks zal het raamwerk ook uitgebreid
worden naar verticale productdifferentiatie. Dit wil niet zeggen dat onzekerheid wat betreft de
vraag en capaciteitsbeperkingen niet belangrijk zijn als veroorzaker van prijsspreiding. In som-
mige markten zullen capaciteitsrestricties een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan het ontstaan van
prijsspreiding of misschien zelfs de belangrijkste bijdrager zijn. Dit betekent dat de modellen
ontwikkeld in dit proefschrift minder van toepassing zijn op die markten.
SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 163
Bestaande zoekmodellen hebben laten zien dat de manier waarop zoekfricties markten be-
ı¨nvloeden afhangt van hoe zoekkosten verdeeld zijn over consumenten. Zo kunnen in het se-
quentie¨le zoekmodel van Stahl (1989) bij hoge zoekkosten gemiddelde prijzen constant blijven
na een fusie, terwijl bij lage zoekkosten het tegenovergestelde gebeurt. Iets soortgelijks zien we
gebeuren in het nonsequentie¨le zoekmodel van Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004): of een
fusie leidt tot een daling dan wel stijging van de gemiddelde prijs hangt af van de hoogte van de
zoekkosten. In meer algemene zin betekent dit dat voor een degelijke analyse van de prijs- en
welvaartseffecten van beleidsmaatregelen zoals het verhogen van de btw, het verminderen van
toegangsbarrie`res of het instellen van een maximum prijs, men kennis moet hebben van vraag-
en aanbodparameters, waaronder de zoekkostendistributie. Men kan simpelweg een bepaalde
distributie veronderstellen, maar gegeven het belang van de exacte vorm van de verdeling kan
dit tot de verkeerde conclusies leiden.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om met methodes te komen om zoekmodellen te schatten.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf essays en kan grofweg verdeeld worden in drie delen. In de
eerste twee essays leg ik uit hoe nonsequentie¨le zoekmodellen te modelleren, te identificeren
en te schatten. Het eerste essay beschrijft een methode om zoekkostendistributies te schatten.
Het startpunt is een oligopolistische versie van het nonsequentie¨le zoekmodel beschreven in
Hong and Shum (2006). De oligopolieveronderstelling is nuttig omdat het de onderzoeker helpt
een onderscheid te maken tussen prijsvariatie veroorzaakt door variatie in het aantal bedrijven
en variatie in zoekkosten. Gebruikmakend van de evenwichtscondities afgeleid van het model
wordt getoond hoe het model met behulp van maximum likelihood geschat kan worden. De
schattingsmethode wordt toegepast op een dataset bestaande uit prijzen van geheugenchips die
online verkocht worden. De schattingsresultaten suggereren dat consumenten of vrij hoge of
juist vrij lage zoekkosten hebben, wat betekent dat consumenten of vrij uitgebreid zoeken of
maximaal drie keer. Zoekfricties geven bedrijven een significante hoeveelheid marktmacht:
ondanks dat er 20 bedrijven actief zijn in de onderzochte markten vinden we prijs-kostenmarges
van ongeveer 25%. Kolmogorov-Smirnov testresultaten suggereren dat de nulhypothese dat de
geobserveerde prijzen door het model gegenereerd worden niet verworpen kan worden. In het
eerste essay wordt ook geı¨llusteerd hoe de structurele methodologie gebruikt kan worden om
de effecten van beleidsinterventies te simuleren.
Het tweede essay gaat dieper in op hoe de identificatie van zoekkosten precies werkt in
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nonsequentie¨le zoekmodellen. Het model beschreven in het eerste essay wordt uitgebreid naar
een meer algemener raamwerk waarin consumenten niet alleen verschillen in zoekkosten, maar
ook in waarderingen voor het goed. In het essay laten we zien dat de zoekkostendistributie
niet volledig nonparametrisch geı¨dentificeerd kan worden indien slechts e´e´n markt in isolatie
wordt bestudeerd. Dit nonidentificatieprobleem kan opgelost worden door een vollediger raam-
werk te nemen waarin de econometrist observaties heeft van meerdere markten met dezelfde
achterliggende zoekkostendistributie. Om de relatie tussen de verschillende markten optimaal
te kunnen gebruiken stellen we in het essay voor om de zoekkostenkansdichtheidsfunctie te
schatten met behulp van een semi-nonparametrische (SNP) kansdichtheidsschatter. De parame-
ters van deze kansdichtheidsschatter maximaliseren de gezamenlijke aannemelijkheid van alle
markten tezamen. Deze in essentie nonparametrische benadering kan gebruikt worden wanneer
alle consumenten een identieke waardering hebben voor het goed of wanneer waarderingen
verschillen maar niet gecorreleerd zijn met zoekkosten. Indien er wel correlatie is tussen waar-
deringen en zoekkosten is het alleen mogelijk om het model parametrisch te identificeren.
In de twee daarop volgende essays richt ik mij op het schatten van sequentie¨le zoekmodel-
len. In het derde essay veranderen we het artikel van Stahl (1989) over oligopolistische prijs-
vorming en sequentieel consumenten zoekgedrag door de veronderstelling dat consumenten de
eerste prijsobservatie voor niks ontvangen te veranderen. In het theoretische gedeelte van dit
hoofdstuk laten we zien dat wanneer alle prijsobservaties kostbaar zijn het zo kan zijn dat niet
alle consumenten deelnemen. De verzameling parameters waarvoor non-shoppers niet volledig
meedoen wordt groter naarmate het aantal shoppers afneemt en/of het aantal bedrijven toe-
neemt. Welvaart neemt af naarmate meer bedrijven de markt betreden. In het essay laten
we zien dat de prijs nooit gelijk zal zijn aan de monopolieprijs wanneer zoeken daadwerke-
lijk kostbaar is. Gebruikmakend van de evenwichtscondities afgeleid uit het model, laten we
in het empirische gedeelte van dit hoofdstuk zien hoe het model geschat kan worden. Met
behulp van dezelfde dataset als in voorgaande hoofdstukken, schatten we het model. De schat-
tingsresultaten laten zien dat het model niet goed de geobserveerde prijspatronen kan verklaren.
Waarschijnlijk is dit gerelateerd aan het feit dat in het beschreven model consumenten of alle
prijzen waarnemen of helemaal niet zoeken, wat van grote invloed is op de flexibiliteit van het
model.
In het vierde essay wordt een algemener sequentieel zoekmodel bestudeerd. Om het raam-
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werk empirisch relevanter te maken, wordt in dit essay verondersteld dat consumenten hun
zoekkosten uit een distributiefunctie trekken. In dit hoofdstuk laat ik zien dat zoekkosten met
gebruik van alleen prijsdata nonparametrisch geı¨dentificeerd kunnen worden, zelfs wanneer er
data van slechts e´e´n markt beschikbaar is. Een vergelijking met het nonsequentie¨le model laat
zien dat om dezelfde prijsdistributie te verklaren hogere zoekkosten nodig zijn in het sequentie¨le
zoekmodel dan in het nonsequentie¨le zoekmodel. Daarnaast zijn de zoekkosten geschat volgens
de methode beschreven in dit essay hoger dan zoekkosten geschat volgens de nonparametrische
methode van Hong and Shum (2006).
In het laatste essay van het proefschrift breid ik het raamwerk uit zodat verticale product-
differentiatie ook als een bron van prijsspreiding kan dienen. In het unieke symmetrische even-
wicht trekken bedrijven met verschillende kenmerken nutseenheden uit een gemeenschappe-
lijke nutsdistributie. Omdat de bedrijven verschillen in hun kenmerken leidt dit tot verschil-
lende prijsverdelingen. Het model levert daarom een theoretische verklaring voor het verklaren
van prijsspreiding als een gevolg van zowel kwaliteitsverschillen als zoekfricties. Gebruikma-
kend van de evenwichtsrestricties afgeleid uit het model, wordt er in het essay uitgelegd hoe
de twee van elkaar te scheiden en hoe het model te schatten. Het model wordt toegepast op
prijzen van Nederlandse supermarktproducten. Schattingen van de zoekkosten laten zien dat
consumenten in de onderzoeksperiode minder zijn gaan zoeken. Daarnaast leidt het negeren
van kwaliteitsverschillen tussen aanbieders tot een te hoge schatting van de zoekkosten van
consumenten. Hoewel de ideee¨n toegepast worden op een non-sequentieel zoekmodel, kan een
sequentieel zoekmodel op dezelfde manier uitgebreid worden.
De vijf essays geven een verscheidenheid aan zoekmodellen. Welk model het meest geschikt
is om te gebruiken in de praktijk hangt af van de kenmerken van de markt die bestudeerd wordt.
Het nonsequentie¨le zoekmodel is meer geschikt voor markten waarin de uitkomsten van het
zoekproces met enige vertraging worden waargenomen, zoals bijvoorbeeld bij het zoeken naar
een baan, hypotheek of verhuisbedrijf. Daarnaast hangt de keuze van het model af van de
beschikbaarheid van data. Zo is voor het schatten van het model beschreven in het vijfde essay
van dit proefschrift alleen prijsdata nodig, terwijl voor een vergelijkbaar model als Hortac¸su
and Syverson (2004) daarnaast ook marktaandelen nodig zijn. Echter, het gebruik van alleen
prijsdata gaat ten koste van de nauwkeurigheid van het model, omdat het model beschreven in
dit proefschrift minder algemeen is dan het model van Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004). In een
166 SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
situatie waarin de econometrist zowel marktaandelen als prijzen tot zijn beschikking heeft, is
het model beschreven in Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) daarom de beste keus.
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